Isler v. N.M. Activities Ass'n
| Decision Date | 20 September 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 10-CV-009 MV/WPL,10-CV-009 MV/WPL |
| Parties | JERRY D. ISLER, Plaintiff, v. THE NEW MEXICO ACTIVITIES ASSOCIATION, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico |
JERRY D. ISLER, Plaintiff,
v.
THE NEW MEXICO ACTIVITIES ASSOCIATION, Defendant.
No. 10-CV-009 MV/WPL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
Dated: September 20, 2012
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 144] and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support Thereof [Doc. 145]. The Court, having considered the motions, briefs, relevant law and being otherwise fully informed, finds that Defendant's Motion is well-taken in part and will be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, and that Plaintiff's Motion is well-taken in part and will be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
Plaintiff was the Head Coach of the Boys' Basketball Program and a science teacher at Clovis High School ("CHS"). In mid-July 2009, Plaintiff received a call from Todd Lieb, the father of Lathan Lieb, a student at Dora High School who played for the Dora High School basketball team. Mr. Lieb informed Plaintiff that he and his son were considering moving from Portales, New Mexico, to Clovis, New Mexico, which would mean that Lathan would enroll at CHS. Mr. Lieb asked to speak with Plaintiff to learn more about the CHS basketball program,
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and the eligibility rules of the New Mexico Activities Association ("NMAA"), the organization charged with regulation of interscholastic sports in New Mexico schools. Plaintiff contacted his supervisor, Brian Stacy, the Athletic Director of CHS, and a meeting was arranged. Plaintiff, along with his assistant coach and Mr. Stacy, met with Mr. Lieb and his son Lathan.
After the meeting, Mr. Lieb and Lathan decided to move to Clovis. They changed their mind, however, and Mr. Lieb called Plaintiff to inform him that Lathan would not be transferring to CHS. Lathan then enrolled in Dora High School for the 2009-2010 academic year. In late August 2009, however, just after the school year began, Lathan again changed his mind, and decided that he would, in fact, transfer to CHS. Mr. Lieb contacted Plaintiff by telephone, and requested that Plaintiff meet with them to discuss the transfer. Plaintiff contacted Mr. Stacy to see if he would participate in a meeting with the Liebs. Mr. Stacy was unavailable. Plaintiff invited Mr. Lieb and Lathan to meet with him at his house. A day or two later, Lathan withdrew from Dora High School and enrolled at CHS.
The NMAA received a complaint regarding Lathan Lieb's transfer, and commenced an investigation of the CHS basketball program. Based on the investigation, the NMAA determined that Plaintiff had violated NMAA Bylaw 6.1.3(K) (Undue Influence), which prohibits "communication with student/parents by school personnel that might be construed as inducement for them to attend a particular school." As a result of this determination, on December 16, 2009, the NMAA suspended Plaintiff from all coaching duties at CHS for the remainder of the 2009-2010 school year. That same day, the Superintendent of the Clovis Municipal Schools, Dr. Rhonda Seidenwurm, advised Plaintiff by letter that the Clovis School District was terminating his coaching duties as of January 13, 2010, and that, in the interim, he was suspended from all coaching duties.
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On December 18, 2009, Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit in the Ninth Judicial District Court of the State of New Mexico against the NMAA, the Board of Education of the Clovis Municipal Schools (the "Board of Education"), and Dr. Seidenwurm. On January 5, 2010, the NMAA removed the case to federal court. See Doc. 1. On January 26, 2010, Plaintiff filed a Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. See Doc. 17. Following two evidentiary hearings, on February 9, 2010, the Court granted Plaintiff's motion, ordering the NMAA to allow Plaintiff to coach for the remainder of the 2009-2010 season, including any post-season tournament games, and ordering the Board of Education and Dr. Seidenwurm to reinstate Plaintiff as Head Coach of the CHS Boys' Basketball Program for the remainder of the 2009-2010 basketball season, including any post-season tournament games. See Doc. 44.
Thereafter, Plaintiff reached a settlement with the Board of Education and Dr. Seidenwurm, and the Court dismissed those Defendants from the case on March 17, 2010. Doc. 49. On April 13, 2011, Plaintiff filed a Third Amended Complaint against the NMAA for Violation of Civil Rights, seeking: a declaratory judgment and damages, including punitive damages, based on his allegations that NMAA Bylaw 6.1.3(K) is unconstitutionally vague and his allegations that the NMAA's conduct in suspending him violates his right to freedom of association (Count I); an injunction enjoining the NMAA from suspending him as the CHS basketball coach (Count II); damages for the state law torts of defamation and tortious interference with contract (Counts III and IV); and damages for depriving him of his liberty interest in his good name and reputation without due process of law (Count V). See Doc. 115.
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Plaintiff's teaching and coaching contracts with CHS were renewed for the 2010-2011 school year. At the end of the 2010-2011 school year, Plaintiff signed a Letter of Intent to continue teaching and coaching for the 2011-2012 school year. In June of 2011, however, Plaintiff applied for and was offered a job as Head Men's Basketball Coach at McMurry University, where his son is a member of the team. He accepted the job, and indicated that he did so because it was the job he preferred. Plaintiff's salary and benefits at McMurry University are more lucrative than what he was receiving at CHS. The job at McMurry University was the only job for which Plaintiff applied after his suspension by the NMAA.
Effective July 1, 2011, NMAA Bylaw 6.1.3(K) was revised, and Plaintiff agrees that the revised provision is not unconstitutionally vague.
On October 17, 2011, each party filed a motion for summary judgment in its favor. Defendant's motion seeks dismissal of all five counts in the Third Amended Complaint. In response to Defendant's motion, Plaintiff concedes that, because he is no longer employed by CHS and because the NMAA rule at issue has been revised, his claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are moot. Further, Plaintiff concedes that his freedom of association claim is unsupported. Accordingly, Plaintiff agrees to dismissal of Count II (request for injunctive relief), that portion of Count I that requests a declaratory judgment, and that portion of Count I that seeks damages as a result of the NMAA's alleged violation of his right to freedom of association. In his own motion, Plaintiff seeks judgment in his favor on the remaining portion of Count I (seeking damages based on the unconstitutional vagueness of NMAA Bylaw 6.1.3(K)), Count III (seeking damages based on defamation), and Count V (seeking damages for the violation of his due process rights).
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
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interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Jones v. Kodak Medical Assistance Plan, 169 F.3d 1287, 1290 (10th Cir. 1999). Under Rule 56(c), "the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). Rather, "[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
Initially, the moving party bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Shapolia v. Los Alamos Nat'l Lab., 992 F.2d 1033, 1036 (10th Cir. 1993). There is no requirement that the moving party negate the nonmovant's claim. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). Once the moving party meets its burden, the nonmoving party must show that genuine issues remain for trial "as to those dispositive matters for which it carries the burden of proof." Applied Genetics Int'l Inc. v. First Affiliated Secs., Inc., 912 F.2d 1238, 1241 (10th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted). Rather than "merely show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts," the nonmoving party is required to "go beyond the pleadings and, by affidavits or depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial." Kaus v. Standard Ins. Co., 985 F. Supp. 1277, 1281 (D. Kan. 1997), aff'd, 162 F.3d 1173 (10th Cir. 1998). There is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Upon a motion for summary judgment, the Court "must view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and allow the nonmovant the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence." Kaus, 985 F. Supp. at 1281.
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I. The NMAA's Liability Under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 for...
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