J. K. Gill Co. v. Fireside Realty, Inc.
| Decision Date | 27 July 1972 |
| Citation | 499 P.2d 813,262 Or. 486 |
| Parties | , 11 UCC Rep.Serv. 202 J. K. GILL COMPANY, a corporation, Respondent, v. FIRESIDE REALTY, INC., a corporation, Appellant, Security Corp. Builders and Realtors, a corporation, Defendant. |
| Court | Oregon Supreme Court |
Howard R. Hedrick, Portland, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief were Hedrick & Fellows, P.C., Portland.
John P. Kneeland, Portland, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Bernard, Hurley, Hodges & Kneeland, Portland.
Before O'CONNELL, C.J., and McALLISTER, DENECKE, HOLMAN, TONGUE and HOWELL, JJ.
The plaintiff, J. K. Gill Company, successfully sued to foreclose a security agreement entered into pursuant to the Uniform Commercial Code.
Gill sold office furniture to Security Corporation Builders and Realtors. In February 1968 Security bought more furniture. To secure the sale the parties entered into a security agreement. The security agreement states the collateral is 'Furniture as per attached listing.' No listing was attached to the security agreement introduced into evidence. A financing statement was filed which is necessary to perfect the creditor's security interest. It states the collateral to be 'Furniture as per attached listing.' The financing statement on file at the courthouse had no listing attached.
The credit manager of Gill testified he prepared both the security agreement and the financing statement and he attached thereto invoices for furniture purchased by Security. According to the witness, these were invoices from September 1966 through February 1968. The witness did not know whether the invoices were attached when either Gill or Security executed the security agreement.
In April 1969 Security negotiated with the defendant Fireside Realty to sell it all of Security's personal property, including office furniture. Security informed Fireside of Gill's security interest. Fireside attempted to determine the items on which Gill claimed a security interest. The financial statement filed at the courthouse gave no information as the invoices were not attached. Fireside called Gill and a representative of Gill brought a number of loose invoices and stated it had a security interest in the furniture listed thereon. The invoices shown to Fireside at this time and the invoices it is contended were attached to the security agreement are not the same. There is a substantial difference. Fireside purchased Security's property. ORS 79.2030 provides:
'(1) * * * (A) security interest is not enforceable against the debtor or third parties unless:
'* * *
'(b) The debtor has signed a security agreement which contains a description of the collateral * * *.'
The official comment to this section states:
* * *.'
Paragraph 5 of the comment provides:
* * *.'
The security agreement is the evidence of the contract of the debtor and creditor. It is not the instrument that gives notice to the third party of the creditor's interest in the property. Notice is provided by the filing of the financing statement. The security agreement, like any other contract, must be sufficient certain in its terms so as to evidence the agreement of the parties.
The parties argued the sufficiency of the description in both the security agreement and the financing statement. We are grounding our decision on the description in the security agreement. 1
ORS 79.1100 provides that for the purposes of the secured transactions portion of the Uniform Commercial Code, 'any description of personal property or real estate is sufficient whether or not it is specific if it reasonably identifies what is described.'
The comment to this section states:
'* * * Under this rule courts should refuse to follow the holdings, often found in the older chattel mortgage cases, that descriptions are insufficient unless they are of the most exact and detailed nature, the so-called 'serial number' test * * *.'
The purpose of this section is stated by Gilmore to be:
...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Community Bank v. Jones
...the loans or collateral involved will not invalidate an otherwise effective security agreement. 10 In J. K. Gill Company v. Fireside Realty, 262 Or. 486, 488, 499 P.2d 813, 814 (1972), we held that a "security agreement, like any other contract, must be sufficiently certain in its terms so ......
-
Komas v. Future Systems, Inc.
...items of property are covered by a secured interest. See Uniform Commercial Code § 9--203, Comment 3; J. K. Gill Co. v. Fireside Realty Inc., 262 Or. 486, 488, 499 P.2d 813 (1972). The second purpose of the signed-writing requirement is to serve as a Statute of Frauds, preventing the enforc......
-
Amex-Protein Development Corp., In re
...or could be found would the instant case be analogous to Rusch. 'This last conclusion is bolstered by J. K. Gill Company v. Fireside Realty, Inc., 262 Or. 486, 499 P.2d 813 (1972), a case similar to Rusch which cited and relied upon Rusch as authority for a similar conclusion. A security ag......
-
In re Modafferi, Bankruptcy No. 83 B 20598.
...which items of property are covered by a secured interest. See Uniform Commercial Code § 9-203, Comment 3; J.K. Gill Co. v. Fireside Realty Inc., 262 Or. 486, 488, 499 P.2d 813 (1972). The second purpose of the signed-writing requirement is to serve as a Statute of Frauds, preventing the en......