Ivy v. Wetzal

Decision Date30 September 2021
Docket Number1:20-cv-00265-RAL
PartiesGLAVIN IVY, Plaintiff v. JOHN WETZAL, et al. Defendants
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania
MEMORANDUM OPINION ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS [ECF NO. 13]
HON RICHARD A.'LANZILLO, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. Introduction

Plaintiff Glavin Ivy (Ivy), an inmate incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Forest (SCI-Forest), commenced this action against nine employees of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC). His six-count Complaint asserts claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and pendent state law claims.[1] ECF No. 1. Count I asserts a First Amendment retaliation claim against all Defendants. Id., ¶ 88. Count II asserts a First Amendment freedom of association claim against all Defendants. Id., ¶ 89. Count III asserts a state law claim of conspiracy against all Defendants. Id., ¶ 90. Count IV asserts a claim for invasion of privacy under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments against Defendant Librarian Winters and Lauren Blake. Id., ¶ 91. Count V asserts a claim for invasion of privacy under state law against Winters and Blake. Id., ¶ 92. Count VI asserts a claim for violation of his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment against all Defendants. Id., ¶ 93. He has sued all Defendants in both their official and individual capacities.

ECF No. 5, ¶ 9. The Defendants have moved pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) to dismiss all of Ivy's claims except his retaliation claims. ECF Nos. 13, 14. Ivy has filed a brief in opposition to the motion. ECF No. 19. For the foregoing reasons, the Defendants' motion will be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Ivy will be granted leave to file an amended complaint in accordance with the guidance provided in this Opinion.[2]

II. Ivy's Allegations

The Court accepts the following factual allegations in Ivy's Complaint as true for purposes of Defendants' motion to dismiss. See U.S. Express Lines Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002). Ivy “tirelessly stud[ies] the law and engage[s] in political activism for the purpose of prison reform and rectification of statewide injustice on behalf of those responsible for carrying out the law.” ECF No. 5, ¶ 17. He voluntarily assists other prisoners with their legal cases. Id., ¶¶ 19-20. According to DOC policy, inmates can sign up for one two-hour law library session per week. Id., ¶ 11. If the inmate has an upcoming deadline, DOC policy allows three two-hour library sessions per week. Id., ¶ 12. “Library staff” implemented a DOC policy that requires inmates to submit legal documentation before they received this additional time. Id., ¶ 15. This documentation is photocopied and preserved. Id. Librarians Winters and Blake had a practice of reading the material that inmates draft and print in the library at all times relevant to this action. Id., ¶ 14.

Ivy is litigating other cases in this United States District Court and in other courts. Id., ¶ 21. Ivy received an appellee's brief in “1274 WDA 2019 on December 18, 2019, and went to the law library on December 20, 2019 for his scheduled law library time to prepare his reply brief. Id., ¶¶ 22-24. While there, Librarian Winters requested proof of Ivy's upcoming deadline to authorize giving him additional library time. Id., ¶ 25. Ivy provided the docket sheet for the case and the appellee's brief to Winters who, “in conformity with the practice and custom, ” photocopied these documents for library records. Id., ¶¶ 26-27. Winters told Ivy she would have this information and his upcoming deadline “verified.” Id., ¶ 30. Ivy expected privacy in his legal paperwork, which Winters showed to inmate Haggerty-an unlicensed inmate law clerk. Id., ¶ 80.

Ivy returned to the law library the next day, as scheduled. Id., ¶ 36. He typed two motions related to his criminal case. He also typed four pages of a petition for habeas corpus for another inmate, Ricky Fritchman, who he had been assisting without compensation. Id., ¶¶ 32, 35, 37. While doing so, Haggerty told him that he had reviewed his legal mail at Winters' direction to verify that he had an upcoming deadline. Id., ¶¶ 38, 39. When Ivy printed his documents, which go to a printer on the librarian's desk, Winters read them and confiscated the documents relating to Fritchman. Id., ¶¶ 13, 40. Ivy told Winters that she could not censor what he typed without a legitimate reason, such as a security issue. Id., ¶ 41. Nevertheless, Winters seized the papers related to Fritchman and issued him a confiscation slip. Id., ¶¶ 42-43; ECF No. 5-1. Ivy then told her that he would file a lawsuit about this. Id., ¶ 44. Winters said, “dumb inmates threaten to sue me all the time.” Id., ¶ 45. Ivy explained how he thought his rights were violated. Id., ¶ 46. As Ivy left the library, Winters threatened not to schedule him for additional time related to his pending deadline in “1274 WDA 2019.” Id., ¶ 47.

Ivy was later escorted to the RHU, although he learned afterwards that officials' usual practice at the time was to confiscate the other inmate's legal material without taking further action. Id., ¶ 45. On December 21, 2019, Ivy was issued misconduct B766832 for “threatening an employee or their family with bodily harm” (Class I, # 15) and “using abusive, obscene, or inappropriate language to an employee” (Class I, # 22). Id., ¶ 49; ECF No. 5-2. Two days later, Hearing Examiner Fiscus dismissed the misconduct without prejudice, writing that he “believe[d] the misconduct to be in error.” Id., ¶ 52; ECF No. 5-3.

Librarian Winters then reissued the misconduct with a few additional sentences, including the two original charges and adding possession of contraband because Ivy had another inmate's legal paperwork (Class I, # 36). Id., ¶ 53; ECF No. 5-4. Ivy insists that he never threatened Winters with bodily harm and that she “exaggerated the language” he used and “trumped-up the facts.” Id., ¶¶ 55-56. During the misconduct hearing conducted by Fiscus, Ivy asked what DOC policy forbids him working on another inmate's legal work, but Fiscus did not explain. Id., ¶¶ 59-60. Fiscus found Ivy guilty of all three charges and sanctioned him to seventy-five days of disciplinary custody in the RHU. Id., ¶ 61. He wrote that he believed Winter's report over Ivy's denials. ECF No. 5-5. He also wrote that another inmate's legal work was contraband. Id. Ivy alleged, upon information and belief, that between the time Fiscus dismissed the first misconduct without prejudice and the reissued misconduct, Fiscus informed Winters that it would be better to charge Ivy with possession of contraband. ECF No. 5, ¶ 64. Ivy alleges that Winters and Fiscus retaliated against Ivy because he expressed “his intent to seek vindication of his constitutional rights in court.” Id., ¶ 81. He further alleges that all Defendants retaliated against him by issuing the misconduct against him for (1) expressing his intent to sue which constituted protected free speech, and (2) for assisting another inmate with seeking habeas relief by typing a document which also constituted protected free speech.” Id., ¶ 88.

On appeal, Gustafson, Perry, Adams, and Mongelluzzo of the Program Review Committee (PRC) upheld the misconduct. ECF No. 5-6. They wrote that DC-ADM 007 Section 2 prohibits an inmate from possessing the legal work of another. Ivy contends that this provision applies only to the job duties of inmate law library clerks, which he is not. ECF No. 5, ¶ 74. Ivy also says he had purchased the paper on which the legal documents were typed, Fritchman never had possession of the papers before they were confiscated, and they were not put on Fritchman's property sheet. Id., ¶ 69.

Ivy seeks compensatory and punitive damages against all Defendants. Id., ¶¶ 94-95. He asks for declaratory relief that “prisoners cannot be disciplined for, or wholly prevented from, assisting other inmates in the preparation of legal filings” and a declaration that “an inmate's efforts in assisting other inmates in the preparation of legal filings is protected under the Free Speech clause and/or the Association clause of the 1st Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, not because of its legal nature, but because it is a form of free speech and/or association like any other.” Id., ¶¶ 96-97. He also requests an injunction “enjoining the Defendants and their subordinates from (1) requiring D.O.C. prisoners to surrender legal documentation to D.O.C. employees for the purpose of inspection, photocopying and preservation, and (2) from punishing prisoners for assisting other prisoners with their cases.” Id., ¶ 98. He demands a jury trial and costs of his suit. Id., ¶¶ 99-101.

III. Standard of Review
A. Motion to Dismiss

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). In deciding a motion to dismiss, the court is not opining on whether the plaintiff is likely to prevail on the merits rather, the plaintiff must only present factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-36 (3d ed. 2004)). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). A complaint should only be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) if it fails to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (rejecting the traditional Rule 12(b)(6) standard established in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). In making this...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT