Iwata v. Intel Corp.

Decision Date08 December 2004
Docket NumberNo. CIV.A.04-10536-WGY.,CIV.A.04-10536-WGY.
Citation349 F.Supp.2d 135
PartiesJeanne M. IWATA, Plaintiff, v. INTEL CORPORATION and Matrix Absence Management, Inc., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

Robert A. Fisher, Foley Hoag LLP, Boston, MA, for Intel Corporation, Matrix Absence Management, Inc., Defendants.

Paul L. Nevins, Attorney at Law, Wellesley, MA, for Jeanne M. Iwata, Plaintiff.

Philip R. Olenick, Boston, MA, for Jeanne M. Iwata, Plaintiff.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

YOUNG, Chief Judge.

In this case, an employee claims that her employment was wrongfully terminated because of her mental disability and her pursuit of long-term disability benefits, and that she is entitled to continuing receipt of long-term disability benefits under an ERISA-governed plan (the "Plan") because the Plan's two-year limitation on benefits for mental illness constitutes unlawful discrimination under state and federal law. Intel Corporation ("Intel"), her employer, and Matrix Absence Management, Inc. ("Management"), the Plan administrator, have moved to dismiss, arguing that her complaint fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE

The plaintiff, Jeanne M. Iwata ("Iwata") alleges the following facts:

Iwata, a 52-year-old white female, worked as an occupational health nurse for Intel's predecessor in interest, Digital Equipment Corporation ("Digital"), in Hudson, Massachusetts, beginning in January 1997. Compl. [Doc. No. 1] ¶¶ 7-9. Intel acquired Digital the following year. Id. ¶ 10. Iwata's duties included reviewing the medical condition of employees seeking to return to work after a medical leave of absence, and she met all performance expectations. Id. ¶¶ 11, 13.

In November 2000, she reported to her managers an "incident... involving a comment made by one employee who had expressed hostility toward Intel's managers on a number of earlier occasions." Id. ¶ 14. Iwata previously had to clear the employee to return to work after he had a defibrillator implanted for a cardiac disorder. Id. ¶ 15. Upon returning to work, the employee demonstrated performance problems and "was scheduled to go on a performance warning." Id. ¶ 16. The employee had alleged a workplace accident prior to going on performance warning. Id. ¶ 17. His personal physician kept him from working for a week, but the Intel physician made him return to work. Id. ¶¶ 18-19.

Upon his return to work, the employee again met with Iwata, and "told her that he had had it," and that the last month at Intel had been difficult for him. Id. ¶¶ 20-21. He then said "I'm going to get a gun permit." Id. ¶ 22. Iwata asked whether he was going to get a gun, to which he replied, "No. I'm just going to let them know that I have one. My crazy Brazilian son-in-law, who has a gun, says that we need to come in here and take care of things." Id. ¶ 23-24.

When the employee left, Iwata informed the other nurse practitioner on duty, as well as the employee's manager, urging that precautions be taken. Id. ¶ 25. Intel's security manager dismissed Iwata's concerns. Id. ¶ 26. The employee later resigned under pressure. Id. ¶ 27. The employee's resignation and Intel's lack of concern about the threat he posed triggered a severe emotional reaction in Iwata, who feared that the employee might return and "open fire in the plant." Id.

The employee tried to get his job back, appealing his resignation and stating that he had resigned under duress. Id. ¶ 28. On February 5, 2001, Iwata discovered that the employee had sent her and the other nurse practitioner an email, which read:

Good morning folks....

[An] HR person ... told me ... that one of the nurses in Hudson told him or someone in Hudson, something about me getting a gun. The HR person wouldn't tell me which nurse supposedly made the statement. The reason I am writing this note to the two of you is because the two of you are the only nurses I normally interact with. I find it hard to believe that one of you folks would make such a statement.... If one of you said it, please be brave enough to admit it so that I may regain my respect for the other.

Id. ¶¶ 30-31.

Upon reading this e-mail, Iwata "became fearful, ... experienced panic, and ... became profoundly depressed." Id. ¶ 32. Intel exacerbated these problems by taking a "cavalier" attitude toward the e-mail. Id. ¶ 33. Iwata immediately sought counseling with Dr. Mark Sorenson, who determined on February 16, 2002, that Iwata was totally disabled and urged her to apply for short-term disability benefits. Id. ¶¶ 34-35. Dr. Sorenson recommended on numerous occasions thereafter that Iwata's short-term disability leave of absence be extended. Id. ¶ 36. On July 20, 2001, at Intel and Matrix's behest, an independent medical examiner saw Iwata and concluded that she "was suffering from Major Depression, Moderate as well as Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, Chronic.... She appeared to have made little progress in terms of the resolution of her symptoms." Id. ¶¶ 37-38.

Before February 2, 2002, the date on which her short-term disability leave expired, Iwata sought long-term disability benefits under the Plan. Id. ¶¶ 39-41. On March 20, 2002, Matrix denied her application for benefits, citing the Plan's limitation of benefits for mentally ill participants to cases where hospitalization is necessary. Id. ¶¶ 43. Iwata has inherently acknowledged that she did not utilize Matrix's appeal procedure. See Pl.'s Mem. [Doc. No. 9] at 5-6.

The provision to which Matrix pointed in denying benefits read:

No participant shall be entitled to a disability benefit if his or her Disability arises out of, relates to, is caused or resulted from ... [m]ental, emotional o[r] psychiatric illness or disorder of any type ... unless he or she is confined in a mental hospital for such illness at a the time a monthly disability benefit is otherwise due an[d] payable.

Compl. ¶ 43.

On February 22, 2002, Iwata's employment was terminated due to her inability to return to work. Id. ¶ 42. Iwata alleges in her memorandum, but not her complaint, that she was discharged for attempting to exercise her right to long-term disability benefits. Pl.'s Mem. at 6-7.

On April 29, 2002, the Social Security Administration determined that Iwata was completely disabled. Compl. ¶ 44. She subsequently filed an administrative complaint with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination and received a right to sue letter from the EEOC on December 19, 2003. Id. ¶ 45.

Iwata filed this action on March 17, 2004. Intel and Matrix, filed their Motion To Dismiss [Doc. No. 6] on May 6, 2004. The Court held a hearing on that motion on July 15, 2004, and at the Court's request, the parties have since submitted further briefing on the relevant statutes and legislative history.

II. DISCUSSION
A. Federal Jurisdiction

This Court has subject matter jurisdiction under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq.; Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132, 1140; and Americans With Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12111 et seq. The Court has jurisdiction over claims arising under the laws of the United States, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and the Massachusetts state constitutional claim falls under the Court's supplemental jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

B. Legal Standard

In passing on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must accept as true all well-pleaded allegations in the nonmovant's complaint, except in deciding certain jurisdictional questions not relevant here, and must draw all inferences in favor of the nonmovant. See, e.g., Cooperman v. Individual, Inc., 171 F.3d 43, 46 (1st Cir.1999). Dismissal "is only appropriate if the complaint, so viewed, presents no set of facts justifying recovery." Id.

Although Iwata did not attach it to her complaint, Matrix has submitted for the record the letter from Matrix to Iwata, denying her claim for long-term disability benefits. As the parties correctly agree, the Court may consider this letter without converting the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment. See Fudge v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 840 F.2d 1012, 1014-15 (1st Cir.1988); Pl.'s Mem. at 5; Defs.' Mem. [Doc. No. 7] at 5.

C. ERISA Claims

Intel and Matrix generally argue that Iwata has not stated a claim under ERISA. The first relevant provision is 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (section 510 of ERISA), which provides:

It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel, discipline, or discriminate against a participant or beneficiary for exercising any right to which he is entitled under the provisions of an employee benefit plan, this subchapter, section 1201 of this title, or the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act, or for the purpose of interfering with the attainment of any right to which such participant may become entitled under the plan, this subchapter, or the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act.

The second relevant provision is 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B)), which permits a participant or beneficiary to sue "to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan." The third is 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3), which permits a participant or beneficiary to bring a civil action for "other appropriate equitable relief."

Iwata claims that she is entitled to benefits under section 1132(a)(1)(B) because the term in the Plan that denies long-term disability benefits to people like her who, though mentally ill, do not require hospitalization, is void under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act. See Pl.'s Mem. at 3, 6-8. She argues that the Plan discriminates between the mentally disabled and the physically disabled because it places a condition — hospitalization — on receipt of long-term benefits for...

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