Italian Fisherman, Inc. v. Commercial Union Assur. Co.
Citation | 215 N.J.Super. 278,521 A.2d 912 |
Parties | ITALIAN FISHERMAN, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, and Gary P. Fish and Judy Fish, Shareholders, Plaintiffs, v. COMMERCIAL UNION ASSURANCE COMPANY, A New Jersey Corporation, Defendant- Respondent, and Howard T. Aidenbaum; Morales, Potter and Buckalew, A New Jersey Corporation; Roger Hutchins and Rudy Jaeger, Defendants. and COMMERCIAL UNION ASSURANCE COMPANY, Third-Party Plaintiff, v. Gary P. FISH, Third-Party Defendant. |
Decision Date | 24 February 1987 |
Court | New Jersey Superior Court – Appellate Division |
Michael F. Chazkel, New Brunswick, for plaintiff-appellant.
Thomas McKay, III, Westmont, for defendant-respondent (Cozen & O'Connor, attorneys; Thomas McKay, III, Westmont, and Douglas B. Lang, Lawrenceville, of counsel and on the brief).
Before Judges MICHELS and O'BRIEN.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
MICHELS, P.J.A.D.
Plaintiff Italian Fisherman, Inc. appeals from a judgment of the Law Division entered on a molded jury verdict in favor of defendant Commercial Union Assurance Company and from a denial of its motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, alternatively, a new trial. The pivotal issue posed by this appeal is whether, in an action on a fire insurance policy, the defenses of arson and fraud and false swearing must be established by clear and convincing evidence or by a preponderance of the evidence.
Plaintiff and its shareholders, Gary P. Fish (Fish) and Judy Fish, instituted this action to recover for a fire loss under a special multi-peril policy of insurance issued by defendant. The fire in question occurred at plaintiff's restaurant located at 411 Broadway, Point Pleasant Beach, New Jersey. Defendant denied liability as to all plaintiffs 1 and asserted several defenses, including that (1) the fire was willfully, deliberately and intentionally set by plaintiff's principal managing agent Fish and (2) plaintiff was guilty of fraud and false swearing concerning the cause and origin of the fire. Pursuant to the terms of the standard mortgagee clause in the policy, defendant paid the mortgagee, Rudy Jaeger, the $141,138.21 still owing on the mortgage on plaintiff's restaurant. As subrogee of Jaeger's right title and interest in the real property, defendant filed a counterclaim against all plaintiffs and a third-party complaint against Fish seeking to recover this money.
At the conclusion of a lengthy trial, the jury found, in answer to special interrogatories submitted by the trial court, that the fire was deliberately set by Fish and that he was in control of plaintiff corporation. Based upon these findings, the trial court molded the verdict, entering judgment in favor of defendant on plaintiff's complaint and awarding defendant damages in the sum of $141,138.21, together with accumulated interest of $44,591.93 on the counterclaim and third-party complaint. Plaintiff's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, alternatively, a new trial was denied and this appeal followed.
Plaintiff contends that the judgment should be reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial because the trial court charged the jury incorrectly that defendant's burden of proving arson was by a preponderance of the evidence. Plaintiff argues that "[t]he defense of arson (insurance fraud) must be proved by clear and convincing evidence." Maintaining that defendant is, in effect, charging it with committing a crime and an act of fraud, plaintiff claims that the higher standard of proof is required to overcome the presumption of innocence of criminal conduct and lack of fraudulent intent. Plaintiff also argues that, in denying coverage on the ground that the fire was intentionally set, defendant is asserting equitable fraud as a basis for rescinding the insurance contract, and, thus, the appropriate standard of proof is by clear and convincing evidence. We disagree.
An action for reformation or recision based upon equitable fraud is clearly distinguishable from the claims asserted by defendant herein. Proof of equitable fraud renders the insurance policy void from its inception because, at the time that it was issued, the insured made certain misrepresentations or had the intent to commit a fraudulent act to collect the proceeds under the policy. See Johnson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 53 N.J. 423, 440, 251 A.2d 257 (1969) (). Defendant does not assert that upon procuring the policy plaintiff intended to commit arson. Rather, defendant is claiming that plaintiff, through its principal managing agent Fish, deliberately and willfully set the fire. This case is not one of equitable fraud. It involves the affirmative defenses of arson and fraud and false swearing which, if proven, establish a violation of the standard provisions of the fire insurance policy, see N.J.S.A. 17:36-5.20, and relieve defendant from any responsibility for plaintiff's fire loss. Where, as here, the plaintiff-insured has intentionally set fire to the property covered by the policy of insurance, sound principles of public policy preclude recovery. See Ruvolo v. American Cas. Co., 39 N.J. 490, 496, 189 A.2d 204 (1963); Lyons v. Hartford Ins. Group, 125 N.J.Super. 239, 244, 310 A.2d 485 (App.Div.1973), certif. den., 64 N.J. 322, 315 A.2d 411 (1974); Miller & Dobrin Furniture Co., Inc. v. Camden Fire Ins. Co. Ass'n, 55 N.J.Super. 205, 213, 150 A.2d 276 (Law Div.1959). Cf. Ambassador Ins. Co. v. Montes, 76 N.J. 477, 482-483, 388 A.2d 603 (1978).
Defendant's evidence that plaintiff set or caused the fire to be set need not be clear and convincing, exclude any reasonable doubt or be the only reasonable explanation for the cause of the fire. The affirmative defense of arson and that of fraud and false swearing may be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. In this State, the preponderance of the evidence standard is the customary burden of proof in civil cases and is thus the appropriate standard by which affirmative defenses must be proven. See, e.g., In re Bridgewater Tp., 95 N.J. 235, 244, 471 A.2d 1 (1984); So. Burlington Cty. N.A.A.C.P. v. Mount Laurel Tp., 92 N.J. 158, 222, 456 A.2d 390 (1983); State v. Cale, 19 N.J.Super. 397, 399, 88 A.2d 529 (App.Div.1952); Miller, supra, 55 N.J.Super. at 213, 150 A.2d 276. There is no justification for raising the standard to require proof beyond a reasonable doubt or even proof by clear and convincing evidence in the instant case.
Here, the only questions submitted to the jury were: (1) "Was the fire deliberately set by Gary Fish on January 14, 1982?" and, if so, (2) "Was Gary Fish in control of the corporation?" Affirmative responses to both questions would establish the defenses raised by defendant. The trial court specifically instructed the jury that defendant bore the burden of proof (persuasion) with respect to the affirmative defenses by a preponderance of the evidence. The trial court's instructions in this regard conformed to the standard applied by the overwhelming majority of American courts. See, e.g., Dempsey v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 717 F.2d 556, 559 (11th Cir.1983) ( ); Vicksburg Furniture Mfg., Ltd. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 625 F.2d 1167, 1170 (5th Cir.1980) ( ); Miele v. Boston Ins. Co., 288 F.2d 178, 180 (8th Cir.1961) (); Hanover Fire Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Argo, 251 F.2d 80, 81 (5th Cir.1957) ( ); Great Am. Ins. Co. v. K & W Log, Inc., 22 Wash.App. 468, 591 P.2d 457, 459 (Ct.App.1979) ( ); Godwin v. Farmers Ins. Co. of America, 129 Ariz. 416, 631 P.2d 571, 573 (Ct.App.1981) ( ); Souper Spud, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 5 Conn.App. 579, 501 A.2d 1214, 1217-1218 (Ct.App.1985), certif. den., 198 Conn. 803, 503 A.2d 172 (1986) ( ); Dean v. Insurance Co. of North America, 453 N.E.2d 1187, 1194 (Ind.Ct.App.1983) (...
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