Ives v. State
| Citation | 418 N.E.2d 220,275 Ind. 535 |
| Decision Date | 30 March 1981 |
| Docket Number | No. 580S118,580S118 |
| Parties | William Herman IVES, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below). |
| Court | Supreme Court of Indiana |
Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Carmen L. Quintana, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
Defendant (Appellant) was convicted after trial by jury of Rape, Ind.Code § 35-42-4-1 (Burns 1979), and of being an Habitual Offender, Ind.Code § 35-50-2-8 (Burns 1979). He was sentenced to ten (10) years imprisonment on the Rape charge and to an additional thirty (30) years imprisonment as an Habitual Criminal, for a total of forty (40) years. This direct appeal presents the following issues:
(1) Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the rape conviction.
(2) Whether errors occurred concerning the defendant's rights relative to the discovery had and evidence admitted on the habitual offender charge.
(3) Whether the trial court erred with respect to jury instructions given and refused.
(4) Whether the trial court erred in admitting the victim's pants into evidence over the defendant's objection that the chain of custody had not been adequately established.
(5) Whether the trial court erred in allowing the alternate juror to sit in the jury room during deliberations.
The defendant contends that the rape conviction is improper for want of evidence of a forcible penetration. Dobrzykowski v. State (1978) 269 Ind. 604, 382 N.E.2d 170.
The prosecutrix and two of her friends drove to Indianapolis to attend the Indy 500 time trials. One of her friends had arranged for the girls to stay at the home of her future employer and had also arranged to meet one, Douglas White, and his friends, who would show the girls around the city. The girls met White and two of his friends, including the defendant, at the Holiday Inn on Shadeland Avenue as prearranged. The group of six persons spent the night partying and dancing and then went to a restaurant at about 2:00 a. m. for breakfast.
After leaving the restaurant, the prosecutrix rode in the defendant's automobile, with the understanding that he would take her back to the Holiday Inn to pick up her own, after which they would go to the house where the girls planned to stay. They followed White's car until it turned, after which he proceeded independently, stating that he had to stop for gasoline but a few minutes later stating that he was going directly to the house where the girls planned to stay.
They drove around for fifteen to twenty minutes, and she suggested that they stop to make a telephone call to get directions, but the defendant parked the vehicle off the road near Eagle Creek Park and pulled her toward him and kissed her. She neither encouraged nor resisted, but told him that they should find a telephone booth, make a call, and leave.
The defendant suggested that she relax. He continued to kiss her and she pulled away. She said that she thought that they should leave to find the others, but he told her to relax, that he wasn't going to do anything.
The defendant then attempted to remove her pants. She told him to stop and that she was menstruating, whereupon he grabbed her waist and pulled her down. The victim's testimony continues:
This struggle continued until the defendant completed the rape. During the struggle the prosecutrix cried and screamed and tried to pull her pants back up as the defendant was trying to pull them down.
Loyd v. State (1980) Ind., 398 N.E.2d 1260, 1264.
The uncorroborated testimony of the victim is sufficient to sustain a rape conviction. Geisleman v. State (1980) Ind., 410 N.E.2d 1293, 1295. As related above, the record shows that the defendant used force to accomplish the penetration of the victim.
Defendant assigns an assortment of alleged errors related to the habitual offender determination phase of the bifurcated trial, the totality of which, he contends, denied him representation by competent, informed counsel and the right to confront his accusers.
The rape information was filed on June 12, 1979. On June 21st, Defendant was arraigned, proper counsel was appointed and discovery ordered completed within thirty days.
On September 11th, Defendant filed a speedy trial motion, and a trial date of October 17th was set. We are not apprised as to why the trial did not commence on that date, but on October 31st, an amended information adding the habitual offender count was filed.
On November 5th, the defendant was again arraigned, the case was set for trial for November 12th; and both sides were ordered to comply with discovery orders within thirty days.
On November 9th, the State, pursuant to discovery orders, supplied the defendant with documents to be offered into evidence supporting the rape charge and others supporting the habitual offender charge. Defendant filed a motion in limine, seeking to preclude introduction of the documents, which motion was subsequently sustained as to the evidence of rape but overruled as to the evidence of the habitual offender status; and the latter was subsequently admitted into evidence, over defendant's timely objection.
The case was called to trial and the jury impaneled and sworn. The defendant then moved orally for a continuance, which was refused.
There is no merit to Defendant's claim that he was harmed by the State's tardy compliance with the original discovery order. The evidence that was tardily disclosed was excluded.
Neither is there merit to the claim that the documentation of his habitual offender status came late. It was furnished nine days following the amendment which added his offender status as an issue, four days following the order and three days prior to the commencement of the trial. The evidence merely related to his identity; and there is no indication that the defendant was surprised by the disclosure. Neither is there any showing of how he would have benefited from an earlier disclosure or by the grant of a continuance. There has been no claim that the records introduced did not relate to him.
The later amendment and election by the State to try the defendant as an habitual offender may well have entitled the defendant to reassess his prior determination to seek an early trial. Abstractly, such a late change could well be valid grounds for a continuance, in which case it would behoove a defendant to act promptly. In the case before us, the defendant did not ask for a continuance when he first became aware of the amended charges but awaited the actual commencement of the trial. He revealed neither a need for the continuance nor a justification for the delay in seeking it, and it was properly denied. Hardin v. State (1981) Ind., 414 N.E.2d 570; White v. State (1975) 263 Ind. 302, 305, 330 N.E.2d 84, 86.
Defendant has alluded to having been placed in a position of electing between foregoing his speedy trial rights and proceeding to trial uninformed, but we do not see that he was uninformed in any significant manner.
We do not understand the defendant's claim that the court did not enforce its discovery orders. Evidence relative to the habitual offender status was not relevant until the amended information was filed. According to his brief, the only other evidence that was supplied to the defendant belatedly was excluded.
The defendant raises three errors relating to the trial court's instructions to the jury.
The Record shows that the defendant, without stating his grounds therefor, objected to Instructions Nos. 16 and 17:
The defendant's brief does not set out the verbatim objection to these instructions.
Brandon v. State (1978) 268 Ind. 150, 154, 374 N.E.2d 504,...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Kindred v. State
....... The rule requiring that a chain of custody be established before an exhibit be admitted into evidence applies with diminishing strictness as the exhibit in question becomes decreasingly susceptible to alteration, tampering or substitution. Ives v. State (1981), 275 Ind. 535, 418 N.E.2d 220. Thus, a high degree of scrutiny and a strict showing of chain of custody are not required for unique, non-fungible goods readily identified by a witness. Id; Woodard v. State (1977), 267 Ind. 19, 366 N.E.2d 1160. No hint of tampering existed in the ......
-
Johnson v. State
...the accused entertained the requisite specific intent." Williams v. State (1980), Ind., 402 N.E.2d 954, 956; see also, Ives v. State (1981), Ind., 418 N.E.2d 220, 224-25. While the trial court believed the evidence of Johnson's drug use justified an intoxication instruction, it apparently t......
-
Curry v. State
...... Morse v. State (1992), Ind., 593 N.E.2d 194, 197. The rule applies with diminishing strictness as the exhibits concerned become decreasingly susceptible to alteration, tampering or substitution. Ives v. State (1981), 275 Ind. 535, 543, 418 N.E.2d 220, 225. If the offered item possesses characteristics which are fairly unique and readily identifiable, and if the substance of which the item is composed is relatively impervious to change, the trial court is viewed as having broad discretion to ......
-
Mayes v. State
...... When she became more calm, however, and studied the men in the lineup, she was positive that number 4, the Defendant, was her assailant. Furthermore, without objection, she identified Defendant at trial. The uncorroborated testimony of the victim is sufficient to sustain the convictions. Ives v. State, (1981) Ind., 418 N.E.2d 220, 223. Moreover, identification testimony need not necessarily be unequivocal in order to sustain a conviction. Johnson v. State, (1982) Ind., 432 N.E.2d 1358, 1361. ISSUE II. Defendant was charged with having committed the instant offenses on ......