Ivey v. State
Decision Date | 07 April 1938 |
Citation | 180 So. 368,132 Fla. 36 |
Parties | IVEY v. STATE. |
Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Error to Circuit Court, Sarasota County; George W. Whitehurst Judge.
James Ivey was convicted of murder in the second degree, and he brings error.
Affirmed.
Frank Redd and Clyde H. Wilson, both of Sarasota, for plaintiff in error.
Cary D Landis, Atty. Gen., and Tyrus A. Norwood, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
Plaintiff in error, James Ivey, was convicted of murder in the second degree in the circuit court of Sarasota county, Fla., on May 14, 1937, for the unlawful killing of one Henry Dorsey, and was sentenced to the State Penitentiary for a period of his natural life. He has perfected his appeal to this court and seeks a reversal of the judgment against him on a number of assignments.
Counsel for plaintiff in error assigns as error certain questions propounded to the defendant while on the stand as a witness by counsel for prosecution. The material questions propounded on cross-examination are:
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It will be observed that the defendant's counsel on direct examination propounded to the defendant the question: 'The only thing you have been in trouble about is that motor valve that you spent 30 days in jail for?' The questions assigned as error were propounded on cross-examination. The questions objected to as disclosed by the record had as their objective not only to cover the field of inquiry made by the general scope of the direct examination, but to test the memory of the witness and the accuracy of his testimony. It is true by section 4373, C.G.S., a defendant on trial may be asked if he has been convicted of crime, and if it is denied, the record can be admitted in evidence to contradict the statement if one was made. Counsel for defendant was not required to ask the question, supra, thereby opening the gate for a thorough and comprehensive cross-examination on this point. We fail to see where the questions and answers were to the detriment of the rights of the defendant, but justice required that the jury should have a full knowledge of the defendant's activities over the years, which counsel for defendant thought was advantageous to his cause and for the jury to have when considering the issues.
It is next contended that the lower court erred in refusing to permit or allow certain evidence to go to the jury detailing the facts existing at the time the fatal shot was fired and shortly prior thereto. Likewise it is contended that the deceased and the witness Elizabeth Ivey were fighting and possibly the homicide was committed by Elizabeth Ivey.
We have read the evidence about the admittance of the deceased into the room or apartment of Elizabeth Ivey, and we fail to find any testimony or reasonable inference therefrom to the effect that the death of Henry Dorsey was caused by her. The evidence shows cordiality or friendship existing between them and no animosities whatsoever. We have examined other assignments based upon the admission or rejection of testimony. While some of the rulings of the lower court may be subject to the criticism offered, but considering the same in the light of all the evidence in connection with the case at bar, we do not think reversible error was committed.
Counsel for plaintiff in error contends that the lower court erred in denying defendant's motion for a directed verdict. We have considered all the evidence before the lower court when the motion urged here was ruled upon. We think the lower court ruled correctly in denying the motion. The evidence shows that Henry Dorsey was killed while in the apartment of Elizabeth Ivey. Witnesses heard a pistol shot, and shortly thereafter another shot, when Elizabeth Ivey was tusseling with the defendant for the possession of the pistol. The defendant admitted firing a shot into the room occupied by Elizabeth Ivey and Henry Dorsey. This court, when considering a motion for a directed verdict in the case of Gravette v. Turner, 77 Fla. 311, text 314-316, 81 So. 476, 477, said:
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Robertson v. State
...jury, the defendant was then subject to cross-examination and potential impeachment like any witness in any case.2See Ivey v. State, 132 Fla. 36, 180 So. 368 (Fla.1938); C.M. v. State, 698 So.2d 1306 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); Ashcraft v. State, 465 So.2d 1374 (Fla. 2d DCA The defendant testified......
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Robertson v. State
...was then entitled to impeach the defendant's statements and to show that he was not being truthful on the stand. See Ivey v. State, 132 Fla. 36, 180 So. 368 (1938); Lusk v. State, 531 So.2d 1377 (Fla. 2d DCA It is important for the legal profession and the judiciary to send a strong message......
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...42 S.W.2d 696; Pinn v. State (Neb.), 186 N.W. 544; State v. Howard (Mo.), 23 S.W.2d 16; State v. Thornhill (La.), 178 So. 343; Ivey v. State (Fla.), 180 So. 368.) No is cited by appellant nor are there any in the majority opinion holding that under statutes similar to ours where the defenda......
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Street v. State, 76928
...Amazon v. State, 487 So.2d 8, 11 (Fla.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 914, 107 S.Ct. 314, 93 L.Ed.2d 288 (1986); Ivey v. State, 132 Fla. 36, 45, 180 So. 368, 372 (1938). In any event, defense counsel did not request replacement of the juror with an alternate or make a motion for a Street also com......