Ives v. Allstate Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 19 February 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:20-cv-02505-AB-AGRx |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of California |
| Parties | Robert Wayne IVES, Plaintiff, v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. |
Eric Bryan Seuthe, Terrence Irvin Swinson, Eric Bryan Seuth and Associates, Beverly Hills, CA, for Plaintiff.
Peter H. Klee, Sheppard Mullin Richter and Hampton LLP, San Diego, CA, Suzanne Badawi, Sheppard Mullin Richter and Hampton LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendant.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [45]
Before the Court is Defendant Allstate Insurance Company's ("Defendant" or "Allstate") Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt. No. 45.) Plaintiff Robert Wayne Ives ("Plaintiff") opposed and Defendant replied. (See Dkt. Nos. 47, 49.) The Court held oral argument on February 12, 2021 and took this matter under submission. After considering all the parties' arguments, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
The following facts are undisputed.1 Defendant issued an auto policy to Plaintiff that included a $250,000 uninsured motorist ("UM") policy limit. (Dkt. No. 45-2, Defendant's Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ("SUF") 1.) The policy contains the following three provisions which are authorized by Insurance Code section 11580.2 :
(Id. )
On September 3, 2019, Plaintiff was injured during an automobile accident when his airbag deployed. (SUF 2.) That same month, Plaintiff retained attorney Eric Seuthe who notified Defendant of his representation. (Id. ) Defendant contacted Mr. Seuthe to ask for information regarding the accident, and in December 2019, Defendant completed its intial investigation and determined that the other driver was at fault and had not been insured at the time of the accident. (SUF 3.) Also in December, Mr. Seuthe wrote Defendant and demanded UM arbitration, (SUF 4), and Defendant assigned the matter to arbitration counsel pursuant to the demand. (SUF 6.)
On December 4, 2019, Mr. Seuthe emailed Defendant's adjuster and enclosed a letter from November 27, 2019 which demanded arbitration. (Cross Decl., ¶ 18; Exh. 3 at 246-47.) There were no medical records enclosed. (Id. ) The adjuster was on paid time off ("PTO") from December 2 to 10, 2019 and December 31, 2019 to January 6, 2020. (Cross Decl., ¶¶ 17, 18; Exh. 2 at 110; Exh. 3 at 246-54.) The adjuster's voicemail notified callers that the adjuster was out-of-office and provided the contact information for another adjuster who was handling claim-related matters. (Cross Decl., Exh. 2 at 110; Exh. 3 at 246-54.) Mr. Seuthe called and wrote the adjuster who was on PTO numerous times in December 2019 and stated that Defendant was ignoring his client's claim. (Id. )
On January 7, 2020, Defendant's counsel wrote Plaintiff's counsel to advise that she represented Defendant in the UM Arbitration and that she accepted Plaintiff's demand for arbitration; she requested Plaintiff's lawyer to contact her so they could select an arbitrator. (SUF 7.) Defendant also served written discovery to obtain information regarding Plaintiff's injuries, damages asserted, and medical care. (Id. ) On January 13, 2020, Mr. Seuthe wrote to Defendant's counsel asserting that Defendant had not responded to a list of arbitrators and policy limit demand and that he was going to file a motion to compel UM arbitration. The same day, Defendant's counsel responded asking for medical records and the police record so Defendant could assess the claim. (SUF 8.)
On January 14, 2020, Mr. Seuthe emailed Defendant and enclosed a demand for the $250,000 policy limit with medical records and bills included; Mr. Seuthe told Defendant that the "the time to accept [the] demand expires tomorrow." (SUF 9.) Attached to the January 14, 2020 letter was a second letter dated December 31, 2019 demanding $250,000 policy limits and included medical records and bills. (Id. ) Defendant had never received medical records prior to January 14, 2020. (Id. )
That same day, Defendant's adjuster received the $250,000 demand with the medical records and bills. (SUF 9.) The medical records indicated that Plaintiff suffered from Parkinson's Disease
and the adjuster believed more information was necessary to determine whether the tremors presented by Plaintiff were a result of the accident or from preexisting conditions. (SUF 12.) The adjuster determined that, in light of Plaintiff's total medical bills of $2,593, that at that time, there was insufficient documentation to support Plaintiff's demand for the $250,000 policy limits. (Id. ) Defendant's adjuster then sought to obtain Plaintiff's deposition to ascertain ongoing pain and an independent medical examination from an orthopedic specialist. (Id. )
On February 5, 2020, Mr. Seuthe served the Complaint on Defendant's counsel and stated that he would not "have any more communication with you until I take your deposition." (SUF 13.) The Complaint alleged four causes of action: (1) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (2) fraud; (3) intentional misrepresentation; (4) negligent misrepresentation. (See Dkt. No. 1-1.) In February 2020, Defendant received responses to interrogatories where Plaintiff asserted $25,673 in medical expenses, loss of earnings of $3,200, and ongoing pain and difficulty carrying heavy items. (SUF 14.) In early March 2020, Plaintiff served written discovery on Defendant. Plaintiff also noticed a deposition of Defendant's person most knowledgeable ("PMK") regarding Defendant's handling of the UM claim. (Id. ) In April 2020, Plaintiff's lawyer served a 998 offer for $249,999.99 and in early May, arbitration was stipulated for August 2020. (SUFs 15, 16, 17.)
On May 27, 2020, Defendant deposed Plaintiff, and Plaintiff testified that he was told on the day of the accident that he had a fractured sternum
and that he still experienced daily pain in his chest and ribs. (SUF 20.) In July 2020, Plaintiff noticed a deposition of Defendant's independent medical expert and sent a new CT scan of Plaintiff's sternum along with a medical report, both dated July 2020. (SUF 21.) The report indicated that Plaintiff's sternum fracture would result in ongoing pain and limitations with everyday activities. (SUF 22.) Later that month, Defendant's independent medical expert examined Plaintiff and reviewed his medical records and other records. (SUF 23.) Defendant's expert concluded Plaintiff did not need additional care and that the fractured sternum likely fully healed and Plaintiff was asymptomatic within three to four months after the accident. (SUFs 23, 24.)
Defendant's adjuster then evaluated the claim and allowed for all medical expenses, the unsubstantiated loss of earnings, and extensive pain and suffering to arrive at a high-end evaluation of $125,000 for Plaintiff's ongoing pain and suffering. (SUF 25.) On August 7, 2020, the parties agreed to a settlement of $125,000 for Plaintiff's UM claim. (SUF 26.) On August 13, 2020, Defendant issued the $125,000 check, and the UM claim settled about eight months after it began. (SUF 27.)
Plaintiff does not object to Defendant's statement of undisputed facts. However, Defendant asserts various evidentiary objections to various declarations of Plaintiff, see generally Dkt. Nos. 50-3, 50-4. To the extent the Court relies on objected-to evidence in this Order, such objections are OVERRULED. See Godinez v. Alta-Dena Certified Dairy LLC , No. CV 15-01652 RSWL, 2016 WL 6915509, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2016).
Summary judgment on a claim or defense is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In order to prevail, a party moving for summary judgment must show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact with respect to an essential element of the non-moving party's claim, or to a defense on which the non-moving party will bear the burden of persuasion at trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once the movant has made this showing, the burden then shifts to the party opposing summary judgment to identify "specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548.
The party opposing summary judgment must then present affirmative evidence from which a jury could return a verdict in that party's favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby , 477 U.S. 242, 257, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). On summary judgment, the Court draws all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the non-movant. Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. "Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge." Id. (citation omitted). "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Id. at 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
A court may consider evidence as long as it is "admissible at trial." Fraser v. Goodale , 342 F.3d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 2003). "Admissibility at trial" depends not on the evidence's form, but on its content. Block v. City of L.A. , 253 F.3d 410, 418-19 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Celotex Corp. , 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S. Ct. 2548 ). The party seeking admission of evidence "bears the burden of proof of admissibility." Pfingston v. Ronan Eng'g Co. , 284 F.3d 999, 1004 (9th Cir. 2002). If the opposing party objects to the proposed evidence, the party seeking admission must direct the district...
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Morales v. Allstate Northbrook Indem. Co.
...and nature of Morales's sensory conditions were in dispute, Allstate's reliance on its own expert's opinion was reasonable. See Ives, 520 F.Supp.3d at 1256 (finding reliance on its own expert reasonable where the extent and nature of plaintiff's injuries were disputed). Allstate has establi......
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Morales v. Allstate Northbrook Indem. Co.
...and nature of Morales's sensory conditions were in dispute, Allstate's reliance on its own expert's opinion was reasonable. See Ives, 520 F.Supp.3d at 1256 (finding reliance on its own expert reasonable where the extent and nature of plaintiff's injuries were disputed). Allstate has establi......