Iwanicki v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole

• Decision Date: 25 January 2013
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 2:12-192
• Parties: CHRISTOPHER IWANICKI, Plaintiff, v. PENNSYLVANIA BOARD OF PROBATION AND PAROLE; ET Al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania

CHRISTOPHER IWANICKI, Plaintiff,

v.PENNSYLVANIA BOARD OF PROBATION AND PAROLE; ET Al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 2:12-192

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Dated: January 25, 2013

Magistrate Judge Cynthia Reed Eddy

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER¹

Plaintiff, Christopher Iwanicki, a state prisoner currently incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Mercer, Pennsylvania, filed a complaint pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 wherein he challenges decisions made by the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (the Board) in denying him release on parole.² Plaintiff filed the underlying civil rights complaint in this Court on February 16, 2012. On June 25, 2012, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 31) along with a Brief in support thereof (ECF No. 32) claiming that the complaint should be dismissed against it for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Plaintiff filed his Response on October 18, 2012 (ECF No. 47).

On January 17, 2013,1 filed a Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 57) recommending that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss be granted and that the Complaint be dismissed withprejudice against the remaining Doe Defendants under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A as it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and it would be futile to allow Plaintiff to file another amended complaint in this matter. The next day, on January 18, 2013, the Court received Plaintiff's consent to have a United States Magistrate Judge conduct all proceedings in this case, including entry of a final judgment (ECF No 58). Defendants filed their consent on January 15, 2013 (ECF No. 56).³

On January 23, 2013, Plaintiff filed Objections to the Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 59) and a Motion to enter additional documents (ECF No. 60). On January 24, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Revocation of Signature (ECF No. 61) wherein he seeks to revoke his authorization to have funds removed from his account to pay for the filing fee in this action as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

Neither Plaintiff's Objections nor his additional submission to the Court undermines my opinion. Moreover, on March 29, 2012, this Court issued a three-page Order advising Plaintiff of the requirement to pay the filing fee and allowing him to withdraw his action at that time (ECF No. 10). Plaintiff may not now revoke his authorization after he learns that his claims have no merit. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth below, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss will be granted and the Complaint will be dismissed with prejudice against the remaining Doe Defendants under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A as it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and it would be futile to allow Plaintiff to file another amended complaint in this matter.

A. Standard of Review

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. In deciding this motion, the court must read the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and all well-pleaded, material allegations in the complaint must be taken as true. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). The court is bound to give the plaintiff the benefit of every reasonable inference to be drawn from the "well-pleaded" allegations of the complaint. Retail Clerks Intern. Ass'n, Local 1625. AFL-CIO v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n. 6 (1963).

A viable complaint must include "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v.Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 556 (2007) (rejecting the traditional 12(b)(6) standard set forth in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 555. See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (holding that, while the Complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, it must contain more than a "formulaic recitation of the elements" of a constitutional claim and must state a claim that is plausible on its face) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and providing further guidance on the standard set forth therein).

Courts generally consider the allegations of the complaint, attached exhibits, and matters of public record in deciding motions to dismiss. Pension Benefit Guar, v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Factual allegations within documents described or identified in the complaint also may be considered if the plaintiff's claims are based upon those documents. Id. (citations omitted). In addition, a district court may consider indisputablyauthentic documents without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 223 (3d Cir. 2004); In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litis., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997).

A court must employ less stringent standards when considering pro se pleadings than when judging the work product of an attorney. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519. 520 (1972). In a § 1983| action, the court must liberally construe the pro se litigant's pleadings and "apply the applicable law, irrespective of whether a pro se litigant has mentioned it by name." Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir,2002) (quoting Holley v. Dep't of Veteran Affairs, 165 F.3d 244, 247-48 (3d Cir. 1999)). See also Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir.1996) ("Since this is a § 1983 action, the [pro se] plaintiffs are entitled to relief if their complaint sufficiently alleges deprivation of any right secured by the Constitution.") (quoting Higgins, 293 F.3d at 688). Notwithstanding this liberality, pro se litigants are not relieved of their obligation to allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal claim. See, e.g., Taylor v. Books A Million. Inc., 296 F.j3d 376, 378, (5th Cir. 2002); Riddle v. Mondragon, 83 F.3d 1197, 2102 (10th Cir. 1996).

B. Relevant Facts of Record

Plaintiff is serving an aggregate term of six (6) years, eight (8) months to twenty-five (25) years incarceration. His minimum release date for this sentence was December 27, 2010 and his maximum date is April 27, 2029. Prior to the expiration of his minimum sentence, on August 31, 2010, Plaintiff was interviewed and evaluated for release on parole by the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole. By Notice recorded on November 2, 2010, the Board denied his application as follows.

AS RECORDED ON NOVEMBER 2, 2010, THE BOARD OF PROBATION AND PAROLE RENDERED THE FOLLOWING DECISION IN YOUR CASE:

FOLLOWING AN INTERVIEW WITH YOU AND A REVIEW OF YOUR FILE, AND HAVING CONSIDERED ALL MATTERS REQUIRED PURSUANT TO THE PAROLE ACT, THE BOARD OF PROBATION AND PAROLE, IN THE EXERCISE OF ITS DISCRETION, HAS DETERMINED AT THIS TIME THAT: YOU ARE DENIED PAROLE/REPAROLE. THE REASONS FOR THE BOARD'S DECISION INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING:

YOUR NEED TO PARTICIPATE IN AND COMPLETE ADDITIONAL INSTITUTIONAL PROGRAMS.

YOUR PRIOR UNSATISFACTORY SUPERVISION HISTORY.

REPORTS, EVALUATIONS AND ASSESSMENTS/LEVEL OF RISK INDICATES YOUR RISK TO THE COMMUNITY.

YOUR MINIMIZATION/DENIAL OF THE NATURE AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE OFFENSE(S) COMMITTED.

YOU ARE TO BE REVIEWED IN OR AFTER SEPTEMBER, 2011.

AT YOUR NEXT INTERVIEW, THE BOARD WILL REVIEW YOUR FILE AND CONSIDER:

WHETHER YOU HAVE SUCCESSFULLY PARTICIPATED IN/SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED A TREATMENT PROGRAM FOR SUBSTANCE ABUSE-THERAPEUTIC COMMUNITY (BASED ON OFFENSE HISTORY AND ADMITTED USE OF ALCOHOL).

WHETHER YOU HAVE MAINTAINED A FAVORABLE I RECOMMENDATION FOR PAROLE FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS.

WHETHER YOU HAVE MAINTAINED A CLEAR CONDUCT RECORD.

OFFENDER'S DETAILED WRITTEN VERSION OF OFFENSE TO BE AVAILABLE AT TIME OF REVIEW.

OFFENDER TO PROVIDE WRITTEN DETAIL RELAPSE PREVENTION PLAN.

YOU MAY FILE AN APPLICATION FOR PAROLE/REPAROLE NO SOONER THAN 1 YEAR AFTER THE DATE THE LAST DECISION DENYING PAROLE/REPAROLE WAS RECORDED.

ECF No. 13-1, pp. 1-2.

Plaintiff re-applied in September of 2011, and his application was denied as follows.

AS RECORDED ON OCTOBER 14, 2011, THE BOARD OF PROBATION AND PAROLE RENDERED THE FOLLOWING DECISION IN YOUR CASE:

FOLLOWING AN INTERVIEW WITH YOU AND A REVIEW OF YOUR FILE, AND HAVING CONSIDERED ALL MATTERS REQUIRED PURSUANT TO THE PAROLE ACT, THE BOARD OF PROBATION AND PAROLE, IN THE EXERCISE OF ITS DISCRETION, HAS DETERMINED AT THIS TIME THAT: YOU ARE DENIED PAROLE/REPAROLE. THE REASONS FOR THE BOARD'S DECISION INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING;

YOUR UNACCEPTABLE COMPLAINCE WITH PRESCRIBED INTITUITONAL PROGRAMS.

YOUR NEED TO PARTICIPATE IN AND COMPLETE ADDITIONAL INSTITUTIONAL PROGRAMS.

THE NEGATIVE RECOMMENDATION MADE BY THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS.

YOUR FAILURE TO DEMONSTRATE MOTIVATION FOR SUCCESS.

YOU ARE TO BE REVIEWED IN OR AFTER SEPTEMBER, 2012.

AT YOUR NEXT INTERVIEW, THE BOARD WILL REVIEW YOUR FILE AND CONSIDER:

WHETHER YOU HAVE SUCCESSFULLY PARTICIPATED IN/ SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED A TREATMENT PROGRAM FOR SUBSTANCE ABUSE-THERAPEUTIC COMMUNITY.

WHETHER YOU HAVE RECEIVED A FAVORABLE RECOMMENDATION FOR PAROLE FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS.

WHETHER YOU HAVE MAINTAINED A CLEAR CONDUCT RECORD.

YOU MAY FILE AN APPLICATION FOR PAROLE/REPAROLE NO SOONER THAN 1 YEAR AFTER THE DATE THE LAST DECISION DENYING PAROLE/REPAROLE WAS RECORDED.

ECF No. 13-8, pp. 1-2.

C. Liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Plaintiff's Complaint seeks to assert liability against Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must meet two threshold requirements. He must allege: 1) that the alleged misconduct was committed by a person acting under dolor of state law; and 2) that as a result, he was deprived of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), overruled in part on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-331 ...