J.C. Sanson, Inc. v. Rodgers

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: ANN McMANAMON; PRYATEL
• Citation: J.C. Sanson, Inc. v. Rodgers, 506 N.E.2d 290, 30 Ohio App.3d 77, 30 OBR 133 (Ohio App. 1986)
• Decision Date: 24 February 1986
• Docket Number: No. 50147,50147
• Parties: , 30 O.B.R. 133 J.C. SANSON, INC., Appellee, v. RODGERS; Administrator of the Ohio Bureau of Employment Services, Appellant.

Page 77

30 Ohio App.3d 77

506 N.E.2d 290, 30 O.B.R. 133

J.C. SANSON, INC., Appellee, v. RODGERS; Administrator of the Ohio Bureau of Employment Services, Appellant.

No. 50147.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Eighth District, Cuyahoga County.

Feb. 24, 1986.

Syllabus by the Court

1. An appeal from the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review to the court of common pleas is perfected when (1) the appellant has timely filed a notice of appeal, (2) the appellant has filed his assignments of error, and (3) the board has filed a certified transcript of the proceedings before the board. (R.C. 4141.28[O], construed.)

2. Once an appeal to the court of common pleas has been perfected in accordance with R.C. 4141.28(O), Civ.R. 55 is inapplicable and the court is required to decide the matter on the merits. (Civ.R. 1[C], applied.)

3. Pursuant to R.C. 4141.28(O), a trial court's review of board decisions is limited to an inquiry of whether the decision was unlawful, unreasonable, or against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Rex W. Post, Northfield, for appellee.

Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., Atty. Gen., Columbus, and Rosalind T. Andrews, Cleveland, for appellant.

ANN McMANAMON, Judge.

The Administrator of the Ohio Bureau of Employment Services ("the administrator") appeals a reversal by the common pleas court of unemployment benefits awarded to Barry L. Rodgers ("the claimant") by the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review. ¹ J.C. Sanson, Inc. ("the employer" or "Sanson"), which successfully challenged the claimant's board-determined benefits, contends that the trial court's judgment followed a scheduled hearing in which the administrator failed to attend and was based on a record consisting of "the transcript in evidence."

For his first assignment of error, the administrator argues that the trial court should not have granted judgment without conducting proceedings beyond the filing of the administrative record by the board.

The court of common pleas exercises appellate review over board decisions pursuant to R.C. 4141.28(O). Once an appeal has been perfected by the filing in the common pleas court of (1) a timely notice of appeal, (2) a statement of the appellant's assignments of error, and (3) a board-certified transcript and record, "[t]he appeal shall be heard upon such record certified by the board."

Although all of these requirements were met in the instant case, we are unable to conclude that the trial court, in fact, conducted its mandated appellate review.

In its brief to this court, the employer contends that the trial court set hearings for January 9, 1985 and March 18, 1985, at which the administrator did not appear. At the March 18 hearing, it is claimed that the court listened to oral arguments and based its reversal upon them as well as its "review of the record before it."

We cannot infer these activities from a silent record. The court made two entries in this case. The first, on January 9, 1985, reflects the scheduling of a pretrial for February 6, 1985. The court's second and final entry which is dated March 18, 1985 states: "Decision of B.E.S. Reversed (CR. 55) [sic ]. s/John L. Angelotta"

The apparent import of the entry is that, by reason of the administrator's absence, a default judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 55 was entered by the court. Such an entry is properly made "when a defendant has failed to plead timely or otherwise defend a case such that the plaintiff's allegations are not at issue." Reese v. Proppe (1981), 3 Ohio App.3d 103, 3 OBR 118, 443 N.E.2d 992, at paragraph one of the syllabus. Clearly, this situation is not comparable to the posture of the parties to this appeal.

We are unable to conclude from the March 18 entry that a substantive review of the record from the board hearing was made by the trial court in compliance with the statute. Accordingly the administrator's first assignment of error is well-taken.

For his second assignment of error, the administrator urges that default judgment was improper, as the court incorrectly applied Civ.R. 55. We agree.

Civ.R. 1(C) expressly excepts procedures upon appeal to review any judgment, order, or ruling from the Rules of Civil Procedure, to the extent the rules "would by their nature be clearly inapplicable." However, the Supreme Court has delineated Civil Rule applicability in numerous administrative review situations. See Price v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. (1982), 70 Ohio St.2d 131, 24 O.O.3d 237, 435 N.E.2d 1114. These determinations are made on a case-by-case basis. See, e.g., Price, supra (summary judgment available in a workers' compensation appeal), and Richmond v. Bd. of Review (1979), 64 Ohio App.2d 243, 18 O.O.3d 180, 412 N.E.2d 418 (Civ.R. 6[B] applicable to filing transcript in unemployment appeal). But, see, Townsend v. Bd. of Bldg. Appeals (1976), 49 Ohio App.2d 402, 3 O.O.3d 461, 361 N.E.2d 271 (Civ.R. 6[E] inapplicable in appeal from board of building appeals).

Our disposition of the administrator's first assignment of error results from the inapplicability of Civ.R. 55 to a perfected appeal pursuant to R.C. 4141.28(O) in the common pleas court. We hold that the statute requires that the trial court reach the merits of the appeal, which shall be based upon the record certified by the board. This statutory mandate precludes a default judgment under Civ.R. 55.

It is the employer's position that there was no default judgment and that the court's review of the case was pursuant to R.C. 4141.28(O). The employer asks us to accept the court's notation of Civ.R. 55 in its judgment entry as a "clerical error." However, we are bound by the record as it...