Iselin v. CW Hunter Co.

• Decision Date: 20 April 1949
• Docket Number: No. 12400.,12400.
• Parties: ISELIN et al. v. C. W. HUNTER CO.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

173 F.2d 388 (1949)

ISELIN et al. v. C. W. HUNTER CO.

No. 12400.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

March 19, 1949.

Rehearing Denied April 20, 1949.

Wils Davis and L. E. Gwinn, both of Memphis, Tenn., and M. C. Redmond, of Monroe, La., for appellants.

Armistead F. Clay and Clarence Clifton, both of Memphis, Tenn., and Thompson, Thompson & Sparks, of Monroe, La., for appellee.

Before HUTCHESON, HOLMES and LEE, Circuit Judges.

HOLMES, Circuit Judge.

This action was brought by the appellants in a state court of Louisiana, and was removed to the federal court by the appellee, a nonresident corporation, on the ground of diversity of citizenship. The appellants are seeking to establish their title to a tract of land, which they allege is in their possession and claimed by the appellee. All parties claim under a common source of title; in fact, the appellee claims under a deed to it by appellants; and the ultimate issue in the case depends upon the construction of that deed in the light of the relevant facts.

On November 30, 1942, by said deed, appellants conveyed to appellee all of fractional sections 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, and 23, Township 14 North, Range 14 East, together with all accretions thereto, situated in Madison Parish, Louisiana. Then followed by metes and bounds a more particular description, which appellants claim referred to a map that is restrictive of all preceding descriptions. The reference to said map is as follows: "* * * said property being identified herewith by a United States Government Contour Map, on which has been marked by red crayon lines the boundaries of the property intended to be conveyed hereby, which said map has been signed by all the parties hereto and has been paraphed by me; Notary, `Ne Varietur' for identification herewith."

The appellants claim that the land identified by the map was smaller in area than that indicated by the preceding descriptions, and that thereby, under local law, the property actually conveyed was restricted to the area within the boundaries shown by the red lines on the map. Thus, as stated in the brief of appellee, with which statement we agree, there was presented for the trial court's determination the issue as to whether the deed to appellee divested the appellants of all their interest in the land described in the complaint or of only the restricted area indicated by the map: but we are unable to agree with the further statement in the appellee's brief that, in sustaining the motion for summary judgment, the trial court was of opinion that said deed had the effect of divesting the appellants of their title to the full acreage embraced in all three descriptions. We say this because the court below, being of the opinion that the case turned upon the plea of res judicata, excluded all evidence relevant to every other issue.

We think the court below erred in upholding the plea of res judicata, and granting summary judgment on that ground; the parties are different in this case; the appellee was neither a party nor in privity with a party to the two prior suits. The application of the doctrine of res judicata is controlled by statute in Louisiana, which provides that the authority of the thing adjudged takes place only with respect to what was the object of the judgment; that the thing demanded must be the same; the demand must be founded on the same cause of action; the demand must be between the same parties, and formed by them against each other in the same quality. Revised Civil Code of Louisiana, Article 2286. This rule is stricti juris, and any doubt as to the identity of the two claims must be resolved in favor of the plaintiffs. State v. American Sugar Refining Co., 108 La. 603, 32 So. 965; Harnischfeger Sales Corp. v. Sternberg Co., Inc., 180 La. 1059, 158 So. 556; Adkins v. Cason, La.App., 170 So. 366; Hope v. Madison, 194 La. 337, 193 So. 666, 668; Lloveras v. Reichert, 197 La. 49, 200 So. 817; Bullis v. Town of Jackson, 14 So. (2) 1, 203 La. 289.

The appellee was not a party to the Mississippi case of Iselin v. La Coste, affirmed by this court in 139 F.2d 887, nor was it a party to the later suit from Louisiana, affirmed by this court in 147 F.2d 791. Those decisions are not res judicata of the present suit; nor is the judgment of the United States District Court for the Western Division of the Southern District of Mississippi, rendered in that certain cause styled "The United States of America, Petitioner, vs. A Tract of Land Containing 2000 acres More or Less, in Warren County, State of Mississippi, and C. W. Hunter Company and divers other persons, Respondents," res judicata of any issue involved in this case, because the parties are different and the issues are not identical. The latter was a condemnation proceeding brought by the United States, and all persons having or claiming an interest in the land sought to be condemned were made parties thereto by publication; but the Government took only an easement in the land, and the judgment did not otherwise affect the fee-simple title of the true owners. Condemnation affects rights of parties, having interests in respect to land taken, only so far as necessary to assure the sovereign's title. U.S. v. Certain Lands, 2 Cir., 129 F.2d 918, 919; 50 C.J.S., Judgments, §§ 719, 762, 763, 764, and 765. Neither are appellants estopped from maintaining this suit by any allegation in their petition for relief filed in the Mississippi case.

It is argued that a judgment should not be reversed merely because the court gave a wrong reason for its decision. This is true if there are other grounds to support the judgment, but here the trial court not only made no other findings of fact, but sustained appellee's objection to all the evidence on behalf of appellants not relevant to the issue of res judicata, and for that reason excluded all evidence relevant to every other issue. The appellants are not estopped in this case by their prior litigation with La Coste in the federal courts of this Circuit, or by the condemnation case, because, among other reasons, the appellee has not been prejudiced by those decisions or misled by anything said or done by appellants in those cases. So far as appears, the appellants were the only parties that lost anything by those proceedings. They lost the land that they were claiming against La Coste, and they received no money out of the Government's condemnation suits. La Coste and appellee were the respective beneficiaries therein, and nothing that was done as a result of those decisions is sought to be upset here. Neither La Coste nor the United States is interested in the present suit, and the appellee does not claim through either of said successful litigants. 50 C.J.S., Judgments, § 763.

Neither the doctrine of res judicata, estoppel, nor stare decisis, precludes a fair hearing upon the merits of the issues presented by the amended complaint as to the scope and effect of the Mengel deed. The appellants are now here with a new issue and a new adversary, and are entitled to their day in court. Not having been a party to the Iselins' prior actions in the federal court against La Coste, the appellee is not bound by what was adjudicated in those two cases, because identity of parties, of subject matter, and of issues, are essential elements of the doctrine of res judicata, the absence of any one of which is fatal to a plea under it. Since the appellee is not concluded by the former judgments, the Iselins are not, because the rule is that estoppels must be mutual and that a party will not be concluded, against his contention, by a former judgment unless he could have used it as a protection if the judgment had been in his favor. It is not only necessary that...