Isom v. State

• Decision Date: 12 February 2014
• Docket Number: C.A. No. PM 2009-1523,C.A. No. P2 2004-1079A
• Court: Rhode Island Superior Court
• Parties: DENNIS ISOM v. STATE OF RHODE ISLAND

DENNIS ISOM v. STATE OF RHODE ISLAND

C.A. No. PM 2009-1523

C.A. No. P2 2004-1079A

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS PROVIDENCE, SC. SUPERIOR COURT

FILED: February 12, 2014

DECISION

CARNES, J. Petitioner, Dennis Isom (hereinafter Petitioner), seeks post-conviction relief from his plea of nolo contendere to a charge of assault with a dangerous weapon, in violation of G.L. 1956 § 11-5-2. Specifically, Petitioner claims that at the time he entered his plea, the Special Magistrate who accepted his plea did not "possess the requisite Constitutional authority to sentence the defendant or mete out the final judgment" of conviction. (Pet'r's Mem. 2.) Jurisdiction is pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 10-9.1-2. After consideration, and for the reasons set forth in this Decision, Petitioner's application for post-conviction relief is denied.

IFacts and Travel

A

On April 1, 2005, Petitioner entered a plea of nolo contendere¹ to charges ofassault with a deadly weapon/domestic in case number P2-2004-1079A. In return for Petitioner's plea, the State's attorney agreed to dismiss both Count 2 (violation of a protective order) and Count 3 (vandalism) of that particular Information. Petitioner was sentenced to a term of twenty (20) years at the ACI, with sixteen (16) years to serve and four (4) years suspended with probation, along with domestic abuse counseling, a no contact with victim order, and restitution, in addition to costs.

The State also agreed to continue Petitioner on the same sentence with respect to two (2) violation proceedings that were pending before the Court at that time. (P1-88-2071A and P2-99-3762A). Both case numbers appear on the transcript of the plea. Prior to his plea on April 1, 2005, Petitioner's violations had been pending before the Special Magistrate on a number of occasions since Petitioner was first presented as a violator on October 17, 2003. (Pet'r's Mem. 2.) Petitioner has produced a number of transcripts of various court proceedings beginning with a transcript of the commencement of a violation hearing before the Special Magistrate on February 18, 2004, where one witness testified. (Tab 1 of Pet'r's Mem. and attached materials). Thereafter, the violation hearing was continued a number of times up to the time of Petitioner's plea on April 1, 2005, almost eighteen (18) months after Petitioner's initial presentment as a violator. (See Tabs 2 through 10 of Pet'r's materials). This Court has reviewed and considered the contents of said transcripts. This Court notes that on March 29, 2005, the Special Magistrate states, "Mr. Isom has filed complaints against me. He has attempted to have me disqualified from this case." (Tr. at Tab 10, 4:24-25). This Court has also reviewedthe form complaint filed with the Commission on Judicial Tenure and Discipline against the Special Magistrate initially dated April 13, 2004, as well as Petitioner's handwritten letter to the Superior Court Justice chairing that Commission. (Pet'r's Mem. and supporting materials, Ex. A attached thereto). Notwithstanding, Petitioner entered a plea as described above before the Special Magistrate on April 1, 2005, some three (3) days later.

On March 17, 2009, Petitioner filed an application for post-conviction relief alleging that his conviction and sentence imposed thereon are in violation of the Constitutions of the United States and the State of Rhode Island due to the Special Magistrate's lack of Constitutional authority to mete out final judgments. (Pet'r's Mem. 2). Thereafter, Petitioner amended his application on March 11, 2010, alleging an additional claim of prosecutorial misconduct. Id. The prosecutorial misconduct claim was withdrawn in open court on October 15, 2012. Id.

BIssues Presented

Petitioner's argument:

In developing his argument, Petitioner begins by correctly asserting that the Special Magistrate who accepted his plea and meted out punishment was appointed as a Special Magistrate pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 8-2-39.1. That statute reads:

"§ 8-2-39.1 Special magistrate. - There is hereby created within the superior court the position of special magistrate, who shall be appointed by the presiding justice of the superior court, with the advice and consent of the senate, for a period of ten (10) years, and until a successor is appointed and qualified. Nothing contained herein shall be construed to prohibit the reappointment of a special magistrate for one or more additional ten (10) year terms, subject to the advice and consent of the senate. The person appointed to serve as special magistrate shall be amember of the bar of the state of Rhode Island. The special magistrate shall have the duties, responsibilities, powers and benefits as authorized in § 8-2-39." (emphasis added).

Petitioner goes on to aver that § 8-15-3.1 was also used to vest the Special Magistrate with the authority of a Justice of the Superior Court. That statute, at the time of Petitioner's plea on April 1, 2005, read as follows:

"§ 8-15-3.1 Chief Justice - Power to assign judges The Chief [J]ustice of the [S]upreme [C]ourt has the power to assign any magistrate of the [S]uperior [C]ourt, [F]amily [C]ourt, and/or [D]istrict [C]ourt to any court of the unified judicial system with the consent of the presiding justice and/or chief judge of the relevant courts in the same manner as a judge may be assigned pursuant to chapter 15 of this title. When a magistrate is so assigned, he or she shall be vested, authorized, and empowered with all the powers belonging to the justices and/or magistrates of the court to which he or she is specially assigned." See P.L. 2003, ch. 200, § 1 (enactment July 11, 2003).²

Petitioner next asserts that, "at the very least, the sentence imposed [on April 1, 2005] must be vacated because the [Special Magistrate] was without Constitutional authority to preside over his violation hearing." Pet'r's Mem. 4-5. Petitioner refers this Court to the Rhode Island Constitution, article 10, section 4, which specifically provides that:

"Section 4. State court judges -- Judicial selection. -- The governor shall fill any vacancy of any justice of the Rhode Island Supreme Court by nominating, on the basis of merit, a person from a list submitted by an independent non-partisan judicial nominating commission, and by and with the advice and consent of the senate, and by and with the separate advice and consent of the house of representatives, shall appoint said person as a justice of the Rhode Island Supreme Court. The governor shall fill any vacancy of any judge of the Rhode Island Superior Court, Family Court, District, Workers' Compensation Court, Administrative Adjudication Court, or any other state court which the general assembly may from time to time establish by nominating on the basis of merit, a person from a list submitted by the aforesaid judicial nominatingcommission, and by and with the advice and consent of the senate, shall appoint said person to the court where the vacancy occurs. The powers, duties, and composition of the judicial nominating commission shall be defined by statute."

Petitioner next argues that "throughout the pendency of this matter, [the magistrate] exercised the full powers of a Superior Court Judge despite the fact that he was never appointed to the position of Special Magistrate by the Governor of Rhode Island nor vetted or approved by the Judicial Nominating Commission." Pet'r's Mem. 5. Petitioner avers that the [Special Magistrate] conducted at least a part of a contested violation hearing, took testimony, engaged in pre-trial negotiations, and ultimately, took a plea from Petitioner and imposed a sentence. Id. at 5. Petitioner argues that since the [Special Magistrate's] actions, as described, were "judicial functions," then § 8-15-3.1, as it was written at the time of Petitioner's plea [before the Special Magistrate], was "Constitutionally infirm" because it allowed for "the impermissible creation of a 'de facto judgeship' in violation of article 10, section 4 [of the Rhode Island Constitution]. Id. at 5. Petitioner further argues that the magistrate's appointment as a Special Magistrate "was in clear violation of the Rhode Island Constitution's requirement that the Governor fill any vacancy of any judge of the Rhode Island Superior Court."

Lastly, Petitioner argues and suggests that, "[I]t is significant that [in] the face of previous legal commentary and prior Constitutional challenge to the judicial authority of Superior Court Magistrates, the Rhode Island Legislature, in 2007, opted to amend Rhode Island General Laws § 8-15-3.1." Id. at 6. Petitioner states that said section at the present time now reads:

"§ 8-15-3.1 Chief justice - Power to assign magistrates. - The Chief justice of the supreme court has the power to assign any magistrate of the superior court, family court, district court, or traffic tribunal to any courtor tribunal of the unified judicial system with the consent of the presiding justice, chief judge, and/or chief magistrate of the relevant courts. When a magistrate is so assigned, he or she shall be vested, authorized, and empowered with all the powers belonging to the magistrates of the court to which he or she is specially assigned." (See P.L. 2007, ch. 73, art. 3, § 10;)

Petitioner argues and suggests that, "[B]y eliminating both the ability of the Presiding Justice to appoint the Magistrates to their (sic) own Courts and eliminating the language [in this section] which, unconstitutionally, granted the full powers of a Judge to sitting Superior Court Magistrates, the Rhode Island legislature acknowledged the Constitutional infirmity that previously existed in R.I.G.L. § 8-15-3.1." Id. at 6.

In closing, Petitioner submits that the sentence imposed upon him [by virtue of his plea on April 1, 2005] was "constitutionally infirm due to the lack of constitutionally granted Judicial authority on the part of the Special Magistrate . . ." and "must be vacated." Id. at 6.

State's argument:

In...