IVAN P. v. Westport Bd. of Educ.
| Decision Date | 23 September 1994 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. 3:93CV905 (AHN). |
| Citation | 865 F. Supp. 74 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
| Parties | IVAN P., parent & next friend of Lukas P., a minor child, v. WESTPORT BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al. |
Carrol L. Lucht, Jerome Frank Legal Services Org., Yale Law School, New Haven, CT, for plaintiff.
Martha M. Watts, Atty. General's Office, Hartford, CT and Andrew S. Turret, Bia Pollock & Dunnigan, Bridgeport, CT, for defendants.
RULING ON CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff, Ivan P., brings this action against the Westport Board of Education ("Westport Board"), the Connecticut State Board of Education ("State Board") and the Connecticut State Department of Education ("State Department of Education") (collectively "defendants"), on behalf of his minor son, Lukas P. ("Lukas"), pursuant to the Individuals With Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1400-85. (West 1990 & Supp.1994) ("IDEA").
Currently pending before the court are cross motions for summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment doc. # 12 is GRANTED, the Westport Board's motion for summary judgment doc. # 17 is DENIED, and the joint motion by the State Board and State Department of Education doc. # 20 is DENIED.
In a motion for summary judgment, the burden is on the moving party to establish that there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), Fed.R.Civ.P.; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2514, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A court must grant summary judgment "`if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact....'" Miner v. Glen Falls, 999 F.2d 655, 661 (2d Cir.1993) (citation omitted). A dispute regarding a material fact is genuine "`if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'" Aldrich v. Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 520, 523 (2d Cir.) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 440, 121 L.Ed.2d 359 (1992). After discovery, if the nonmoving party "has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of its case with respect to which it has the burden of proof," then summary judgment is appropriate. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The court resolves "all ambiguities and draws all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party in order to determine how a reasonable jury would decide." Aldrich, 963 F.2d at 523. Thus, "only when reasonable minds could not differ as to the import of the evidence is summary judgment proper." Bryant v. Maffucci, 923 F.2d 979, 982 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 849, 112 S.Ct. 152, 116 L.Ed.2d 117 (1991). See also Suburban Propane v. Proctor Gas, Inc., 953 F.2d 780, 788 (2d Cir.1992).
Keeping this standard in mind, the court finds the following facts to be undisputed.1
Lukas was born on June 15, 1988. He qualified for services under the IDEA beginning with the 1991-92 school year. Prior to the fall of 1991, the Westport Board evaluated Lukas in order to develop an Individualized Education Program ("IEP") for him. On May 25, 1991, the Westport Board presented the plaintiffs with a draft IEP for the 1991-92 school year. On May 30, 1991, Keith Bardos, then the plaintiffs' attorney, wrote to the Westport Board rejecting the proposed placement because the plaintiffs believed it was unsuitable for Lukas. The plaintiffs subsequently placed Lukas in the Foundation School at their own expense and he remained there through the summer of 1993.
On December 6, 1991, the plaintiffs' present counsel wrote to the Westport Board advising it that the plaintiffs were seeking funding for Lukas's placement at the Foundation School. The letter also requested that a meeting be held to discuss Lukas's program and to arrange for an independent evaluation.
Correspondence between the plaintiffs and the Westport Board continued through April, 1992. On April 24, 1992, the Westport Board met with the plaintiffs and presented them with a draft IEP for the 1992-93 year. The plaintiffs rejected the proposed placement on May 7, 1993, and, on the following day, the plaintiffs' counsel requested a due process hearing to seek reimbursement for the costs of Lukas's placement at the Foundation School during the 1991-92 school year and for his continued placement there in 1992-93.
A due process hearing was held, at the conclusion of which the administrative hearing officer found that the program proposed by the Westport Board for the 1991-92 school year was inappropriate and that Lukas's placement with the Foundation School for the 1991-92 school year was appropriate. The hearing officer also concluded, however, that the program offered to Lukas by the Westport Board for the 1992-93 school year was appropriate. The hearing officer ordered the Westport Board to reimburse the plaintiffs for the costs of placement at the Foundation School from May 8, 1992, the date on which Lukas's parents requested the due process hearing, through the end of the 1992 summer session. The hearing officer cited section 10-76d(e)(1) of the Connecticut General Statutes as permitting a special education hearing officer to order reimbursement "back to the date of the initiation of the request for due process review."
Pursuant to 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(e)(2), the plaintiffs seek judicial review of the administrative hearing officer's order that they be reimbursed only for those special education expenses they incurred after May 8, 1993, the date on which they requested a due process hearing,2 rather than from the date on which they placed Lukas at the Foundation School. In so doing, the plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of section 10-76d(e)(1) of the Connecticut General Statutes ("section 10-76d(e)(1)"), pursuant to which the hearing officer limited the reimbursement award.
Section 10-76d(e)(1) provides in relevant part:
If a hearing board ... rejects the educational program prescribed by the local or regional board of education and determines that a placement by a parent or guardian was appropriate, the local or regional board of education shall reimburse the parent or guardian for the reasonable costs incurred for the provision of special education pursuant to this section from the initiation of review procedures as provided by ... section 10-76h.
Conn.Gen.Stat.Ann. § 10-76d(e)(1) (West 1986 & Supp.1994).
The plaintiffs and the defendants agree in one respect: each takes the position that section 10-76d(e)(1) limits a hearing officer's discretion to award reimbursement by permitting reimbursement only from the date on which a parent or guardian requests review of his or her child's placement, rather than from the date on which the placement itself commenced. They disagree, however, as to the legal consequences of interpreting section 10-76d(e)(1) in this way. The plaintiffs argue that section 10-76d(e)(1) impermissibly restricts the remedies authorized by section 1415(e)(2) of the IDEA, which empowers a court to "grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate," and is therefore inconsistent with and preempted by the IDEA. The defendants contend that section 10-76d(e)(1)'s limitation on reimbursement is consistent with the IDEA and therefore reject the proposition that the state law is subject to preemption.
The court disagrees with the reading of section 10-76d(e)(1) urged by both the plaintiffs and the defendants, as it finds nothing in that section to prohibit a hearing officer from awarding greater reimbursement than the minimum prescribed. Section 10-76d(e)(1) provides that reimbursement "from the initiation of review procedures" "shall" be awarded. Conn.Gen.Stat.Ann. § 10-76d(e)(1). Thus, the statute by its own terms makes partial reimbursement mandatory. If parents demonstrate that the educational placement the school board proposed for their child was inappropriate and that their placement was appropriate, section 10-76d(e)(1) entitles them to reimbursement running from the date on which they request review of the school board's placement. Under such circumstances, a hearing officer cannot decline to award reimbursement for the period commencing with the date on which the parents initiated review procedures. It would also be entirely consistent with the terms of section 10-76d(e)(1), however, for a hearing officer to award additional reimbursement, including reimbursement commencing from the date on which the placement itself began.
This reading of the statute is the most obvious.3 "The starting point for interpreting a statute is the language of the statute itself." United States v. Piervinanzi, 23 F.3d 670, 677 (2d Cir.1994) (quoting Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, 447 U.S. 102, 108, 100 S.Ct. 2051, 2056, 64 L.Ed.2d 766 (1980)), petition for cert. filed Aug. 1, 1994. Both the plaintiffs and the defendants acknowledged at oral argument that the court's reading of section 10-76d(e)(1) is supported by the language of that section. (See also Def. Brief, doc. # 18, at 11 n. 3 ().) A literal interpretation of section 10-76d(e)(1) supports the conclusion that a hearing officer is not required to, but may choose to, award additional reimbursement. By contrast, the plaintiffs and defendants read into section 10-76d(e)(1) a limitation that does not appear in its express terms. Moreover, the court has been offered no justification for looking beyond the statute's text. Indeed, it is...
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