Ivy Steel and Wire Co., Inc. v. City of Jacksonville
Decision Date | 13 August 1975 |
Docket Number | No. 72-216-Civ-J.,72-216-Civ-J. |
Citation | 401 F. Supp. 701 |
Parties | IVY STEEL AND WIRE COMPANY, INC., a corporation and Food Fair Stores, Inc., a corporation, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. The CITY OF JACKSONVILLE, a Municipal Corporation, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Ulmer, Murchison, Ashby & Ball, Jacksonville, Fla., for plaintiffs; Gary B. Tullis, Lynda R. Aycock, Jacksonville, Fla., of counsel.
Harry L. Shorstein, Gen. Counsel, Jacksonville, Fla., for defendant; Donald R. Hazouri, Asst. Counsel, Jacksonville, Fla., of counsel.
Plaintiffs Ivy Steel and Wire Co., Inc. and Food Fair Stores, Inc., on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, bring this class action for declaratory relief, namely, that Section 614.506 of Ordinance 71-747-334 of the City of Jacksonville, Florida is void as violative of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The jurisdiction of this Court was properly invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This case was tried to the Court on stipulated facts. For the reasons set forth below, the relief sought is denied and the constitutionality of the challenged ordinance is upheld.
The section of the Ordinance under attack provides as follows:
The water pollution control charge established by this ordinance went into effect on August 24, 1971. No persons connecting to the Jacksonville sewer system prior to August 24, 1971 were required to pay the water pollution control charge. All persons connecting to the Jacksonville sewer system after August 24, 1971, including named plaintiffs herein, have been required to pay the water pollution control charge. (Court's Ex. 1, §§ 4-5, 8-10). We note that the water pollution control charge is not a charge for connection to the sewer system or for use of the sewer system but is merely a charge paid at the time of connection and in addition to the connection charge. As stated in subsection (d) of Section 614.506 ( ), the revenues from this charge are placed in a separate capital improvement fund in the Water and Sewer Enterprise Fund, designated the Sewage Treatment Capital Improvement Fund. These revenues are to be used only for the construction or acquisition of additions, extensions, renewals and replacements to the sewerage treatment plants and pumping stations of the City's sewer system.
The essence of plaintiffs' argument is that although the revenues will benefit every citizen in Jacksonville, payment of the charge falls solely upon those persons connecting to the city sewer system after August 24, 1971. They argue that this distinction is arbitrary and capricious and that the city cannot justify on any rational basis the different treatment afforded to persons connecting to the system prior to August 24, 1971 as opposed to those connecting after August 24, 1971.
We first consider the contention that the classification date of August 24, 1971 was arbitrarily chosen. While it is true that that date is merely the date on which the City Council of Jacksonville enacted City Ordinance 71-747-334 into law, nevertheless it is also true that every regulation, every charge, every tax must have a beginning. Russo v. Shapiro, 309 F.Supp. 385 (D.Conn.1969), involved a class action seeking a declaration that certain actions taken by the Connecticut Commissioner of Welfare were unconstitutional. Prior to the fall of 1969, the Connecticut Welfare Department did not provide a back-to-school clothing allowance. Between August 29 and September 3, 1969, such allowances were awarded to several persons on the basis of need without a ceiling on the amount allowable for each individual. On September 3, 1969, the Commissioner issued a directive which included a provision establishing a $30.00 maximum allowance per eligible child for back-to-school clothing. The court, in upholding the Commissioner's actions, stated, with reference to the dates chosen, as follows:
In United States v. Kline, 354 F.Supp. 931 (M.D.Pa.), aff'd mem., 474 F.2d 1337 (3d Cir. 1972), the defendant attacked his classification by the Selective Service as I-A on several grounds, among them that the Executive Order abolishing the paternity deferment as of April 24, 1970 violated equal protection. The trial court dismissed this argument:
Though the test has been variously stated, the ultimate criterion is whether the line drawn is a rational one; and a classification is arbitrary only if it is without any reasonable basis. . . . The defendant has failed to establish, and the court fails to perceive, that the abolition of the paternity deferment discriminates invidiously. Kline's argument implicitly assumes that any enactment which creates or terminates rights must arbitrarily affect those who suffer by exclusion. However, equal protection does not prevent an enactment from having a beginning or an end, and thereby distinguishing between rights of an earlier or a later time. 354 F.Supp. at 934-935 (footnotes omitted).
Similarly, the Constitution does not prevent the use of the date of August 24, 1971 by Jacksonville to establish the water...
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...render the imposition of fees to raise such funds unconstitutional. This issue was directly addressed in Ivy Steel and Wire Co. v. City of Jacksonville, 401 F.Supp. 701 (M.D.Fla. 1975). In Ivy Steel, the City of Jacksonville needed to raise money for general improvements to its sewer system......
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