Issa v. State
Decision Date | 29 January 1992 |
Docket Number | No. 1155-90,1155-90 |
Citation | 826 S.W.2d 159 |
Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
Parties | Michel 1 Wadin ISSA, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee. |
W.V. Dunnam, Jr., Waco, for appellant.
Paul E. Gartner, Jr., Dist. Atty., Tanya S. Dohoney, Asst. Dist. Atty., Waco, and Robert Huttash, State's Atty., Austin, for the State.
Before the court en banc.
OPINION ON APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
Appellant was charged by indictment with the felony offense of theft of property with a value of at least $750 but less than $20,000, alleged to have been committed on or about April 16, 1987. On December 11, 1987, in the 54th Judicial District Court of McLennan County, appellant plead guilty before the court per a plea agreement. Pursuant thereto, on February 5, 1988, an order deferring adjudication placed appellant on probation for a period of five years. The State filed a motion to revoke said probation on February 20, 1989, alleging that appellant had committed a subsequent misdemeanor theft offense. On May 25, 1989, a contested hearing was held and thereafter the probation was revoked with appellant being sentenced to ten years confinement in the Texas Department of Corrections. 2
Appellant's petition for discretionary review raised five grounds, each complaining about the revocation. We granted review solely on ground number one, which avers:
The judge who presided at the hearing on Motion to Proceed to Adjudication and to Revoke Probation erred by adjudging Defendant guilty and immediately sentencing him to ten years confinement without giving Defendant any opportunity to be heard on the issue of punishment and sentence, in violation of Due Process of Law guaranteed the Defendant under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and the Due Course of Law Provision of Article 1, Section 10 of the Constitution of the State of Texas. [Emphasis in original.]
The record reflects that after the State's presentation of evidence at the hearing on the motion, appellant moved for the court to "render [j]udgment denying revocation" based upon insufficient evidence of proof of the alleged violation. The trial court denied the motion. Appellant then responded, "Defendant rests." The trial court then asked, "Argument on the findings?" The State proceeded to argue that it had proven the alleged violation while appellant argued that it had not. In response to an objection by the State during appellant's argument, appellant asked to re-open and present testimony from his supervising probation officer who had not previously testified. 3 The trial court denied the request, whereupon appellant indicated that he wanted "to show what the probation officer would testify [to] for [his] record." After the trial court denied that request, appellant continued his attack upon evidence sufficiency. At the conclusion of appellant's argument, the following was stated:
Appellant's complaint is to the propriety of the trial court's assessment of a sentence immediately after adjudicating guilt.
The Tenth Court of Appeals held that because appellant did not call any witnesses when he had the opportunity, and because he did not object on the ground asserted on appeal, he had waived any complaint. Issa v. State, No. 10-89-199-CR (Tex.App.--Waco, delivered May 17, 1990). It also opined that once a decision to adjudicate guilt was reached, the court could assess punishment immediately. Id.
We observe that the record does not reflect an objection by appellant to the trial court's action of immediately sentencing him. 4 Appellant claims that the trial judge immediately left the bench without giving him the opportunity to make such an objection. It would appear that the first time appellant raised such complaint was in his motion for new trial filed on June 20, 1989, 26 days after the contested revocation hearing. 5 The State avers that appellant's failure to immediately object at the revocation hearing waived his complaint. We disagree.
In Duhart v. State, 668 S.W.2d 384, 387 (Tex.Cr.App.1984), we stated that "[f]airness would dictate that a defendant be accorded an opportunity to offer appropriate evidence in mitigation of punishment after the revocation of 'probation' and the adjudication of guilt and before the assessment of punishment if such evidence has not already been elicited during the proceedings, particularly if the defendant requests the opportunity." Thus, the trial court should have allowed appellant to present such evidence prior to sentencing. Appellant indicated at the hearing on his new trial motion that he had wanted to present evidence, prior to sentencing, regarding the facts of the original offense for which he had just been adjudicated guilty of committing, his purported absence of a prior arrest record, and his claimed difficulty in comprehending and communicating in the English language.
Today we hold that when a trial court finds that an accused has committed a violation as alleged by the State and adjudicates a previously deferred finding of guilt, the court must then conduct a second phase to determine punishment. As Art. 42.12, § 3d(b), V.A.C.C.P. (1988), provides, "[a]fter an adjudication of guilt, all proceedings, including assessment of punishment, pronouncement of sentence, granting of probation, and defendant's appeal continue as if the adjudication of guilt had not been deferred." See now Art....
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Escochea v. State
...a component that proceedings revoking regular community supervision do not: the adjudication decision. Issa v. State, 826 S.W.2d 159, 161 (Tex.Crim.App.1992) (per curiam). Section 5(b) of article 42.12 prohibits a defendant who has been adjudicated guilty of the original charge from raising......
-
Chavez v. State
...a component that proceedings revoking regular community supervision do not: the adjudication decision. Issa v. State, 826 S.W.2d 159, 161 (Tex.Crim.App.1992) (per curiam). Section 5(b) of article 42.12 prohibits a defendant who has been adjudicated guilty of the original charge from raising......
-
Harrison v. State
...But [the] operation [of the rule] may depend on the party's having an opportunity to comply with the rule."); Issa v. State , 826 S.W.2d 159, 161 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (permitting appellant to raise his objection for the first time in a motion for new trial since "appellant had no opportun......
-
Sample v. State
...allege that he did not have an opportunity to object when sentence was pronounced and so failed to preserve error); Issa v. State, 826 S.W.2d 159, 161 (Tex.Crim.App.1992) (permitting appellant to raise his objection for the first time in a motion for new trial since “appellant had no opport......
-
Punishment Phase
...the defendant the opportunity to present evidence in mitigation of punishment before assessing and imposing sentence. Issa v. State, 826 S.W.2d 159 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). The inquiry of the defendant as to whether there is any reason why sentence should not be imposed does not satisfy the ......
-
Punishment phase
...the defendant the opportunity to present evidence in mitigation of punishment before assessing and imposing sentence. Issa v. State, 826 S.W.2d 159 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). The inquiry of the defendant as to whether there is any reason why sentence should not be imposed does not satisfy the ......
-
Punishment Phase
...the defendant the opportunity to present evidence in mitigation of punishment before assessing and imposing sentence. Issa v. State, 826 S.W.2d 159 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). The inquiry of the defendant as to whether there is any reason why sentence should not be imposed does not satisfy the ......
-
Punishment Phase
...the defendant the opportunity to present evidence in mitigation of punishment before assessing and imposing sentence. Issa v. State, 826 S.W.2d 159 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). The inquiry of the defendant as to whether there is any reason why sentence should not be imposed does not satisfy the ......