J.K. v. State

Decision Date17 July 2020
Docket NumberCourt of Appeals No. A-13372
Citation469 P.3d 434
Parties J.K., Petitioner, v. STATE of Alaska, Respondent.
CourtAlaska Court of Appeals

Renee McFarland, Assistant Public Defender, and Beth Goldstein, Acting Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Petitioner.

Nancy R. Simel, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Kevin G. Clarkson, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Respondent.

Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Wollenberg and Harbison, Judges.

OPINION

Judge ALLARD.

A criminal defendant is incompetent to stand trial when, as a result of a mental disease or defect, the defendant is "unable to understand the proceedings against the defendant or to assist in the defendant's own defense."1 It is a violation of due process to try a defendant who is incompetent to stand trial.2 When a defendant has been found to be incompetent, the trial court is required to stay the criminal proceedings.3 Under AS 12.47.110(a), a trial court has the authority to commit an incompetent defendant "to the custody of the commissioner of health and social services" for up to 90 days in an effort to restore the defendant to competency. This initial commitment period is mandatory in all felony cases but discretionary in misdemeanor cases.4

The only facility that currently provides competency restoration treatment in the State of Alaska is the Alaska Psychiatric Institute (API), which is administered by the Department of Health and Social Services. For some time, API has had significant capacity issues, with only ten beds available in their forensic unit. As a result, waitlists have developed, and incompetent defendants who have been committed for competency restoration are instead remaining in jail for long periods of time awaiting transfer to API. These delays in obtaining competency restoration treatment raise serious due process concerns.5

The current case involves an incompetent defendant, J.K.,6 who was charged with a misdemeanor and committed to the custody of the Department of Health and Social Services for competency restoration treatment under a 90-day commitment order. J.K. was placed on a waitlist and remained in jail pending admission to API. When it became clear that the 90-day order was likely to expire before J.K. could be transferred to API, J.K.’s defense attorney moved to dismiss the case in the furtherance of justice. The district court denied this motion. Later, after the 90-day order expired — with J.K. still in jail and still on API's waitlist — J.K.’s defense attorney moved a second time to dismiss the case. This time, the attorney argued that J.K.’s right to substantive due process under Jackson v. Indiana7 was being violated by the delay in receiving treatment and that the proper remedy for this constitutional violation was dismissal without prejudice. At the urging of the prosecutor, however, the trial court entered a second 90-day commitment order and ultimately denied the motion to dismiss.

In response, J.K.’s attorney filed a petition to this Court, seeking immediate review of the trial court's ruling. Instead of filing a response to the petition, the State responded by dismissing J.K.’s case without prejudice under Alaska Criminal Rule 43(a)(1). Although J.K.’s case was now moot, we granted the petition under the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine.8 We now hold that the prolonged delay in obtaining competency restoration treatment violated J.K.’s right to substantive due process and required dismissal without prejudice of J.K.’s criminal case.

Factual background

In March 2018, J.K. was arrested and charged with fourth-degree fear assault, a misdemeanor.9 The charge was based on an incident at a Juneau restaurant in which J.K. allegedly approached another patron and threatened her with a butter knife. At arraignment, it was clear that J.K. had serious mental health issues; the court questioned whether "there might be a Title 47 issue" and stated that "in an abundance of caution," it would require a "Title 47" before J.K.’s release — a consideration that was never addressed again.

(Title 47 governs the civil commitment of persons who are mentally ill and, as a result of that condition, are likely to cause harm to themselves or others, or are gravely disabled.10 This civil procedure for involuntary commitment is independent from any criminal proceedings that may have been instituted.11 )

J.K. was appointed an assistant public defender. The assistant public defender filed an unopposed motion for a competency evaluation, which was granted by the court. By the time the evaluation was submitted (approximately three weeks after the 60-day deadline set by the court), J.K. had already been in custody for 143 days.

The forensic psychologist who conducted the evaluation, Dr. Dianna Rehn, had difficulties with the evaluation. J.K. is Korean and has limited proficiency in English. Dr. Rehn attempted to interview J.K. twice — the second time with an interpreter — but J.K. was continually shouting at the interpreter. The interpreter also stated that J.K. was speaking an "atypical" form of Korean that was mostly "gibberish."

Dr. Rehn reported that J.K. was not doing well in custody and that he had been transferred to the jail's acute mental health unit. J.K. was noncompliant with his psychotropic medications and was exhibiting bizarre behavior, including walking around naked, reacting to internal stimuli, speaking gibberish, and barking. J.K. refused to shower and was "malodorous." He had also developed an eye infection

after placing his fingers in his rectum and then in his eye. J.K. refused any treatment for this eye infection.

Dr. Rehn diagnosed J.K. with "an unspecified schizophrenia

spectrum or other psychotic disorder," and she concluded that he was incompetent to stand trial — that is, she found that J.K. lacked the capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense.12 The doctor opined that treatment with psychiatric medications would "likely improve [J.K.’s] symptoms," but it was "unclear [if] this improvement would restore [J.K.] to competency." Dr. Rehn further opined that it was "highly unlikely" that J.K. could be restored to competency if he continued to be noncompliant with his psychotropic medications. She also noted that restoration services were likely to be made more difficult by J.K.’s limited English.

A status hearing regarding the competency evaluation was held on August 14, 2018. By the time of the hearing, J.K. had already served 149 days in custody.

At the hearing, the trial court found J.K. incompetent to stand trial, and the court ordered J.K. to be committed to API for competency restoration treatment under AS 12.47.110(a). The trial court acknowledged that it was not required to order competency restoration treatment in J.K.’s case because he was only charged with a misdemeanor.13 But the court justified its decision to order treatment on the ground that J.K. would likely be a danger to himself and to others if released or, "at the very least, gravely disabled." The court did not address the possibility of a dismissal without prejudice and civil commitment under Title 47.

The trial court committed J.K. to the custody of the Department of Health and Social Services (the department that administers API) for a period not to exceed 90 days. The written order was signed the day after the hearing — on August 15 — and distributed on August 21.

On September 6, API notified the court that its forensic beds were full and that J.K. was number twenty-six on the waitlist. API further informed the court that it was "likely" that the delay in admitting J.K. to API would account for "most, if not all" of the 90-day commitment order. During the delay, J.K. would remain in jail without any competency restoration treatment.

The trial court held a status hearing on September 12 to discuss the delay in obtaining treatment. The defense attorney noted that J.K. was only charged with a misdemeanor, that he had already been in custody for almost six months, and that there was a low likelihood that he was even restorable to competency. The trial court agreed that the forensic report indicated that Dr. Rehn "didn't really have a high level of confidence that things were going to improve," and, in fact, "[J.K.] was getting progressively worse." The court called API to help "decide where [to] go for [J.K.] at this point," and it scheduled another hearing on the matter for the following week.

The next day, on September 13, J.K.’s defense attorney filed a motion to dismiss under Alaska Criminal Rule 43(c). Criminal Rule 43(c) grants trial courts limited authority to dismiss criminal cases in "furtherance of justice."14 The defense attorney argued that dismissal of J.K.’s charge was the appropriate remedy given the delay that had already occurred, the delay that was anticipated to occur, and the amount of time J.K. had already spent in custody. The defense attorney pointed out that the maximum penalty for a class A misdemeanor is one year and that J.K. would likely have served that time by the time he was admitted to API.

The State filed an opposition to J.K.’s motion to dismiss, arguing that there was no injustice because delay was a normal part of the process. According to the prosecutor, "[i]t does not work an injustice to the defendant if the [statutory] procedure [of determining a defendant's competency to stand charges and restoring him to competency] is followed, regardless of the status of negotiations or the length of time [J.K.] may face if convicted of this crime."

The next status hearing was held on November 6. At that hearing, the defense attorney inquired when the trial court would rule on the pending motion to dismiss and noted that J.K. had been in custody for 233 days — "nine days away from a year with good time."15 The trial court explained that it still needed more information, and it again called API for an update regarding J.K.’s status on the waitlist....

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  • R.B. v. State
    • United States
    • Alaska Court of Appeals
    • 30 Junio 2023
    ...court may decline to commit the defendant and instead may dismiss the case. As support for this contention, R.B. relies in large part on J.K. v. State - is this Court's only case discussing the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Jackson v. Indiana.[11] In Jackson, the United States Su......

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