Isley v. State
| Decision Date | 30 January 2023 |
| Docket Number | 21A-CR-2837 |
| Parties | Tina M. Isley, Appellant-Defendant, v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Indiana |
Appeal from the Johnson Circuit Court The Honorable Andrew S Roesener, Judge, Trial Court Cause No. 41C01-2002-F4-4
Attorney for Appellant James H. Voyles, Jr. Jennifer M Lukemeyer Tyler D. Helmond Voyles Vaiana Lukemeyer Baldwin & Webb Indianapolis, Indiana
Attorneys for Appellee Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Megan M. Smith Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
WEISSMANN JUDGE.
[¶1] In this interlocutory appeal, Tina Isley challenges the admissibility of her blood draw results and medical records as evidence of her intoxication during a fatal car crash. Isley argues that this evidence was obtained in violation of her rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution, and Indiana's implied consent laws. Finding no such violations, we affirm.
Facts[1]
[¶2] After an evening spent drinking with friends, Isley was involved in a two-car, head-on collision that killed the other driver. Police questioned Isley at the scene, and Isley admitted to drinking alcohol that night before she was transported to the hospital. Johnson County Sheriff's Deputy Shawn Hodson followed the ambulance to gather more evidence of Isley's impairment. While en route, Deputy Hodson learned that an open container of alcohol was found in Isley's vehicle. The medics transporting Isley smelled alcohol emanating from Isley and she confessed to them that she had been drinking.
[¶3] At the hospital, Isley was lucid and able to provide her address and basic details of the crash to Deputy Hodson. During this conversation, taking place in a hospital hallway, Isley was strapped to a gurney in a neck brace. While talking with Isley, Deputy Hodson noticed she smelled of alcohol and was slurring her speech. Isley guessed that she had around five beers that night and drank the last one around 30 minutes before the crash. Eventually, hospital staff took Isley into an examination room to assess her injuries, which ended up just being a broken ankle. After this initial examination, hospital staff gave Deputy Hodson permission to speak with Isley again.
[¶4] During their second conversation, Deputy Hodson asked Isley to sign a consent form to release her medical records to the State. He stated: "We need your consent to get medical records . . . your medical records for these guys." App. Vol. II, p. 101. Deputy Hodson did not elaborate that "these guys" referred to the local prosecutor's office.
[¶5] Right after Deputy Hodson spoke and before Isley signed the form, the nurse assigned to perform the blood draw incorrectly explained that the consent form granted permission "to draw [Isley's] blood." Id. Isley signed the form, after which the nurse asked for Isley's permission to perform the blood draw. Isley orally consented. Then, despite the consent form already being signed, Deputy Hodson read Isley the form and asked for her oral agreement. Isley provided her verbal consent. The blood draw showed Isley had a blood alcohol content of .144%.
The State charged Isley with causing death when operating a vehicle with an Alcohol Concentration Equivalent (ACE) of .08 or more, a Level 4 felony, alongside four counts of operating a vehicle while intoxicated, as a Class A, a Class B, and two Class C misdemeanors. Before trial, Isley moved to suppress her blood draw results and medical records. The trial court denied the motion, after which Isely filed this interlocutory appeal.
Discussion and Decision
[¶6] Isley argues that her blood draw results and medical records were obtained in violation of her rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution, and Indiana's implied consent laws.
[¶7] As laid out by our Supreme Court, we review the denial of a motion to suppress "similar to other sufficiency matters." Taylor v. State, 689 N.E.2d 699, 702 (Ind. 1997). This means, "[t]he record must disclose substantial evidence of probative value that supports the trial court's decision." Id. The evidence is not reweighed on appeal and conflicting evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to upholding the trial court's ruling. Id. We review the constitutionality of a search and seizure de novo. Wilson v. State, 173 N.E.3d 1063, 1066 (Ind.Ct.App. 2021).
[¶8] The taking of a blood sample and a suspect's medical records is a search under [¶9] the Fourth Amendment. [2] Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S.Ct. 2160, 2173 (2016). The Fourth Amendment is satisfied when police obtain a warrant, but a warrant is not required when there is consent to search. Garcia-Torres v. State, 949 N.E.2d 1229, 1237 (Ind. 2011). Consent to a search is valid when given voluntarily and knowingly, which "is a question of fact determined from the totality of the circumstances." Id. (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1972)). Consent to search is not valid when it follows fraud, duress, fear, intimidation, or a submission to the supremacy of the law. Wahl v. State, 148 N.E.3d 1071, 1082 (Ind.Ct.App. 2020).
[¶10] Isley contends she did not validly consent for two reasons. First, her presence in the hospital, awaiting treatment for her injuries, rendered her too vulnerable to make rational decisions. Second, Deputy Hodson and the phlebotomist made unclear and conflicting statements confusing her on what she was consenting to. We disagree with Isley's characterization of the facts.
[¶11] Although Isley lay strapped to a hospital bed in a neck brace, she only suffered a broken ankle. Nothing in the record shows that this injury would have impacted her executive reasoning. Indeed, when prompted by Deputy Hodson, Isley immediately recited her address, provided personal details, and remembered the events of the crash. App. Vol. II, pp. 99-100. The Record demonstrates Isley possessed a lucidity that defies her argument that she was unable to validly consent.
[¶12] Isley also seizes upon the potential confusion created by Deputy Hodson and the nurse performing the blood draw. Deputy Hodson's initial statement was admittedly vague. He informed Isley only that "these guys" required her consent for the blood draw-without specifying that this referred to the local prosecutor's office. Id. at 101. And right after this statement, the nurse incorrectly told Isley that the consent form merely authorized the blood draw itself-rather than allowing the State access to the blood draw's results and her medical history. Isley contends this confusion prevented her from knowingly consenting.
[¶13] Evidence from the record undercuts Isley's argument. The record shows Isley consenting multiple times both in writing and orally. Id. at 101-02. First, Isley gave her consent by signing the consent form. And even assuming that there was ambiguity at this time over what Isley was consenting to, Deputy Hodson cured this by rereading the implied consent form and again asking Isley orally to consent to the blood draw-which she did. Id. at 102. At no point during Isley's conversations with Deputy Hodson did she show any sign of disagreement or unwillingness to provide her consent. Deputy Hodson used no threats, coercion, or overt pressure during any of their interactions. See, e.g., Wahl, 148 N.E.3d at 1082 (); Garcia-Torres, 949 N.E.2d at 1237 (same). Thus, the totality of the circumstances shows that Isley voluntarily provided her consent.
[¶14] To the extent Isley disputes the underlying facts, she asks us to reweigh the trial court's findings. We do not reweigh the evidence when reviewing a motion to suppress and consider conflicting evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling. Taylor v. State, 689 N.E.2d 699, 702 (Ind. 1997).
[¶15] Although Article 1, Section 11 shares the same language as the Fourth Amendment, Indiana courts have interpreted and applied it independently.[3] State v. Bulington, 802 N.E.2d 435, 438 (Ind. 2004). The main difference between the two constitutional inquiries is that the Fourth Amendment approach "focus[es] on the defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy" while the Article 1, Section 11 approach "employ[s] a totality-of-the-circumstances test to evaluate the reasonableness of the officer's actions." Duran v. State, 930 N.E.2d 10, 17 (Ind. 2010) (internal quotations omitted).
[¶16] Generally, a warrantless search violates the Indiana Constitution unless the search is reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. Courts consider three non-exhaustive factors when determining the reasonableness of the officer's actions under the Indiana Constitution: "1) the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred, 2) the degree of intrusion the method of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen's ordinary activities, and 3) the extent of law enforcement needs." Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 361 (Ind. 2005). The factors are intended to "provide guidance and structure our analysis of Article 1, Section 11 while staying true to considering the totality of the circumstances." Hardin v. State, 148 N.E.3d 932, 943 (Ind. 2020).
Degree of Police Concern, Suspicion, or Knowledge
[¶17] The degree of police concern, suspicion, or knowledge was high. "In evaluating the officers' degree of suspicion, we consider all "the information available to them at the time" of the search or seizure. Id.
[¶18] Deputy Hodson knew Isley had been drinking...
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