Izazaga v. Superior Court

• Citation: 285 Cal.Rptr. 231,815 P.2d 304,54 Cal.3d 356
• Decision Date: 30 August 1991
• Docket Number: No. S017642,S017642
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 815 P.2d 304 Javier Valle IZAZAGA, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Tulare County, Respondent. The PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest.

Page 231

285 Cal.Rptr. 231

54 Cal.3d 356, 815 P.2d 304

Javier Valle IZAZAGA, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Tulare County, Respondent The PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest.

No. S017642.

Supreme Court of California In Bank.

Aug. 30, 1991.

As Modified on Denial of

Rehearing Oct. 24, 1991.

Neal Pereira, Public Defender, Tim Bazar, Asst. Public Defender and Hugo Loza, Deputy Public Defender, Visalia, for petitioner.

Norwood Nedom, Michael E. Cantrall, Linda F. Robertson, Thomas Havlena, Kevin J. Phillips, Wilbur Littlefield, Public Defender, Los Angeles, Laurence M. Sarnoff and Ablert J. Menaster, Deputy Public Defenders, Jay B. Gaskill, Public Defender, Alameda, Harold G. Friedman, Asst. Public Defender, and Kent S. Scheidegger as amici curiae on behalf of petitioner.

No appearance for respondent.

John K. Van de Kamp and Daniel E. Lungren, Attys. Gen., Richard B. Iglehart and George Williamson, Chief Asst. Attys. Gen., Arnold O. Overoye and John H. Sugiyama, Asst. Attys. Gen., Michael J. Weinberger and David D. Salmon, Deputy Attys. Gen., San Francisco, for real party in interest.

Edwin L. Miller, Jr., Dist. Atty., San Diego, Thomas F. McArdle, Deputy Dist. Atty., as amici curiae on behalf of real party in interest.

LUCAS, Chief Justice.

In this case we resolve several issues presented by the adoption on June 5, 1990, of an initiative measure designated on the ballot as Proposition 115 and entitled the "Crime Victims Justice Reform Act." Petitioner raises various challenges under the federal and state Constitutions to the provisions of the measure authorizing reciprocal discovery in criminal cases. (See also Raven v. Deukmejian (1990) 52 Cal.3d 336, 276 Cal.Rptr. 326, 801 P.2d 1077 [Raven; single-subject and revision challenges to Prop. 115]; Tapia v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282, 279 Cal.Rptr. 592, 807 P.2d 434 [challenge to retroactive application of Prop. 115].)

We conclude that, properly construed and applied, the discovery provisions of Proposition 115 are valid under the state and federal Constitutions, and that Proposition 115 effectively reopened the two-way street of reciprocal discovery in criminal cases in California.

I. FACTS

Petitioner was charged with two counts of forcible rape (Pen.Code, former § 261, subd. (2)), one count of kidnapping (Pen.Code, § 207), and numerous enhancement allegations. The acts were alleged to have occurred on June 18, 1990. The People served on petitioner an informal request for discovery pursuant to newly adopted Penal Code section 1054.5, subdivision (b) (section 1054.5(b)). After petitioner refused the informal discovery request, the People filed a formal motion for discovery in superior court, to which petitioner filed an opposition. Following a hearing, the court granted the motion and issued an order requiring discovery. ¹

The Court of Appeal summarily denied petitioner's application for a writ of mandate or prohibition. We stayed the discovery order and issued an alternative writ of mandate to consider the important constitutional and interpretive questions presented. Petitioner raises several arguments regarding the constitutionality of the discovery provisions added by Proposition 115. Before we consider these contentions, we first review these new discovery provisions.

II. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

Proposition 115 added both constitutional and statutory language authorizing reciprocal discovery in criminal cases. Section 30, subdivision (c), added to article I of the California Constitution (article I, section 30(c)) by Proposition 115, declares discovery to be "reciprocal" in criminal cases. ("In order to provide for fair and speedy trials, discovery in criminal cases shall be reciprocal in nature, as prescribed by the Legislature or by the People through the initiative process.")

Proposition 115 also added a new Penal Code chapter on discovery. (Pen.Code, § 1054 et seq. [hereafter, the new discovery chapter].) The new Penal Code sections relevant to the issues that arise in this case are section 1054 (providing for interpretation of the chapter to give effect to certain specified purposes), section 1054.1 (providing for defense discovery), section 1054.3 (providing for prosecutorial discovery), section 1054.5 (providing mechanism for compelled discovery), section 1054.6 (providing that discovery shall not be required of work product or otherwise privileged information and material), and section 1054.7 (requiring disclosure at least 30 days prior to trial, placing a continuing duty to disclose on both prosecution and defense, and providing for denial of disclosure on a showing of "good cause"). ²

Proposition 115 also repealed several discovery provisions, including Penal Code former section 1102.5 (previously declared unconstitutional in In re Misener (1985) 38 Cal.3d 543, 213 Cal.Rptr. 569, 698 P.2d 637 [Misener ], discussed below), and former Penal Code section 1430 (requiring prosecutor to furnish defendant with police and arrest reports). Furthermore, Proposition 115 repealed the provisions in Penal Code section 859 requiring prosecutors to furnish defendants with police and arrest reports.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Privilege Against Self-incrimination

Petitioner asserts application of the discovery provisions enacted by Proposition 115 would violate his state and federal constitutional privileges against compelled self-incrimination. We disagree.

1. Federal Constitutional Challenge. The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution recites in pertinent part: "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself...." Petitioner asserts that the new discovery chapter enacted by Proposition 115 compels a criminal defendant to be a witness against oneself in violation of the foregoing self-incrimination clause.

First, petitioner argues that the requirement under section 1054.3 ³ that the defense must disclose to the prosecution the names and addresses of all witnesses it intends to call at trial, rather than merely its alibi witnesses, violates the self-incrimination clause. Decisions of the Supreme Court compel a contrary conclusion.

In Williams v. Florida (1970) 399 U.S. 78, 90 S.Ct. 1893, 26 L.Ed.2d 446 (Williams ), the high court upheld against a self-incrimination clause challenge Florida's "notice-of-alibi" rule, which required a criminal defendant intending to rely on an alibi defense to notify the prosecution of the place where the defendant claimed to be at the time in question, and of the names and addresses of the witnesses the defendant intended to call in support of the alibi. Petitioner, noting that section 1054.3 is not limited to situations involving an alibi defense, attempts to distinguish Williams and argues that the self-incrimination clause prohibits the compelled discovery of defense witnesses in the absence of an alibi defense and the special problems it presents. As support for this argument petitioner cites the language in Williams that, "Given the ease with which an alibi can be fabricated, the State's interest in protecting itself against an eleventh-hour defense is both obvious and legitimate." (Id. at p. 81, 90 S.Ct. at p. 1896.)

Petitioner's argument is misguided. The language in Williams on which he relies relates to the due process and fair trial issues addressed in that case, and is not relevant to the Fifth Amendment analysis. Moreover, petitioner's argument misinterprets the scope of the self-incrimination clause, which "protects a person only against being incriminated by his own compelled testimonial communications. " (Fisher v. United States (1976) 425 U.S. 391, 409, 96 S.Ct. 1569, 1580, 48 L.Ed.2d 39 italics added.) Under cases of the Supreme Court, there are four requirements that together trigger this privilege: the information sought must be (i) "incriminating"; (ii) "personal to the defendant"; (iii) obtained by "compulsion"; and (iv) "testimonial or communicative in nature." (See United States v. Nobles (1975) 422 U.S. 225, 95 S.Ct. 2160, 45 L.Ed.2d 141 [Nobles ]; Schmerber v. California (1966) 384 U.S. 757, 761, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1830-1831, 16 L.Ed.2d 908; Doe v. United States (1988) 487 U.S. 201, 207, 108 S.Ct. 2341, 2345-2346, 101 L.Ed.2d 184.) ⁴

Statutorily mandated discovery of evidence that meets these four requirements is prohibited. Conversely, discovery of evidence that does not meet each of these requirements is not barred by the self-incrimination clause. (See Schmerber v. California, supra, 384 U.S. 757, 761, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1830-1831.) This is so even in the absence of special state interests such as protection against easily fabricated "eleventh-hour" defenses. The absence of particular state interests in disclosure affects none of these four requirements, and thus cannot itself trigger the self-incrimination clause. (See New Jersey v. Portash (1979) 440 U.S. 450, 459, 99 S.Ct. 1292, 1297, 59 L.Ed.2d 501.)

In Williams, supra, 399 U.S. 78, 90 S.Ct. 1893, the high court held that discovery of the names and addresses of a defendant's alibi witnesses is not "compelled" self-incrimination, and therefore does not violate the Fifth Amendment. (Id. [54 Cal.3d 367] at p. 85, 90 S.Ct. at p. 1898.) The court reasoned, "At most, the rule only compelled [defendant] to accelerate the timing of his disclosure, by forcing him to divulge at an earlier date information that the [defendant] from the beginning planned to divulge at trial." (Ibid., italics added.) Thus, discovery of the names and addresses of the witnesses that the defense intends to call at trial, whether or not in support of an alibi defense, merely forces the defendant "to divulge at an earlier date information that the [defendant] from the beginning planned to divulge at trial." (Ibid.) Under the rationale of Williams, such discovery does

not constitute compelled self-incrimination, and therefore does not implicate the privilege. ⁵

We thus address petitioner's...