J.B. v. Frisco Indep. Sch. Dist.
| Citation | 528 F.Supp.3d 614 |
| Decision Date | 02 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:19-CV-00814-RWS |
| Parties | J.B., B/N/F LAUREN and Eric B., Plaintiff, v. FRISCO INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant. |
| Court | United States District Courts. 5th Circuit. United States District Court of Eastern District Texas |
Anna Rebecca Skupin, Clyde Moody Siebman, Siebman Forrest Burg & Smith LLP, Sherman, TX, Roy Tress Atwood, Atwood Gameros LLP, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff.
Meredith Prykryl Walker, Alexandra Marie Mosser, Nona C. Matthews, Walsh Gallegos Trevino Russo & Kyle PC, Irving, TX, Donald Craig Wood, Walsh Gallegos Trevino Russo & Kyle PC, San Antonio, TX, for Defendant.
Plaintiff J.B. b/n/f Lauren and Eric B. filed this lawsuit asserting claims against Frisco Independent School District ("Frisco ISD") under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA") and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Docket No. 34. Frisco ISD moved for judgment on the administrative record regarding J.B.’s IDEA claim. Docket No. 30. The Magistrate Judge recommends granting Frisco ISD's motion. Docket No. 68 ("Report and Recommendation"). J.B. filed objections to the Report and Recommendation, and also a Motion to Reconsider and Motion to Supplement the Record. Docket Nos. 70, 72, 77. Frisco ISD filed responses and surreplies. Docket Nos. 74, 81, 75, 82, 83, 91. And J.B. filed replies. Docket Nos. 78, 79, 84. The Court conducted a de novo review of the Magistrate Judge's findings and conclusions.
J.B. originally filed his Complaint in the Eastern District of Texas on November 8, 2019. Docket No. 1. On April 8, 2020, J.B. filed his Amended Complaint, the live pleading, asserting one claim under the IDEA and two claims under Section 504. Docket No. 34. J.B. is challenging the Special Education Hearing Officer's ("SEHO") determination that Frisco ISD provided him with a free appropriate public education ("FAPE") while he was enrolled as a student during the relevant time period. Frisco ISD's Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record asks the Court to affirm the SEHO's decision, and thus seeks dismissal of J.B.’s one claim under the IDEA. Docket Nos. 30, 39. J.B. opposes the dismissal request, arguing the SEHO erred. Docket Nos. 37, 42. On November 24, 2020, the Magistrate Judge recommended the Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record be granted and J.B.’s IDEA claim be dismissed, leaving J.B.’s two claims under Section 504. Docket No. 68. After entry of the report, J.B. timely filed objections and further moved the court to reconsider and allow supplementation of the record. Docket Nos. 70, 72, 77.
1 As a general rule, "a district court reviewing a magistrate judge's R & R has wide discretion to consider and reconsider the magistrate judge's recommendation." Saqui v. Pride Cent. Am., LLC, 595 F.3d 206, 211 (5th Cir. 2010). Accordingly, the Court now takes up both of J.B.’s pending motions while also considering the Report and Recommendation and J.B.’s corresponding objections. See Mars, Inc. v. TruRX LLC, No. 6:13-CV-526, 2015 WL 11232358, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2015) (); Fuller v. Moya, No. 9:08CV202, 2008 WL 5204116, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 11, 2008) (same).
2 J.B. filed a Motion to Reconsider and Motion to Supplement the Record on December 18 and December 23, 2020, respectively. Docket Nos. 72, 77. In the Motion to Reconsider, J.B. asks the Court to reconsider the Magistrate Judge's finding and recommendation based on "evidence not previously and timely produced" by Frisco ISD. Docket No. 72. And in the Motion to Supplement the Record, J.B. asks the Court to allow in the record additional documents that Frisco ISD produced after the Report and Recommendation was entered. Docket No. 77. The motions largely overlap and address the same arguments; thus, the Court considers them together.
34 Under IDEA, a court "shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party[.]" 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(ii). "The determination of what is additional evidence must be left to the discretion of the trial court." E.R. by E.R. v. Spring Branch, 909 F.3d 754, 764 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (quoting Town of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ. for Mass., 736 F.2d 773, 790 (1st Cir. 1984) ) (internal quotation marks omitted). In this context, "courts should avoid turning the administrative hearing into a mere dress rehearsal followed by an unrestricted trial de novo." E.R. by E.R., 909 F.3d at 764 (quoting Schaffer v. Weast, 554 F.3d 470, 476 (4th Cir. 2009) ) (internal quotation marks omitted). This is because the norm is for a court to simply render a decision based on the administrative record. E.R. by E.R., 909 F.3d at 764 (quoting West Platte R-II Sch. Dist. v. Wilson, 439 F.3d 782, 785 (8th Cir. 2006) ). J.B. provides no meritorious basis for the departure from the norm of rendering a decision based on the administrative record. See E.R. by E.R., 909 F.3d at 764.
J.B. asks the Court to supplement the administrative record based upon Frisco ISD's recent production of a document entitled "Overview of Special Education Department Structures, Supports, and Programing: 2016-2017 School Year." Docket No. 77 at 1–2. Because Frisco ISD purportedly failed to follow certain procedures outlined in this document that could have led to earlier behavioral support, J.B. argues he was denied a FAPE. Id. at 2, 5. J.B. also insinuates Frisco ISD deliberately withheld the document. Id. at 2–4. In response and in its surreply, Frisco ISD notes J.B. did not submit a discovery request prior to the due process hearing that encompassed this entire document and that, in any event, the document is not "relevant." Docket Nos. 83 at 2–3; 91 at 1–2. Frisco ISD also advances that there is no authority for the proposition that a school district's failure to follow internal guidelines constitutes a violation under the IDEA. Docket No. 83 at 5. In reply, J.B. argues that Frisco ISD's failure to disclose the document based on the non-use of the "magic words" is "discovery gamesmanship." Docket No. 84 at 2.
The dispute presented by the instant motions revolves around J.B.’s Request for Production 5, sent prior to the due-process hearing (the "SAIL Request"). Docket No. 77 at 2. This request states in full: "Any documents reflecting policies relating to and the location of Social and Interpersonal Learning [("SAIL")] classrooms within the Frisco Independent School District." Docket No. 77-2 at 6. J.B. contends the entire thirty-six-page document entitled "Overview of Special Education Department Structures, Supports, and Programming: 2016-2017 School Year" (Docket No. 77-1) should have been produced in response to the SAIL Request because the document discusses "Process for Requesting a Change of Placement: SBS or SAIL." Docket Nos. 77 at 1–2; 77-1 at 35–37.
The Court is unpersuaded that Frisco ISD deliberately or improperly withheld the document. In response to Request for Production 5 and after asserting objections and in advance of the due process hearing, Frisco ISD produced those pages discussing SAIL, specifically the section entitled "Process for Requesting a Change of Placement: SBS or SAIL"; the top of each produced page is labeled "From Special Education Department Overview"; and the bottom of each produced page is bates-stamped FISD DPH (Frisco ISD Due Process Hearing). Docket No. 76-18 at 10–13, AR 1188–91. The pages produced are responsive to the request. J.B. points to no additional request at the due process hearing level after receiving this document. And J.B. himself admitted and utilized the produced document in the underlying due process hearing before the SEHO. AR 1188, 2286–2287. Nonetheless, J.B. now says he should have received the entire "Special Education Department Overview" document, including certain portions discussing behavior procedures: "Behavior Support and Referral Process." Docket No. 77 at 2–3.
56 Even if the Court agreed that J.B.’s due process hearing discovery request encompassed the entire "Special Education Department Overview" document, the Court's ultimate analysis would not change. J.B. failed to carry his burden to establish the SEHO erred. See Seth B. ex rel. Donald B. v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 810 F.3d 961, 972 (5th Cir. 2016). The IDEA guarantees a "basic floor" of opportunity. Klein Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Hovem, 690 F.3d 390, 396 (5th Cir. 2012). Without authority, J.B. implies a school district's own policies and procedures outlined in the document impose a legal obligation above and beyond the statutory "basic floor." Such a reading would be inconsistent with the IDEA's structure and existing case law. A school district satisfies its IDEA obligations if it complies with the Act's procedural requirements and the Individualized Education Program ("IEP") is reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits. That was properly the focus of the Magistrate Judge's analysis. Moreover, procedures related to the SAIL program, which is what J.B. sought in Request for Production 5 at the underlying due process level, are immaterial to whether J.B. should have been provided a Functional Behavior Assessment or Behavior Intervention Plan within a certain time period. And the remaining pages of the Special Education Department Overview that J.B. seeks to admit reference a Functional Behavior Assessment or Behavior Intervention Plan only when describing (1) the role of a behavior specialist and licensed specialist in school psychology; and (2) what type of evidence may be considered and reviewed by school personnel. Docket Nos. 77-1 at 7–8, 11, 35–36. The document does not substantively address Functional Behavior Assessments or Behavior Intervention Plans (the crux of Plaintiff's objections to the Magistrate Judge's findings); it does not answer the...
To continue reading
Request your trial