J. Ambrogi Food Distribution, Inc. v. Teamsters Local Union No. 929
| Decision Date | 29 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION No. 2:21-cv-01907 |
| Parties | J. AMBROGI FOOD DISTRIBUTION, INC., Plaintiff, v. TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 929, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
Mark W. Delaquil, Baker & Hostetler LLP, Washington, DC, Todd A. Dawson, Baker & Hostetler LLP, Cleveland, OH, Christian R. White, Baker & Hostetler LLP, Philadelpa, PA, for Plaintiff.
Vladislav Kachka, Spear Wilderman, Philadephia, PA, for Defendant.
J. Ambrogi Food Distribution, Inc. (hereinafter "Plaintiff") commenced this action on April 26, 2021 against Teamsters Local Union No. 929 (hereinafter "Defendant"). Presently before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (hereinafter "Motion"), which lists several reasons for dismissal, including: that Plaintiff failed to state damages for its breach of contract claim; the Collective Bargaining Agreements’ (hereinafter "CBAs") no-strike provisions do not extend to non-arbitrable disputes; the matter should be stayed pending the National Labor Relations Board (hereinafter "NLRB")’s ruling on a similar issue; and the impropriety of declaratory relief in this instance. For the reasons stated herein, Defendant's Motion is denied.
Plaintiff is a produce distribution company that deals with perishable inventory that regularly delivers to customers on a "just in time" basis. Am. Compl., ECF No. 9, ¶¶ 2, 34. Defendant is a union that represents the drivers, pullers, packers, custodians, and warehouse employees who work at Plaintiff's New Jersey facility. Am. Compl. ¶ 6. Defendant and Plaintiff are parties to four (4) CBAs that have an effectuation period of July 1, 2017 through June 30, 2022. Am. Compl. ¶ 7. Each CBA contains identical no-strike provisions.
These provisions, found in Article 15, Sections 2 & 3, read:
See CBAs, attached to Am. Compl. as Exhibits A-D (hereinafter "Exs. A-D").
Kristy's Kuts, Inc. (hereinafter "Kristy Kuts") is an entity that shares common ownership with Plaintiff and previously had a CBA with Defendant regarding employment. Am. Compl. ¶ 10. In February of 2021, a majority of Kristy Kuts's employees indicated that they no longer wanted Defendant to represent them; as a result, the Union President, Rocky Bryan, Jr., threatened to strike. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 11-13.
In March of 2021, Plaintiff received reports that Defendant was planning a strike at one of their locations, so they notified Defendant that if a strike occurred, they would seek relief under Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 14, 16. In response, Defense counsel cited Article 5 of the CBAs as authorizing a strike, which reads in relevant part:
It shall not be a violation of this Agreement, and it shall not be cause for discharge or disciplinary action nor shall such employee be permanently replaced in the event an employee refuses to enter upon any property involved in a primary labor dispute, or refuses to go through or work behind any primary picket line, including the primary picket line of Unions party to this Agreement, and including primary picket lines at the Employer's places of business.
Am. Compl. ¶¶ 17-18. Following this, Defendant sent a first strike notice to Plaintiff on April 14, 2021, and they proceeded to hold a meeting on April 25 to discuss a strike on May 1 or 2, 2021. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 21–22. As a result of this meeting, some of Plaintiff's employees did not report for work as scheduled on May 1, 2021. Am. Compl. ¶ 28. On May 7, 2021, Defendant sent another strike notice to Plaintiff. Am. Compl. ¶ 29. This notice resulted in a meeting on May 16, 2021, to advise employees that Defendant may order them to refuse Plaintiff's instructions in handling and/or delivering certain products. Am. Compl. ¶ 31. No strike resulted from this second meeting.
Despite this, Plaintiff claims they have incurred significant monetary damages from Defendant's actions. Am. Compl. ¶ 35. Specifically, given the perishable nature of their inventory and having to replace employees, Plaintiff states the following: "the Union's violation of the CBAs has caused and will continue to cause damages to the Company ... the precise amount of [damages] cannot be ascertained at this time ... but which the Company reasonably believes will amount to between Three and Four Million Dollars." Am. Compl. ¶¶ 37, 43. Plaintiff argues that Defendant violated Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act and asks this Court to issue a declaratory judgment clarifying the parties’ obligations under the relevant provisions of the CBAs. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 37–50.
On April 26, 2021, Plaintiff commenced the present action in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. See Compl., ECF No. 1. Though Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss said Complaint on May 17, 2021 (ECF No. 8), the Motion was mooted by Plaintiff filing an Amended Complaint on May 28, 2021 (ECF No. 9). Presently before Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, filed on June 11, 2021. ECF No. 11. Therein, Defendant argues that Plaintiff failed to assert damages for its breach of contract claim; the CBAs’ no-strike provisions do not extend to non-arbitrable disputes; the matter should be stayed pending the NLRB's ruling on a similar issue; and the impropriety of declaratory relief in this instance. On June 25, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition (hereinafter "Response") (ECF No. 13), rebutting such allegations. With these filings, Defendant's Motion is ripe for the Court's review.
Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff's claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (b)(6). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, courts must "accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief." Phillips v. County of Allegheny , 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "[A]ll civil complaints must now set out sufficient factual matter to show that the claim is facially plausible." Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside , 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal citation omitted). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ).
It is incumbent upon a plaintiff to plead with clarity. Id. "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Phillips , 515 F.3d at 233 (internal citation omitted). This standard, which applies to all civil cases, "asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) authorizes dismissal of a complaint for a court's lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case. "At issue in a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is the court's very power to hear the case." Petruska v. Gannon Univ. , 462 F.3d 294, 302 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal quotations omitted). There are two types of Rule 12(b)(1) motions: those that attack a court's subject matter jurisdiction on the complaint's face and those that attack subject matter jurisdiction as a matter of fact. Id. at 302 n. 3. Where a defendant does not challenge the truthfulness of the facts material to a jurisdictional analysis, a court evaluates the motion as a facial attack, and it accepts the plaintiff's factual allegations as true in assessing whether the court has jurisdiction. Id. Where a defendant challenges factual allegations that are material to the court's jurisdiction, there is no presumption of truthfulness for plaintiff's allegations, and "the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude [the court] from evaluating for [itself] the merits of [a] jurisdictional claim[ ]." Id.
Here, Defendant's allegations regarding 12(b)(1) do not attack any facts in the Amended Complaint. Rather, it urges that "[b]ecause Plaintiff failed to plead a sufficient [Taft-Hartley Act] claim, the Court must also dismiss the claims under the Declaratory Judgment Act due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction." Mot. 15. Such is a facial attack, and the Court will accept Plaintiff's factual allegations as true in assessing whether the Court has jurisdiction. Petruska , 462 F.3d at 302 n.3.
Defendant, relying on state law, argues that Plaintiff's Amended Complaint insufficiently pleads damages.2 Specifically, Defendant states that the damages alleged are insufficient because Plaintiff does not plead any inventory was lost, nor do they list a dollar figure from employees not...
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