J.C. v. Mendham Tp. Bd. of Educ., CIV.A. 98-293.

• Decision Date: 09 December 1998
• Docket Number: No. CIV.A. 98-293.,CIV.A. 98-293.
• Citation: 29 F.Supp.2d 214
• Parties: J.C., a minor by his parents, J.C. and C.C., Plaintiffs, v. MENDHAM TOWNSHIP BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

29 F.Supp.2d 214

J.C., a minor by his parents, J.C. and C.C., Plaintiffs, v. MENDHAM TOWNSHIP BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendant.

No. CIV.A. 98-293.

United States District Court, D. New Jersey.

December 9, 1998.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Herbert D. Hinkle, Lawrenceville, NJ, for Plaintiffs.

Ellen S. Bass, Rand, Algeier, Tosti & Woodruff, Morristown, NJ, for Defendant.

OPINION

WOLIN, District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on its application for attorneys' fees pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). The Court has decided the matter pursuant to Rule 78 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons stated herein, the Court will deny plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and dismiss plaintiffs' complaint without prejudice.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff J.C. is a minor who has certain learning disabilities that entitle him to receive specialized educational instruction pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. In accordance with the individualized educational program developed for J.C. for the period from March 10, 1997, to March 10, 1998, he was placed in a program at the Developmental Learning Center ("DLC"), a private facility located outside his school district, Mendham Township Public Schools ("Mendham"), the defendant in this matter.

Subsequent to J.C.'s initial placement at DLC, Mendham created an in-district special education program that Mendham felt would better meet J.C.'s educational needs than DLC. In July and August of 1997, J.C.'s parents and Mendham discussed the possibility of transferring J.C. from DLC to the in-district program beginning in the fall of 1997. J.C.'s parents felt that the decision to transfer J.C. to the in-district program was premature and sought additional investigation of the matter. A barrage of correspondence ensued between the parties.

In a letter dated August 25, 1997, J.C.'s parents requested that J.C. be permitted to continue to attend DLC pending the resolution of his placement. Mendham did not directly address this request but did propose, in a letter dated August 29, 1997, a meeting between J.C.'s parents and various Mendham personnel on September 4, 1997, "to further discuss the in-district program we are designing for your son." J.C.'s parents did not receive this letter until September 2, 1997, and they notified Mendham that they would be unable to attend the meeting. J.C.'s father asserts that on September 2, 1997, he called Mendham and was informed that Mendham was denying the parents' request to continue J.C.'s placement at DLC.

On September 9, 1997, Herbert D. Hinkle ("Mr.Hinkle"), counsel for J.C. and his parents, filed a petition with the Office of Special Education of the New Jersey Department of Education, requesting a due process hearing in accordance with the provisions of N.J.A.C. 6A:14-2.7. On September 11, 1997, Mr. Hinkle filed, on behalf of plaintiffs, a notice of motion and supporting letter brief with the Commissioner of Education seeking emergent relief maintaining J.C.'s placement at DLC "until the dispute over the proposed change in placement is resolved." In support of their argument, plaintiffs cited to the "stay-put" provisions of 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j), which provides that during the pendency of any proceedings conducted pursuant to the IDEA, "the child shall remain in the then-current educational placement of such child ...."

Also on September 11, 1997, Mendham sent J.C.'s parents a letter advising that J.C.'s placement at DLC would terminate on September 26, 1997, and that on September 29, 1997, J.C. would begin his new placement at the in-district program.

On September 16, 1997, Mr. Hinkle and Ellen S. Bass ("Ms.Bass"), counsel for Mendham, had a telephone conversation memorialized in a letter from Ms. Bass to Mr. Hinkle of the same date. In her letter, Ms. Bass indicated that Mendham agreed to continue paying tuition for J.C.'s placement at DLC "until the parents have had an opportunity to visit the proposed new program and discuss it in greater detail with school personnel." Ms. Bass advised Mr. Hinkle that J.C.'s parents could disregard the September 29, 1997 date specified in Mendham's September 11, 1997 letter for J. C. to begin the in-district placement. She noted that "it is important that a meeting with the [Child Study] Team, and a visit to the new program, be arranged and take place promptly." Ms. Bass's letter mentioned that "in light of the above," Mr. Hinkle had expressed a willingness to withdraw the due process and emergent relief requests, without prejudice, in order to give the parties an opportunity to resolve the situation amicably.

Mr. Hinkle then sent a letter dated September 17, 1997, to the Division of Special Education and the Office of Administrative Law, stating that his clients' request for emergent relief "has been settled and I am withdrawing that motion. The settlement also resolves the underlying dispute ...." Mr. Hinkle asked that the "underlying petition" be withdrawn without prejudice.

On October 22, 1997, Seth N. Broder of Mr. Hinkle's office wrote to Ms. Bass, stating, "Now that the above case has been settled, please contact this office and advise as to your client's position regarding reimbursement of fees in this matter."

In a certification accompanying Mendham's opposition to J.C.'s motion for summary judgment, Ms. Bass asserts that the parties' efforts subsequent to September 1997 to amicably resolve the issue of J.C.'s placement were unavailing. As a result, she wrote to the Division of Special Education on October 23, 1997, requesting the initiation of mediation pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:14-2.6. There is no indication on the record before the Court as to further progress in resolving the issue of J.C.'s placement.

On January 23, 1998, plaintiffs filed a complaint with this Court seeking recovery of attorneys' fees pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). In the complaint, plaintiffs make the following allegations:

6. Last year, a dispute arose between Plaintiffs and Defendant concerning the placement of J.C., with the Defendant seeking to move J.C. from his current placement at the Developmental Learning Center ("DLC"), a private school for children with autism and related disabilities, to alternatively, an in-district program.

7. Plaintiffs refused the change in placement believing that J.C. continued to need the highly specialized services available to DLC and that he would seriously regress if moved at this time to the program advocated by Defendant.

8. When efforts to informally resolve the matter failed, Plaintiffs sought a hearing before the New Jersey Commissioner of Education pursuant to the procedure established under the IDEA.

9. While the matter was pending before the Commissioner of Education, Defendant agreed to Plaintiffs' demand for continued placement at DLC.

10. Plaintiffs are prevailing parties within the meaning of 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(E)(4) [now 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)] and are entitled to reimbursement of attorney's fees and costs in conjunction with this matter.

Plaintiffs have moved for summary judgment on their complaint, and defendant has opposed summary judgment.

DISCUSSION

Jurisdiction

The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(A) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Summary Judgment

The Court may grant summary judgment only if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

Where a summary judgment motion is properly made and supported, "an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleading, but the adverse party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(e). If the adverse party fails to respond with a showing that there is a genuine issue for trial, "summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the adverse party." Id.

In making its determination, the Court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See National State Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 979 F.2d 1579, 1581 (3d Cir.1992).

Standard for Recovery of Attorneys' Fees Under § 1415(i)(3)(B)

Pursuant to § 1415(i)(3)(B), in any action brought under § 1415, "the court, in its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the costs to the parents of a child with a disability who is a prevailing party."

Naturally, much debate has surrounded the determination of what qualifies a party as "prevailing." The legislative history of the most recent amendment to the attorneys' fees provision of the IDEA directs that the term "`prevailing party' ... be construed consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 440, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983)." H.R.Rep. No. 105-95, at 105-06 (1997), reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 78, 103-04. The Court notes that the determination of whether a party is prevailing "is left to the sound discretion of the court in light of the policies which Congress sought to promote in enacting the provisions." D.B. v. Ocean Township Bd. of Educ., 985 F.Supp. 457, 541 (D.N.J.1997), aff'd, 159 F.3d. 1350, No. 97-5813 (3d Cir. July 21, 1998).

Hensley is the first in a line of cases that interpret a statutory provision comparable to § 1415(i)(3)(B) that authorizes courts to grant attorneys' fees to the prevailing party in civil rights cases. See 42 U.S.C....