Isolantite, Inc. v. United Elec., Radio and Mach. Workers of Am., C. I. C.

• Decision Date: 03 December 1942
• Docket Number: No. 210.,210.
• Parties: ISOLANTITE, Inc. (CHEMICAL AND OIL WORKERS UNION NO. 22026, A. F. OF L, Intervener) v. UNITED ELECTRICAL, RADIO AND MACHINE WORKERS OF AMERICA, C. I. C., et al.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

29 A.2d 183

132 N.J.Eq. 613

ISOLANTITE, Inc. (CHEMICAL AND OIL WORKERS UNION NO. 22026, A. F. OF L, Intervener)

v. UNITED ELECTRICAL, RADIO AND MACHINE WORKERS OF AMERICA, C. I. C., et al.

No. 210.

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

Dec. 3, 1942.

[Copyrighted material omitted.]

Appeal from Court of Chancery.

Suit by Isolantite, Incorporated, against the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America, affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations, and others, for injunctive and other relief, wherein the Chemical and Oil Workers Union No. 22026, A. F. of L., intervened. From order entered, 130 N.J.Eq. 506, 22 A.2d 796, the defendants appeal.

Order modified.

Samuel L. Rothbard, of Newark, for appellants.

Pitney, Hardin & Ward, of Newark (Donald B. Kipp, of Newark, of counsel), for respondent.

Jacob Friedman, of Jersey City (Morris F. Pearlman, of Jersey City, of counsel), for intervening respondent.

PERSKIE, Justice.

This is a labor dispute. Anti Injunction Act, P.L. 1941, c. 15, p. 27; N.J.S.A. 2:29-77.1, et seq. We are called to pass upon the propriety of the restraints and provisions imposed, by the pendente lite order under review, upon the labor union and its named participants, all defendants-appellants.

As to the facts which are fully stated in the opinion, ubi supra, it is sufficient to observe that respondent, Isolantite, Inc. (hereafter referred to as the company), is a Delaware corporation which operates, as it has operated, for about twenty years last past, a plant at Belleville, N. J., where it manufactures "high frequency ceramic insulation for radio instrument and equipment", now an "absolutely essential" war product. For about a year prior to October 10, 1941, the date of the filing of the bill, over 80% of the company's products were purchased for the war needs of the United States government.

While the company was so operating, a jurisdictional dispute arose between two rival labor unions for the right to act as the exclusive bargaining agent for the company's employees. More specifically, appellant union (affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations, and hereafter referred to as C. I. O. union) set out to organize the company's employees to the end of supplanting the intervening respondent (affiliated with the American Federation of Labor, and hereafter referred to as the A. F. L. union) in its contractual status as the exclusive bargaining agent for the company's employees. The company employed 575 workers, approximately 80% of whom were females.

In pursuance of its planned action, the C.I.O. union apparently gained the support of one Melchionne, a member of the A.F.L. union and employed by the company. For his disloyalty, Melchionne was expelled from his union. Additionally, his union made demand upon the company that he be dismissed from his employment. The company pursuant to its contract with the A.F. L. union, "to employ or retain in its employ only members in good standing in the union", dismissed him.

The dismissal of Melchionne provided the incident which forthwith precipitated the planned strike and its concomitant activities, such as alleged mass picketing in front of the only entrance to the plant (so limited at the suggestion of a Federal agency to avoid sabotage), intimidating of employees who desired to continue in their employment, directing insulting, abusive and obscene epithets at the employees, committing acts of violence upon them, and threatening them with acts of violence and the like.

In this posture of affairs, the company filed a bill of complaint praying for an injunction against all picketing and for other relief. The company also sought to obtain a rule to show cause with ad interim restraint. On due notice and hearing the prayer against the picketing was denied but the following ad interim restraints were imposed upon the appellants:

"(a) From gathering, parading or patrolling, loitering or picketing about the premises of complainant, or the public street or sidewalks approaching thereto, or in the vicinity thereof, particularly on Cortland Street between Holmes and Joralemon Streets; provided, that not more than ten pickets may peaceably walk up and down the sidewalks or the street in front of complainant's plant upon condition that they maintain a space of at least ten feet between each such picket and that they or any of them do not obstruct the entrance to the plant or molest or interfere with the entry into or egress from said plant by any employees, servants or agents of complainant or any person having business with complainant;

"(b) From violence or threats of violence or intimation practiced upon any person now employed or hereafter to be employed by complainant, or who is willing to be employed by complainant;

"(c) From using obscene or insulting language;

"(d) From intercepting, molesting or following any person now employed or hereafter to be employed by complainant, or who is willing to be employed by complainant on his or her way to or from complainant's plant; or at any other place;"

Upon considering further proofs offered (in part by affidavits and in part by the examination and cross-examination of witnesses in open court) at the several hearings on the rule to show cause, the learned Vice Chancellor made the finding of facts (prescribed by N.J.S.A. 2:29-77.3 and 2:29-77.5) and, by order of December 16, 1941, continued the aforesaid restraints until final hearing, adding subdivision (e) as follows: "(e) From ordering, commanding, directing, assisting, aiding or abetting in any manner whatsoever any person or persons who attempt to violate or who violate the terms of this order."

Appellants attack the restraints thus imposed upon them, and other provisions of the order.

In support of their attack appellants argue that the limitation of their right to picket impairs the right of free speech guaranteed to them under our Federal and State Constitutions, and that the restraints imposed trench upon our Anti Injunction Act, supra, as to the procedure followed and as to the scope of the relief granted.

Respondents, on the other hand, in defense of the restraints, argue that our Anti Injunction Act, supra, "is at best a procedural statute" whose "mandates they have fully complied with." And respondents conclude with the passing suggestion (without argument) that any other construction would render the act unconstitutional as an attempt "by legislative fiat to impair the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery", that "to deny litigants the aid of (Chancery) in enjoining acts of violence and intimidation would be in direct contravention of Art. 1 of our State Constitution N.J.S.A. and in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution", and that if the act (N.J.S.A. 2:29-77.1) be construed as purporting to change "the substantive law of contracts and of torts", it is void because it violates Art. IV, sec. 7, par. 4 of our State Constitution, which among other things, provides that "every law shall embrace but one object, and that shall be expressed in the title."

In light of the arguments thus made, we deem it advisable before considering and determining the validity of the attack made upon each restraint and provision imposed, to make some preliminary observations concerning our Anti Injunction Act, which act is before us for the first time.

By this Act, our legislature established the public policy of our state. It is a policy which falls in the class referred to in Hotel & Restaurant Employee's International Alliance, Local No. 122 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 315 U.S. 437, 62 S.Ct. 706, 708, 86 L.Ed. 946, 949, as "furthering desirable industrial relations". Such a policy is within the ambit of the proper exercise of legislative power so long as "rights" guaranteed by our Constitutions (Federal and State) are "respected" (Hotel & Restaurant Employee's International Alliance v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, supra), and so long as "rights" of suitors otherwise established are not impaired. Thus if the stated rights are not impaired, the provisions of the act, designed to make the declared public policy of the state a reality, should be followed and observed.

A reading of this act clearly indicates that it was not designed to impair, nor does it impair, the inherent power which our Court of Chancery has heretofore exercised, in a proper case, to issue restraints and injunctions comparable to those which were issued in the case at bar. Cf. Evening Times Printing & Publishing Co. v. American Newspaper Guild, 124 N. J.Eq. 71, 199 A. 598; International Ticket Co. v. Wendrich, 123 N.J.Eq. 172, 196 A. 474.

It is equally clear that the act was designed merely to regulate the procedure which must be followed to obtain the injunctive relief and to limit the scope of the relief granted. Cf. Newark Milk & Cream Co. v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees Local No. 680, of Newark, A. F. of L., 19 A.2d 232, 236, 19 N.J.Misc.R. 468, 473.

In thus construing the act, we desire to emphasize that when, as here, the question is whether the legislature has acted in excess of power, we consider only the actual issues raised in the case before us. Cf. Michaelson v. Wall Township, 92 N.J.L. 72, 77, 108 A. 145. Or as otherwise stated, where questions respecting the application of constitutional guarantees arc abstract or hypothetical, they will not be anticipated. Cf. Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111, United Electrical Radio and Machine Workers of America v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 315 U.S. 740, 62 S.Ct. 820, 86 L.Ed. 1154, and cases collated at page 1157.

There is, therefore, no occasion on the record before us to express or intimate an opinion as to respondents' suggested invalidity of the act in light of one or more of the severable provisions of N.J.S.A. 2:29-77.1, not here in issue.

We now proceed with our consideration and determination of the broadly...