Ittersagen v. Advocate Health & Hosps. Corp.
| Full Citation | Ittersagen v. Advocate Health & Hosps. Corp., 2021 IL 126507, 186 N.E.3d 378, 452 Ill.Dec. 654 (Ill. 2021) |
| Decision Date | 18 November 2021 |
| Citation | 2021 IL 126507,186 N.E.3d 378,452 Ill.Dec. 654 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 126507 |
| Parties | Thomas ITTERSAGEN, Appellant, v. ADVOCATE HEALTH AND HOSPITALS CORPORATION et al., Appellees. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Leslie J. Rosen, of Leslie J. Rosen, Attorney at Law, P.C., Todd A. Smith, of Smith Lacien LLP, and Carla A. Colaianni, all of Chicago, and Michael T. Sawyier, of Chesterton, Indiana, for appellant.
Robert L. Larsen, of Cunningham, Meyer & Vedrine, P.C., of Warrenville, for appellees.
Bruce R. Pfaff and Alexander J. Marsh, of Pfaff, Gill & Ports, Ltd., of Chicago, for amicus curiae Illinois Trial Lawyers Association.
¶ 1 Plaintiff, Thomas Ittersagen, brought a medical malpractice action against defendants Advocate Health and Hospitals Corporation, doing business as Advocate Medical Group (Advocate Medical), and one of its doctors, Anita Thakadiyil, M.D. Plaintiff alleged that defendants negligently failed to diagnose him with sepsis and treat him appropriately. The matter proceeded to a trial, and a jury was impaneled and sworn.
¶ 2 More than halfway through the trial, the Cook County circuit court received a note from a juror, who reported that he had a business relationship with what he called "the Advocate Health Care System Endowment." The juror said he believed the endowment was affiliated with but separate from Advocate Medical. He explained that his connection to Advocate Medical was so attenuated that he forgot to mention it during jury selection. The juror insisted that the outcome of the trial would not affect him financially and that he could remain fair and impartial.
¶ 3 Plaintiff asked the trial court to remove the juror for actual bias or implied bias and to replace him with an alternate juror. The trial court denied the request, and the jury ultimately returned a verdict for defendants. The appellate court rejected plaintiff's claim of juror bias and affirmed the judgment for defendants. 2020 IL App (1st) 190778, ¶ 63, 448 Ill.Dec. 189, 175 N.E.3d 1099.
¶ 4 On appeal, plaintiff seeks a new trial on the sole ground that the juror should have been removed for implied bias. Plaintiff contends the juror's business relationship with the endowment created a presumption of bias against defendants that cannot be rebutted by the juror's claims of impartiality. Defendants respond that, without evidence of the affiliation between the endowment and Advocate Medical, plaintiff failed to show a disqualifying relationship between the juror and defendants. Based on the limited evidence and the unique circumstances presented, we agree with defendants and affirm.
¶ 6 On the first day of the 11-day trial, juror William Glascott was impaneled and sworn as a member of the jury. At the beginning of the seventh day, the trial judge received a note from juror Glascott. The judge summoned the attorneys outside the presence of the jury and read the note, which stated:
¶ 7 Plaintiff's counsel immediately asked to strike juror Glascott for cause, arguing that, if this information had been disclosed during voir dire , counsel would have had the opportunity to strike the juror for cause or exercise a peremptory challenge. The trial judge elected to investigate the business relationship rather than excuse the juror summarily. However, the parties did not request a continuance to gather and present additional evidence on the alleged bias. The trial court's decision not to strike juror Glascott was based solely on a colloquy among the trial judge, the parties’ attorneys, and the juror.
¶ 9 Juror Glascott attempted to explain his employment and how it related to the endowment and defendants. Juror Glascott reported that he was employed by Green Courte Partners (Green Courte), a private equity company that raises funds to invest in real estate. He described Green Courte as a "general partner" that creates investment funds on behalf of its clients, whom he called "limited partners." As many as 50 limited partners may invest in any given fund. One such limited partner was something juror Glascott called "the Advocate Health Care System Endowment." Neither Advocate Medical nor the doctor was a limited partner.
¶ 10 Green Courte charged its limited partners an asset management fee, depending on the amount invested. Green Courte used the fees to pay its employees’ salaries and bonuses and other operational expenses. Green Courte also received a portion of the return if the firm met incentive thresholds.
¶ 11 Juror Glascott was the chief investment officer of Green Courte, and his role was to "oversee all of the new investments that we make." His annual compensation consisted of a salary and bonuses tied to the aggregate investment in the firm's funds. He also had the opportunity to invest his own money alongside the firm's limited partners.
¶ 12 Juror Glascott insisted that he believed the verdict would not affect his compensation in any way because
¶ 13 Juror Glascott conceded to plaintiff's counsel that Green Courte, as the general partner, owed a fiduciary duty to its limited partners, including the endowment. He expressly stated, "I have a fiduciary responsibility to the endowment of Advocate." But he insisted that neither he nor his employer owed a fiduciary duty to defendants.
¶ 14 When asked why he did not disclose his fiduciary duty to the endowment sooner, he explained that he "didn't make the connection" because "there wasn't a specific question" during jury selection about business relationships with the parties.1 He recalled that the questioning had been limited to whether he had been a patient of Advocate Medical or was familiar with its operation.
¶ 15 Juror Glascott described his "connection" to defendants as "several layers removed." The link did not even occur to him until an e-mail jogged his memory. The night before he sent the note to the trial judge, juror Glascott received an automated e-mail from LinkedIn, a professional network platform. The message announced a job promotion for someone the juror was "connected to at Advocate." He did not specify whether "Advocate" referred to the endowment, defendant Advocate Medical, or some other entity.
¶ 17 Juror Glascott told the court that he believed Advocate Medical's business was separate from the endowment. He explained his firm's client was "the overall $6 billion endowment" and not "the medical group that's here." He also agreed with defense counsel's statement that "the endowment people are separate from the Medical Group per se , and you understand that this [defendant] is Advocate Health and Hospitals, Advocate Medical Group, and one of its doctors." Juror Glascott also stated he did not know and had never met the doctor.
¶ 18 Juror Glascott did not know whether the endowment "paid" defendants in any way. He did say But otherwise, he said he did not know who owned the endowment or "where that money goes." Juror Glascott said, "I believe the endowment's purpose is to grow by [adding] hospitals, grow hospitals, you know, fund growth of—you know, build buildings, that type of thing."
¶ 19 Defense counsel then interjected—without comment from plaintiff's counsel, the trial judge, or the juror—that
¶ 20 According to juror Glascott, the endowment did not have anything to do with malpractice liability, "other than they own hospitals and I assume they earn money in some capacity from the defendant, one of their affiliates do."
¶ 22 Juror Glascott asserted repeatedly, beginning with his note, that his business relationship with the endowment would not prevent him from serving as an impartial juror. He told the court he could "stay neutral and unbiased to both parties" and that his employment would not color his view of the evidence. The juror insisted he could remain "fair and unbiased."
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