J. G. Hutchinson & Co. v. Morris Bros.

• Decision Date: 25 May 1908
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals
• Parties: J. G. HUTCHINSON & CO. v. MORRIS BROS. (BRASSFIELD, Interpleader.)

110 S.W. 684

131 Mo. App. 258

J. G. HUTCHINSON & CO. v. MORRIS BROS. (BRASSFIELD, Interpleader.)

Kansas City Court of Appeals. Missouri.

May 25, 1908.

1. TRIAL — RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE — OBJECTIONS — SUFFICIENCY.

The statement "I don't think it would be competent" is insufficient as an objection to the admission of evidence; a statement as to why the evidence was incompetent being required.

2. SAME.

Plaintiffs cannot complain of the admission of a letter in evidence, where, on it being offered, they objected, "unless" the whole letter should be read, and the court ordered the whole letter admitted.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Grundy County; P. C. Stepp, Judge.

Action by J. G. Hutchinson & Co. against Morris Bros., in which John F. Brassfield interpleaded. From a judgment for interpleader, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

See 190 Mo. 673, 89 S. W. 870.

Platt Hubbell, for appellant. Hall & Hall, for respondent.

ELLISON, J.

This case was here on former appeal, and is reported in 86 Mo. App. 40, where a statement of the case can be found. It is perhaps necessary to state shortly that the plaintiffs as wholesale merchants sold to Morris Bros., a partnership composed of Marion and Charles Morris, a bill of goods, for which afterwards they brought an action for the purchase price and sued out an attachment which was levied upon their partnership property. After the sale of the goods by plaintiffs Marion Morris became indebted to the interpleader Brassfield in the sum of $500 in the manner shown by said statement. To secure interpleader from the debt of Marion Charles executed in the firm name a mortgage on their partnership effects, which interpleader failed to have recorded. The plaintiffs contend that it was agreed between the parties to leave it off the record, but interpleader testified that he thought that he had had it recorded, and that it was a mistake on his part in not having it done. The interpleader claimed that the goods were turned over to him by Charles Morris to pay the debt, and that he did not claim by virtue of his mortgage. Marion Morris was not present at the time the mortgage was executed, and the interpleader in order to show that he consented to the sale and transfer of the goods to himself, introduced the statement of witnesses, which consisted of what Charles told them Marion had told him. The cause was reversed on the ground that the evidence was mere hearsay. The court in the opinion used this language: "None of these witnesses pretended that Marion himself had said he authorized the sale." In the brief in that case appellants (the plaintiffs) admitted that it was competent to have proved what the witness himself heard Marion say in reference to the matter. The judgment in the trial court was again for the interpleader.

We have examined the evidence taken at the last trial, and we are content with the action of the trial court in refusing a demurrer to the evidence in interpleader's behalf. A careful re-examination of the entire case has left us satisfied with the views heretofore expressed. At the last trial, as at the first, interpleader endeavored to show that Marion Morris, for whom interpleader had furnished cash bail and which Marion forfeited, had consented that Charles Morris, who was his partner and brother, should turn over to interpleader the stock of goods in controversy as indemnity to the latter. He undertook at the first trial to show such consent by having witnesses state, not what they had heard Marion say, but what they heard Charles say Marion had said to him. Plaintiffs objected to such evidence as hearsay, but it was received by the trial court, and we reversed the case for another trial. As stated above,...