Iwaniszek v. Pride Transp., Inc.
| Decision Date | 17 February 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:17-cv-02918-JCM-BNW |
| Parties | Stephen J. Iwaniszek, Plaintiff, v. Pride Transport, Inc., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Nevada |
Before the Court is plaintiff Stephen J. Iwaniszek's application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP"). ECF No. 21. Iwaniszek submitted the affidavit required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) showing an inability to prepay fees or costs or give security for them. Therefore, Iwaniszek's request to proceed IFP will be granted.
Further, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court screened plaintiff's operative complaint below. Iwaniszek failed to allege a plausible claim for relief under any of the statutes cited or theories raised in his complaint. Therefore, his complaint will be dismissed without prejudice but with leave to amend. Plaintiff must closely review this screening order and file an amended complaint, if he wishes to proceed with this action, in accordance with the Court's instructions by March 10, 2021.
Iwaniszek initiated this matter with an application to proceed IFP and an accompanying complaint on November 21, 2017. ECF No. 1. The magistrate judge then-assigned to this matter recommended to the district judge that he deny Iwaniszek's application because his income and assets were sufficient to pre-pay the costs and fees for this civil action. ECF No. 6 at 2-3. Since that time, Iwaniszek filed an updated application to proceed IFP, ECF No. 21, which the Court granted above.
On February 13, 2019, the Court screened Iwaniszek's original complaint, dismissed it without prejudice for failure to state a claim, and allowed Iwaniszek an opportunity to file an amended complaint. ECF No. 4. Iwaniszek filed his amended complaint at ECF No. 11.
Iwaniszek was previously employed by defendant Pride Transport, Inc. Id. at 2. He alleges that he sustained an injury on September 21, 2016, while on the job. Id. Specifically, he claims that he strained his "muscle of fascia and tendons of the lower back." Id.
Following this injury, a physician ordered that Iwaniszek be permitted to return to work but that he be restricted from lifting over 10 pounds and driving a company vehicle. Id. at 3, 10.1 Iwaniszek claims that Pride Transport failed to accommodate this order between September 18, 2016, through December 20, 2016. Id. at 3. Iwaniszek further claims that Pride Transport attempted to have him sign "various leave of work contracts." Id.
Iwaniszek filed a workers' compensation claim on September 21, 2016. Id. at 24. His claim was denied on November 3, 2016. Id. Iwaniszek alleges that the filing of this claim resulted in the termination of his employment by Pride Transport on or around December 1, 2016. Id. at 3.
Following this termination, Iwaniszek submitted a claim for unemployment benefits to the State of Utah Unemployment Division. Id. at 6. Iwaniszek alleges that Pride Transport lied to the unemployment division when it informed the unemployment division that Iwaniszek had resigned from his employment. Id. In truth, Iwaniszek alleges, Pride Transport had terminated Iwaniszek's employment. Id. This alleged lie resulted in the unemployment division denying Iwaniszek's unemployment claim. Id. at 3, 6.
Based on these allegations, Iwaniszek asserts claims against Pride Transport for violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, violation of the Rehabilitation Act, violations of Title VII,violation of the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, and for breach of trust, breach of contract, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Upon granting a request to proceed in forma pauperis, a court must screen the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). In screening the complaint, a court must identify cognizable claims and dismiss claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Dismissal for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2) incorporates the standard for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). To survive § 1915 review, a complaint must "contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The court liberally construes pro se complaints and may only dismiss them "if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
In considering whether the complaint is sufficient to state a claim, all allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Wyler Summit P'ship v. Turner Broad. Sys. Inc., 135 F.3d 658, 661 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). Although the standard under Rule 12(b)(6) does not require detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff must provide more than mere labels and conclusions. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action is insufficient. Id. Unless it is clear the complaint's deficiencies could not be cured through amendment, a pro se plaintiff should be given leave to amend the complaint with notice regarding the complaint's deficiencies. Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995).
Title VII "is central to the federal policy of prohibiting wrongful discrimination in the Nation's workplaces." Univ. of Tex. Southwestern Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 342 (2013).It forbids two categories of employer conduct. The first category is status-based discrimination, which prohibits an employer from discriminating on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)). The second category is "employer retaliation," which prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee for having opposed, complained of, or sought remedies for unlawful workplace discrimination forbidden by Title VII. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)).
To state a prima facie case of status-based discrimination under Title VII, plaintiff must allege that: (1) plaintiff belongs to a protected class; (2) plaintiff was qualified for the position; (3) plaintiff was subject to an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated individuals outside of plaintiff's protected class were treated more favorably. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).2
Here, plaintiff has not alleged a plausible status-based discrimination claim under Title VII. For the first element, plaintiff does not allege that he belongs to a protected class. Indeed, the complaint lacks any reference to plaintiff's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Further, plaintiff does not allege that he was qualified for his job position, which means his allegations fail to meet the second element, too. Finally, regarding the third element, plaintiff failed to allege that similarly situated individuals outside his protected class were treated more favorably. Therefore, plaintiff's claim will be dismissed without prejudice but with leave to amend.3
For a retaliation claim under Title VII, plaintiff must allege: (1) that plaintiff engaged in a protected activity; (2) that plaintiff suffered a materially adverse action that would deter a reasonable employee from making a charge of employment discrimination; and (3) a but-forcausal link between the protected activity and the adverse action. See Porter v. Calif. Dept. of Corrections, 419 F.3d 885, 894 (9th Cir. 2005); Nassar, 570 U.S. at 359-60. An employee engages in protected activity if the employee: (1) opposes any practice made unlawful by Title VII; or (2) made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under Title VII. Brophy v. Day & Zimmerman Hawthorne Corp., 799 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1199 (D. Nev. 2011) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000E-3(a)).
Here, plaintiff has not alleged a plausible claim for Title VII retaliation. Plaintiff has not pointed to any oppositional activity that he engaged in. Nor has plaintiff alleged that he participated in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under Title VII. Therefore, plaintiff has not alleged that he engaged in a protected activity, and his claim fails at the first element.
Even if plaintiff had sufficiently alleged a protected activity, plaintiff's claim would still fail at the third element because he failed to allege but-for causation. Albro v. Modly, 2020 WL 1937056, at *12 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2020) (). Thus, plaintiff has not alleged a plausible Title VII retaliation claim. Accordingly, plaintiff's claim will be dismissed without prejudice but with leave to amend.
The Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") prohibits discrimination "against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). The ADA applies to private employers. Puckett v. Park Place Ent. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 2d 1349, 1352 (D. Nev. 2004).
Here, it appears that plaintiff alleges an ADA claim under three theories: failure to accommodate, discrimination, and retaliation.4
For a plausible failure-to-accommodate claim under the ADA, plaintiff must allege that: (1) plaintiff is disabled within the...
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