Ives v. Edison
| Decision Date | 05 June 1900 |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
| Parties | IVES v. EDISON et al. |
Appeal from circuit court, Kent county, in chancery; Allen C. Adsit Judge.
Suit by Marietta Ives against George M. Edison and Abraham May for an injunction. Decree for defendants. Complainant appeals. Reversed.
Charles E. Ward, for appellant.
Knappen & Kleinhans, for appellees.
Prior to May, 1886, there was a four-story brick block, known as the 'McReynolds Block,' at the corner of Lyon and Canal streets, in the city of Grand Rapids. The block had a frontage of about 80 feet on Canal street, and 90 feet on Lyon street. The north half of the block is now owned by the Richmond estate. The south half was then owned by Edison & Tolford. In the center of the block, leading from Canal street, there was a stairway about 5 1/2 feet wide, reaching to the second story of the block. This stairway was one-half on the south half, and one-half on the north half, of the block. The only access to the upper three stories of the block from Canal street was up this stairway. On the second story of the block was a rotunda reaching across the entire width of the two center stores. Immediately in front of the stairway from Canal street, but at the further side of the rotunda, was a stairway leading to the third story of the building. A gallery running all around the rotunda enabled one to reach the rooms surrounding the rotunda in the third story. A flight of stairs on each side of the second stairway reached from the third to the fourth floor of the building where there was a similar gallery to the one in the story below. The rotunda was lighted from the roof. In May, 1886 Calvin L. Ives bought the south store in this block, subject to a mortgage of $6,000, for the sum of $16,000, and a deed was executed and delivered to him on the 10th day of that month. The deed, in addition to conveying the south 19 feet and 9 inches of the block, contained the following provisions: 'Granting and conveying, also, for the consideration aforesaid, unto the party of the second part his heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns, the further right and privilege, in case said block shall ever be destroyed by fire, of building, on the premises immediately north of the premises hereby conveyed, a stairway, both in front and rear, suitable for the building or buildings to be erected or rebuilt on the premises hereby conveyed, and next immediately north thereof, the center line of which said front and rear stairway (or cases) shall be exactly over and upon the north line of the premises hereby conveyed, which front and rear stairways shall be built and perpetually maintained at the mutual and proportional expense of the party of the second part hereto, and George M. Edison, his heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns; hereby conveying an easement to the said party of the second part hereto in the premises north of the premises hereby conveyed, for the purpose above stated, and reserving to the said George M. Edison, his heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns, a like easement and privilege in the premises hereby conveyed, upon a like contingency. Also, hereby quitclaiming to the party of the second part hereto, for all laudable and legitimate purposes, the free, perpetual, and uninterrupted use, for himself, family, friends, customers, and lessees, of the stairs and stairways now leading into the block of buildings known as the 'McReynolds Block,' in the said city of Grand Rapids, both front and rear, and all other stairs and stairways accessible from what is called the 'rotunda' in said building or block, with a like perpetual use for a passageway, and for light of said so-called 'rotunda' aforesaid, and the passageways thereto and therefrom, except such passageways as lead to the private apartments in said building or block, as belong to the parties owning the premises north of the premises conveyed in this deed. Also, hereby conveying the privilege and right to hand, place, and suspend signs, pictures, etc., at the foot of said two flights of stairs hereinbefore mentioned,--said right to hang and place pictures, signs, etc., to be used in such a manner as not to interfere with or obstruct the travel up and down said stairs,--with a like right and privilege to suspend signs and pictures in the south half of said rotunda aforesaid in said building or block. Reserving to George M. Edison, his heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns, the right of use in common of the front entrance to the basement of said block, so that he, his lessees, his heirs, executors, and administrators, shall and may have a right of access to pass to and from the basement of the store next north of the premises hereby conveyed, and known as 'No. 20 Canal Street." After this deed was delivered, Mr. Ives took possession of the property; renting the first story as a store, and the upper rooms for offices and for other purposes. When this bill was filed, August 30, 1899, the one-fourth of the block next north of Mr. Ives was owned by the defendant Edison. The defendant May was a tenant of the Richmond estate, and occupied the north half of the first story as a double store. He also rented the store owned by Mr. Edison. He desired to take out the partition wall between this store and the double store then occupied by him, making one large room of the three stores, and to take out the center stairway, so that he would have but one entrance and a continuous front. He got the consent of Mr. Edison to remove the stairway from the center of the block, Mr. May proposing to put one somewhat narrower, just adjoining the party wall between Mr. Ives and Mr. Edison; the whole of it to be upon the property owned by Mr. Edison. He sought the consent of Mr. Ives, but the latter refused to give it. Mr. Ives learned that Mr. May proposed to remove the stairway after he had refused his consent to its removal, and filed this bill on the 30th of August, 1899, to prevent his tearing out the center stairway. After it was filed, Mr. Ives died, and Mrs. Ives is now his representative in the proceeding. December 30, 1899, after a hearing, the bill was dismissed, with costs against complainant. An appeal was promptly taken by complainant.
After the decree was entered in the court below, the defendant treated the case as though it was finally adjudicated in his favor, and, as appears from affidavits filed with the briefs, has torn out the center stairway entirely, and has put in the stairway as already indicated. The proof taken before the circuit judge was contradictory as to whether the proposed change would seriously injure the complainant or not. It is urged here that, while defendant may not have had the legal right to do what he has done, the change is a beneficial one to the complainant, and, in any event, has not done her such an irreparable injury as to entitle her to the aid of a court of chancery, and her relief, if any, is in a court at law; citing Woods v. Early, 95 Va. 307, 28 S.E. 374; Johnston v. Hyde, 32 N. J. Eq. 453; McBryde v. Sayre, 86 Ala. 458, 5 So. 791, 3 L. R. A. 861; Trustees v. Thacher, 87 N.Y. 311; Starkie v. Richmond, 155 Mass. 188, 29 N.E. 770. We do not place the same interpretation as do the solicitors for the defendant upon the case of Woods v. Early, 95 Va. 307, 28 S.E. 374. In that case an injunction was granted by the court. In the opinion the following language was used: .' In Johnston v. Hyde, 32 N. J. Eq. 446, cited by the counsel, the court granted an injunction, and stated: In the notes to this case is a collection of authorities holding that the easement cannot be changed without the consent of both the parties interested, even though the change would be beneficial, and in nearly all of the cases relief by injunction was granted. Merritt v. Parker, 1 N. J. Law, 460; Tillotson v. Smith, 32 N.H. 90; Hulme v. Shreve, 4 N. J. Eq. 116; Dewey v. Bellows, 9 N. H. 282; Dickenson v. Canal Co., 15 Beav.
260. In McBryde v. Sayre, 86 Ala. 458, 5 So. 791, 3 L. R. A 861, it was made to appear that complainants had changed the use of the easement very materially from what it was when granted, and that the change was harmful to the dominant estate. The court, under the circumstances, declind to grant the writ of injunction, and left the parties to their remedy at law. In the case of Starkie v. Richmond, ...
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