J. D. H. v. Juvenile Court of St. Louis County

• Decision Date: 29 April 1974
• Docket Number: No. 58558,58558
• Citation: 508 S.W.2d 497
• Parties: In the Interest of J. D. H., a child under seventeen years of age, Petitioner, v. JUVENILE COURT OF ST. LOUIS COUNTY, Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Page 497

508 S.W.2d 497

In the Interest of J. D. H., a child under seventeen years

of age, Petitioner, v. JUVENILE COURT OF ST. LOUIS COUNTY, Respondent.

No. 58558.

Supreme Court of Missouri, En Banc.

April 29, 1974.

Harvey Tessler, Clayton, for petitioner.

Corinne R. Goodman, Supervising Atty., Clayton, for respondent; Gregory D. Hoffmann, Law Student Intern.

SEILER, Judge.

This is habeas corpus involving a juvenile. The question is whether the juvenile court of St. Louis County, Missouri, is unlawfully restraining him. We conclude it is not and accordingly deny relief.

The juvenile is a resident of St. Louis County. He is now between 16 and 17 years of age. On February 7, 1973, after a hearing on a supplemental petition, he was placed under the jurisdiction of the St. Louis County juvenile court. The court's order of that date made a finding of and exercised jurisdiction over the juvenile and, after providing for a six month's commitment to the Division of Mental Health and calling for reports and further review by the court, concluded by stating 'All subject to the continuing jurisdiction of the court.' This order was modified on March 16, 1973 to transfer custody, with the matter of further disposition to be reviewed by the court and concluding with these words: 'All subject to the continuing jurisdiction of the Court and courtesy supervision to be arranged by the Deputy Juvenile Officer.'

On October 1, 1973, the juvenile allegedly abducted a woman in St. Louis County and took her car after she escaped. He was apprehended that same day in Jefferson County, Missouri while driving the car west on U.S. 66, by officers of the highway patrol, who delivered him to the juvenile officer in Jefferson County. Within a few hours the juvenile officer released him to police officers from St. Louis County, who took him from Jefferson County to the detention center of the St. Louis County juvenile court, where he has since been held under order of the St. Louis County juvenile court. There is pending before that court a supplemental petition filed January 21, 1974 by the juvenile officer of St. Louis County, alleging that the behavior, environment, and associations of the child were injurious to his welfare, by reason of the alleged offenses of October 1, 1973.

The juvenile contends that inasmuch as he was apprehended and taken into custody in Jefferson County and there delivered to the juvenile officer of that county, the juvenile court of Jefferson County obtained exclusive jurisdiction over him and therefore St. Louis County is without jurisdiction to detain him. Respondent takes the position that the juvenile court of St. Louis County, having already taken and continued jurisdiction over the child as shown by the above orders, is the only juvenile court which has exclusive, original jurisdiction over the juvenile to detain him and hear subsequent petitions filed concerning him, citing Sec. 211.041. ¹

The juvenile code, chapter 211, establishes a statewide juvenile court system for Missouri. Sec. 211.031 gives this statewide juvenile court system original jurisdiction of all juvenile proceedings under that section, to the exclusion of courts of general jurisdiction. In addition, Sec. 211.131 provides that a juvenile comes under the protective wing of the juvenile court system--that is, that the statewide juvenile court system has exclusive jurisdiction of a juvenile from the time he is taken into custody. Sec. 211.061 aids these provisions by requiring that once a juvenile is taken into custody by police he 'shall be taken immediately and directly before the juvenile court or delivered to the juvenile officer or person acting for him.' This insures that custody of the juvenile is given to the juvenile court system, which has exclusive jurisdiction to determine proper disposition of the juvenile.

Sec. 211.041 provides: 'When jurisdiction over the person of a child has been acquired by the juvenile court under the provisions of this chapter in proceedings coming within the applicable provisions of Section 211.031, the jurisdiction of the child may be retained for the purpose of this chapter until he has attained the age of twenty-one years . . .'

In the case before us, the juvenile court of St. Louis County acquired jurisdiction over the person of the juvenile by the proceedings which culminated in the order of February 7, 1973. The court retained jurisdiction in this order and retained jurisdiction in its modification order of March 16, 1973. Thus, when J. D. H. was apprehended on October 1, 1973, in Jefferson County, he was under the continuing jurisdiction of the St. Louis County juvenile court, pursuant to that court's orders and the authority of Sec. 211.041.

Petitioner argues that Jefferson County has exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile because he was apprehended in that county. Petitioner relies heavily on language in In re M. W., 504 S.W.2d 189 (Mo.App.1973), to the effect that jurisdiction vests immediately in the juvenile court of the county where the juvenile was apprehended and that jurisdiction cannot be divested by the action of the police in transporting the juvenile to another county. Counsel also cites State v. Adams, 485 S.W.2d 442 (Mo.App.1972) and In re Shaw, 449 S.W.2d 380 (Mo.App.1969) to the same effect, to which could be added the decision of In re C. W., Jr., v. Murphy, 508 S.W.2d 520, decided April 9, 1974 by the Court of Appeals, St. Louis district. There is an important difference between those cases and the present case. None of the cases cited involved the situation where one juvenile court already had continuing jurisdiction over the juvenile at the time he was apprehended in another county. The language of the M.W., Adams, Shaw and C. W., Jr. cases, then, must be read in the context of the facts of those cases. In the case at bar, St. Louis County had already taken and retained jurisdiction under Sec. 211.041, which was not true of any of the cases relied on by counsel. Hence, at the time the juvenile was apprehended in Jefferson County he was under the continuing jurisdiction of St. Louis County and thus there was no jurisdiction available for Jefferson County to acquire. ²

Petitioner says that Sec. 211.041 gives the juvenile court judge a right to retain only a very limited jurisdiction, '. . . a narrow discretion which is limited to the same subject matter or matters arising out of the same transaction . . .' Petitioner relies on several cases to support this narrow construction of Sec. 211.041, State ex rel. Dzurian v. Hoester, 494 S.W.2d 67 (Mo. banc 1973); In re Adoption of K, 417 S.W.2d 702 (Mo.App.1967); State ex rel. Grimstead v. Mueller, 361 Mo. 92, 233 S.W.2d 700 (banc 1950); and In re Sypolt's Adoption, 230 S.W.2d 877 (Mo.App.1950). ³ All of these cases involve the question of whether or not a juvenile court's continuing jurisdiction extends to include jurisdiction to hear a subsequent adoption case. These cases hold that if a juvenile court first obtains jurisdiction on the basis of neglect of the child or termination of parental rights or a parent's waiver of necessity to consent to future adoption, this jurisdiction does not continue to hear a different subject matter, namely, petition for adoption of the child. These cases do not preclude continuing jurisdiction in St. Louis County juvenile court in the case before us. Here the subsequent petition filed concerning petitioner does involve the same subject matter, i.e., subsequent acts of misconduct by the juvenile.

Our construction of Sec. 211.041 accords with the purpose and philosophy of the juvenile court system as expressed in Sec. 211.011 that it is the purpose of the juvenile code 'to facilitate the care, protection and discipline of children who come within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.' In addition, '(t)he philosophical underpinning of the juvenile justice system is premised upon the belief that rehabilitation is more desirable than retribution, that retributive justice is less in the long-term interests of society than is corrective justice. Indeed, with respect to delinquency, it is the rhetoric of rehabilitation that serves as the sole justification for the independent existence of the juvenile justice system apart from the criminal justice system. See generally, Comment, Juvenile Court Waiver: The Questionable Validity of Existing Statutory Standards, 16 St.L.U.L.J. 604 (1972).' R. Habiger, Prosecution of Children in Missouri, 30 J.Mo.B. 11, n. 7 (1974). It should also be remembered that proceedings under the juvenile code are civil, not criminal. Thus, the emphasis of the juvenile code is on continuing care, protection and rehabilitation of the juvenile.

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