Ives v. NMTC, Inc., CV970073322S

Citation746 A.2d 236,46 Conn. Sup. 235
Decision Date16 December 1999
Docket NumberNo. CV970073322S,CV970073322S
CourtSuperior Court of Connecticut
Parties(Conn.Super. 1999) VINCENT IVES v. NMTC, INC., ET AL

Guendelsberger & Taylor, for the plaintiff.

Gordon, Muir & Foley, for the named defendant.

Cotter, Cotter & Sohon, for the defendant Michael Bowe.

Horton, Shields & Cormier, for the defendant White Industrial Tool, Inc.

Before: FRAZZINI, J.

Memorandum on the defendant White Industrial Tool, Inc.'s motion for summary judgment on counts four and five of the plaintiff's amended complaint.

FRAZZINI, J.

This case presents an issue of first impression in Connecticut; whether to toll the statute of limitations for actions brought against a manufacturer under the state's Product Liability Act, General Statutes 52-572m et seq., until a plaintiff discovers the identity of the manufacturer. Courts in other states have repeatedly wrestled with this issue, but the present case appears to be the first time a Connecticut court has addressed it.

The plaintiff, Vincent Ives, owns a gas station and garage in Washington, Connecticut. He claims that a socket wrench he purchased from defendant Michael Bowe broke and injured him on March 30, 1994. On February 26, 1997, the plaintiff filed a complaint against Bowe and the named defendant, NMTC, Inc. (NMTC), which he claimed had either manufactured the socket wrench or distributed it to Bowe. After NMTC brought a third party complaint seeking indemnification from the manufacturer of the socket wrench, White Industrial Tool, Inc. (White), the plaintiff amended his complaint on March 25, 1999, to add White as an original defendant. The fourth count of the amended complaint, brought against White under the Product Liability Act, alleges that the socket wrench was defective and unreasonably dangerous when sold. The fifth count, seeking damages against White under the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes 42-110a et seq., alleges that the socket wrench was sold as a new tool when it was actually used. White has now moved for summary judgment claiming that the plaintiff's claims against it are barred by the statute of limitations. For the reasons stated below, the court grants the motion for summary judgment.

A court will grant summary judgment if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party; Elliott v. Waterbury, 245 Conn. 385, 391, 715 A.2d 27 (1998); there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party would be entitled to a directed verdict on those facts. Batick v. Seymour, 186 Conn. 632, 647, 443 A.2d 471 (1982). A material fact is one that will make difference in the result of the case. Hammer v. Lumberman's Mutual Casualty Co., 214 Conn. 573, 578, 573 A.2d 699 (1990). The moving party has the burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. Gupta v. New Britain General Hospital, 239 Conn. 574, 582, 687 A.2d 111 (1996). A party opposing summary judgment, however, "must substantiate its adverse claim by showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact together with the evidence disclosing the existence of such an issue. . . . Mere assertions of fact . . . are insufficient to establish the existence of a material fact and, therefore, cannot refute evidence properly presented to the court [in support of a motion for summary judgment]." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Water & Way Properties v. Colt's Mfg. Co., 230 Conn. 660, 664-65, 646 A.2d 143 (1994). A court should grant summary judgment "if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Practice Book 17-49. "Summary judgment may be granted where the claim is barred by the statute of limitations." Altfeter v. Naugatuck, 53 Conn. App. 791, 801, 732 A.2d 207 (1999).

In the present case, defendant White claims that the plaintiff's claims against it are barred by the statute of limitations because the plaintiff brought the case more than three years after being injured. The relevant statute of limitations for the product liability claim is General Statutes 52-577a (a), which provides that: "No product liability claim as defined in section 52-572m shall be brought but within three years from the date when the injury, death or property damage is first sustained or discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered except that, subject to subsections (c), (d) and (e), no such action may be brought against any party nor may any party be impleaded pursuant to subsection (b) later than ten years from the date that the party last parted with possession or control of the product." The statute of limitations for the CUTPA claim is General Statutes 42-110g (f), which provides that: "An action under this section may not be brought more than three years after the occurrence of a violation of this chapter."

Deciding this issue is a matter of statutory construction. "As with any issue of statutory interpretation, our initial guide is the language of the operative statutory provisions." In re Baby Z., 247 Conn. 474, 498, 724 A.2d 1035 (1999); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Peabody, N.E., Inc., 239 Conn. 93, 102, 680 A.2d 1321 (1996). As our Supreme Court has instructed, "our fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. . . . In seeking to discern that intent, we look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Castagno v. Wholean, 239 Conn. 336, 339, 684 A.2d 1181 (1996). "It is axiomatic, however, that when the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, construction of the statute by reference to its history and purpose is unnecessary." National Loan Investors Ltd. Partnership v. Heritage Square Associates, 54 Conn. App. 67, 72, 733 A.2d 876 (1999).

There is no dispute here that the plaintiff brought this action more than three years after sustaining and discovering his injuries. The plaintiff claims in his objection to White's motion for summary judgment that since he "was not capable of suing White prior to ascertaining who [it was] and what [its] connection to the subject product was," there are "genuine issues of material fact as to when the plaintiff's actionable harm against the defendant arose."

I THE CUTPA CLAIM

Our higher courts have already addressed the statute of limitations claim on the CUTPA count. In Fichera v. Mine Hill Corp., 207 Conn. 204, 212, 541 A.2d 472 (1988), the court held that the statutory language of 42-110a (f) "precludes any construction thereof delaying the start of the limitation period until the cause of action has accrued or the injury has occurred. " The period of limitations for claims brought under CUTPA begins on the date that the unfair practice occurs. Even claims of fraudulent concealment do not toll the CUTPA statute. "Since CUTPA violations are defined in General Statutes 42-110b to include 'deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce,' it is evident that the legislature intended that the perpetrators of such fraudulent practices, as well as other CUTPA violators, should be permitted to avail themselves of the statute of limitations defense provided by 42-110g(f)." Id., 216.

II THE PRODUCT LIABILITY CLAIM

"In Connecticut, a [product liability] cause of action accrues when a plaintiff suffers actionable harm. Catz v. Rubenstein, 201 Conn. 39, 43, 513 A.2d 98 (1986). Actionable harm occurs when the plaintiff discovers or should discover, through the exercise of reasonable care, that he or she has been injured and that the defendant's conduct caused such injury." Champagne v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 212 Conn. 509, 521, 562 A.2d 1100 (1989). Specifically, actionable harm occurs "when the plaintiff discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have discovered, the essential elements of a cause of action." Lambert v. Stovell, 205 Conn. 1, 6, 529 A.2d 710 (1987). The plaintiff maintains that "the key inquiry must be when the plaintiff knew, or should have known, of the facts which constituted an actionable harm."

Applying the above criteria, the plaintiff argues that he did not suffer "actionable harm" at the hands of defendant White until he discovered "that the defendant's conduct caused his injury." The plaintiff argues that the date on which he discovered the essential elements of the cause of action, and, therefore, the proper date from which to measure the three year statute of limitations would be the date he first learned that White was the manufacturer of the socket wrench. The plaintiff thus relies on the so-called "discovery rule" to avoid the statute of limitations. As applied by some courts, that rule states that the limitations period starts to run not from the date the tortious act occurred (here, 1994) but from the date that a plaintiff discovers his injury and, in some jurisdictions, the identity of the party causing the injury (here, by manufacturing the socket wrench).

Although Connecticut does, by legislation, toll the product liability statute of limitations when a party fraudulently conceals its conduct; General Statutes 52-595; no reported Connecticut cases have considered the application of the discovery rule to discovery of the defendant's identity when there is no claim of fraudulent concealment; nor is the court aware of any unreported decisions from the Superior Court on this issue.

The two prongs of the "actionable harm" test used by Connecticut courts to determine when the statute of limitations begins to run -- when the...

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1 cases
  • Tarnowsky v. Socci
    • United States
    • Appellate Court of Connecticut
    • March 18, 2003
    ...element of a negligence action. The defendant does not take issue with Catz or the interpretation of that case in Ives v. NMTC, Inc., 46 Conn. Sup. 235, 746 A.2d 236 (1999). He argues, nonetheless, that the Ives discussion of causation and actionable harm should govern this case. We disagre......

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