Iseminger v. Criswell

• Decision Date: 20 May 1896
• Citation: 67 N.W. 289,98 Iowa 382
• Parties: ISEMINGER v. CRISWELL ET AL. FIRST NAT. BANK OF CHARTER OAK v. CRISWELL ET AL. ROMANS ET AL. v. CRISWELL ET AL.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

98 Iowa 382

67 N.W. 289

ISEMINGER

v.CRISWELL ET AL.

FIRST NAT. BANK OF CHARTER OAK

v.CRISWELL ET AL.

ROMANS ET AL.

v.CRISWELL ET AL.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

May 20, 1896.

Appeal from district court, Crawford county; C. D. Goldsmith, Judge.

Creditors' bill to subject certain real estate, the legal title to which is in Eldora T. Criswell, to the payment of a judgment held by plaintiff against A. S. Criswell. Trial to the court. Decree for defendants, and plaintiff appeals. Reversed.Harding & Harding, J. P. Connor, and Shaw & Kuehnle, for appellant.

P. E. C. Lally, for appellee Eldora T. Criswell.

DEEMER, J.

The land which is the subject of this suit consists of 120 acres, lying in Crawford county. It was purchased of one Montague by the defendant A. S. Criswell, March 17, 1887. A. S. Criswell, at the time he purchased the land, was a farmer, but he shortly afterwards concluded to embark in the mercantile business. At this he was a failure, and, becoming heavily involved, he transferred his stock of goods to a clerk who had been in his employ, assigned his books of account and other choses in action, and on the 9th day of October, 1893, conveyed the Montague land to his wife, his co-defendant in this case. At the time he made the conveyance, he was indebted to the plaintiff and various other parties in considerable sums. The expressed consideration for the deed was $4,000; but, as a matter of fact, there was no present consideration therefor. It is claimed by the plaintiff that the deed was wholly voluntary, and that it was made with intent to hinder, delay, and defraud the creditors of the husband, and particularly this plaintiff, and that it was and is void. The appellee Eldora T. Criswell denied that the deed was without consideration, and denied the alleged fraud. She further pleaded that the conveyance to her was in execution of a trust growing out of certain transactions between herself and husband during the early years of their married life. She alleged that she furnished her husband the money with which the land was purchased, intending that the title should be taken in her name, but that her husband, unmindful of his agreement, took the title in his own name; that as soon as she discovered the land was not in her name, which was some time after the deed was taken, “she persistently and incessantly demanded of her husband that he convey the real estate to her, and has at all times claimed it as to her own”; that the deed was finally made in accordance with her demands, and to place the legal title where it in fact belonged. To these claims of the defendant Eldora Criswell, the plaintiff pleaded an estoppel, growing out of the fact that she permitted the title to remain in her husband, and allowed him to gain and obtain credit on the strength of his apparent ownership of the land. The district court found that the conveyance was in good faith, for a valid consideration, and without fraud or fraudulent intent, and was either in payment or satisfaction of a valid obligation owing to her by her husband, or a mere formal conveyance to her of a title which, in equity and good conscience, she absolutely owned. The appeal is from this decree.

It becomes necessary to determine, first, whether the conveyance was made in consideration of a valid obligation on the part of the husband to the appellee. It appears from the evidence that, when appellee was married, she had $1,400, which she received from her father's estate. Of this amount, $1,000 was invested in a farm in Scott county, and the remainder was used for the support of the family, and in the purchase of farm implements. Afterwards the land in Scott county was sold, and the Montague land, in Crawford county, was purchased. It is claimed by appellee that the money paid for the Crawford county land came from the sale of Scott county land; while appellant contends that the money which paid for the land in dispute came from lands in Scott county owned by the husband. We pass this dispute now to consider the question whether the relation of debtor and creditor existed between the appellee and her husband. We have read and re-read the record, to discover any promise on the part of A. S. Criswell to repay the money, and find that there is no evidence of any such agreement. No notes were at any time given, and the claim of appellee rests solely upon the proposition that she furnished the money with which the land was purchased. The appellee said when on the witness stand: “I wanted the place. I never asked him for a note representing the amount that he owed me. He never said anything about paying me any money on account of it.” She further said: “I thought I ought to have the title to the land because I had the money, and my money bought it.” “I wanted it because I paid for it, and I thought I ought to have it that way, and I told my husband I wanted it in my name.” “I always wanted that land, and always claimed it. It was not in my name, but I always wanted it, and always claimed it.” “It was my money bought it, and I always wanted it, and thought I ought to have it by rights as mine. When we were married, we did not have anything, only what was mine, and, of course, I thought whatever we got ought to be mine.” “I wanted this land when we first came to this county, and wanted him to give me a deed to it, and I could not make him do it.” “I received this deed on the evening of October 9th, from my husband. He made the deed for the reason I always wanted him to make a deed to it, and spoke about it different times; and this time he and his brother got into trouble, and he was security for his brother, and I thought it was time we had to pay somebody else's debts why I wanted it for mine.” “I insisted upon the land being deeded to me because it by rights belonged to me.” This is all the evidence showing or tending to show the relation of debtor and creditor between the appellee and her husband, and it is manifest that it is not sufficient to sustain the conveyance of the land. We have frequently held that while a husband may discharge a bona fide indebtedness to his wife, by a conveyance of property to her, still such transactions cannot be sustained as against creditors of the husband without...