Ivie v. Johnston

Decision Date25 February 1887
Citation82 Ala. 545,2 So. 22
PartiesIVIE AND WIFE v. JOHNSTON.
CourtAlabama Supreme Court

Appeal from chancery court, Pickens county.

Bill in equity to set aside sale and cancel conveyance by register and for account of rents.

The bill in this case was filed by S. and N.M. Stringfellow against appellants, T. J. Ivie, and his wife, A. Kate Ivie for the purpose of setting aside a register's sale of certain real estate, canceling the conveyance thereunder to said A. Kate Ivie, and for an account of rents and general relief. The sale sought to be vacated was made under the decree, which was reversed by this court, in Stringfellow v. Ivie, 73 Ala. 209. In the present case a decree was rendered against appellant granting the relief prayed for by the complainants, said S and N.M. Stringfellow. Both of said complainants having died after said decree, the appellee, W. F. Johnston, was appointed their administrator, and guardian ad litem of their infant heirs.

Willett, Stone & Hodo, for appellant.

W. F. Johnston, contra.

STONE C.J.

When property is sold under execution or chancery decree, and the plaintiff becomes the purchaser, receiving title, if the judgment or decree be afterwards reversed, his title is left without ground or consideration to rest on, and it will be set aside and vacated. If, however, a stranger purchases and receives title, a subsequent reversal will not furnish ground for setting the sale aside, unless the judgment or decree under which the sale was made is void on its face, in contradistinction to being merely erroneous and reversible. In the first case, setting the sale aside simply restores the parties to their relative rights held by them before the sale. In the latter case, to set aside the sale would leave the purchaser with his money expended, and nothing realized in its stead. Freem. Judgm. §§ 482, 484; Marks v. Cowles, 61 Ala. 299. Several reasons are given why a mere reversible error in the judgment, and subsequent reversal, should not impair the title of a stranger, who purchases while the judgment of a competent jurisdiction is standing, and confers the power to sell. Among them is the patent one that he is an innocent, bona fide purchaser, relying, and having the right to rely on the solemn judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction. But, to come within the protection of a bona fide purchase, there must be a purchase in fact, not the acceptance of a bounty. It implies a parting with something valuable, the surrender of a legal right, or the incurring of a binding obligation, against which defense cannot be made,...

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