Iwanicki v. Commonwealth
| Decision Date | 15 August 2011 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 10 - 1373 |
| Parties | CHRISTOPHER IWANICKI, Petitioner, v. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA; PENNSYLVANIA COURTS; PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS and PENNSYLVANIA BOARD OF PROBATION AND PAROLE Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania |
It is respectfully recommended that the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and that a certificate of appealability be denied.
Petitioner, Christopher Iwanicki, a state prisoner currently incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Mercer, Pennsylvania, has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 wherein he challenges decisions made by the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (the Board) in denying him release on parole. For the reasons set forth below, the Petition should be denied.
The record evidence reveals a long and tortured criminal history for Petitioner. Relevant to the instant Petition is a sentence he received on April 27, 2004, for five consecutive terms ofone year, four months to five years incarceration for five violations of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2709(a)(2) (Stalking) and three consecutive one year terms of probation for three violations of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2709(a)(4) (Harassment) in Chester County Case No. CP-15-CR-90-2004. The aggregate term of incarceration imposed in this sentence is six (6) years, eight (8) months to twenty-five (25) years incarceration. His minimum release date for this sentence was December 27, 2010 and his maximum date is April 27, 2029. On September 20, 2005, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed his judgment of sentence in Case No. CP-15-CR-90-2004 (ECF No. 20-3, pp. 50-70).
Prior to the expiration of his minium sentence, on August 31, 2010, Petitioner was interviewed and evaluated for release on parole by the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole. By Notice recorded on November 2, 2010, the Board denied his application as follows.
A prisoner may be granted federal habeas corpus relief only if he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Petitioner's habeas petition does not state a cognizable basis for federal habeas corpus relief because it fails to assert any violation of constitutional or federal law associated with the Board's actions in denying his application for release on parole.
As an initial matter, it is extremely unclear exactly what grounds Petitioner is raising in regards to his parole denial. Because Petitioner repeatedly references the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court will assume he is attempting to assert that the Board's actions violated his due process rights. Due process is guaranteed through the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The Due Process Clause was promulgated to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government. The "procedural" aspect of the Due Process Clause requires the government to follow appropriate procedures to promote fairness in governmental decisions; the substantive aspect of the Clause bars certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them so as to prevent governmental power from being used for purposes of oppression. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 329-33 (1986). (citations omitted.)
To establish a procedural due process violation, a person must demonstrate that he has been deprived of a constitutionally-protected property or liberty interest. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 339 (1986). If a person does not have a constitutionally-protected interest, he or she is not entitled to the procedural protections afforded by the Due Process Clause. A constitutionally-protected interest may arise either from the Due Process Clause itself, or from a statute, rule, or regulation. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466 (1983). A liberty interest "inherent" in the Constitution arises when a prisoner has acquired a substantial, although conditional, freedom such that the loss of liberty entailed by its revocation is a serious deprivation requiring that the prisoner be accorded due process. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 781 (1973). Liberty interests that fall within this category include the revocation of parole, Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), and the revocation of probation, Gagnon, 411 U.S. at778. However, the granting of parole prior to the expiration of a prisoner's maximum term is not a constitutionally-protected liberty interest that is inherent in the Due Process Clause. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979). Thus, Petitioner must show that he has a liberty interest in parole that arises under state law.
The existence of a state parole system alone does not create a constitutionally-protected interest. Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 373 (1987). Instead a liberty interest for purposes of parole would only arise if the state code requires a parole board to make its decision based upon the existence or absence of a particular factor. Cf. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 487 (1995). In this regard, the Pennsylvania Parole Act does not grant Pennsylvania state prisoners any constitutionally-protected liberty interest arising under state law in being released on parole prior to the expiration of their maximum terms.1 Pennsylvania law unambiguously provides that a prisoner is not entitled to release from prison until the expiration of his maximum sentence.2 Nothing in the Pennsylvania Parole Act (or any other provision of Pennsylvania law) requires the Board to release a prisoner on parole prior to the expiration of his maximum term. The Board has complete discretion to determine whether an inmate is sufficiently rehabilitated such that he will be permitted to serve the remainder of his sentence outside the prison walls onparole. Although a prisoner is eligible for parole at the end of his minimum term, nothing in Pennsylvania law or the United States Constitution requires a prisoner to be released at such time. Accord Newman v. Beard, Civil No. 08-2652, 2010 WL 3211135, at* 6 (3d Cir. Aug. 16, 2010). Thus, Petitioner has failed to show a violation of his procedural due process rights with respect to the Board's actions in denying him release on parole.
Notwithstanding, several courts, including the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, recognize that, even though an inmate has no protectable liberty interest in parole that implicates procedural due process, his substantive due process rights may be violated if parole is denied by arbitrary government action.3 In this regard, the constitutional right to "substantive due process" protects individuals against arbitrary governmental action, regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.4 Some courts have determined that decisions to grant or deny parole may violate a prisoner's right to substantive due process if such decisions are based on arbitrary and capricious factors. The Supreme Court has declined to set forth a precise rule that defines the scope of impermissible "arbitrary" conduct for purposes of applying the substantive component of the Due Process Clause. Nonetheless, the Court has clarified that governmental conduct does not violate a person's substantive due process rights unless it amounts to an abuse of official power that "shocks the conscience." County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998).
Applying this standard, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected substantive due process challenges to state parole board decisions in Coady v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 487 (3d Cir. 2001), and Hunterson v. DiSabato, 308 F.3d 236, 246-47 (3d Cir. 2002). In Coady, the prisoner insisted that the decision of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole violated substantive due process because the board used constitutionally impermissible criteria to deny parole, applied erroneous descriptions of the conduct underlying his offense, and considered false information. The Third Circuit rejected Coady's claims on the grounds that "federal courts are not authorized by the due process clause to second-guess parole boards and the requirements of substantive due process are met if there is some basis for the challenged decision." Coady, 251 F.3d at 487.
In Hunterson v. DiSabato, the Third Circuit reversed an order granting the writ...
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