J. L. Mott Iron Works v. Arnold
Decision Date | 20 June 1913 |
Citation | 35 R.I. 456,87 A. 17 |
Parties | J. L. MOTT IRON WORKS v. ARNOLD. |
Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Exceptions from Superior Court, Providence and Bristol Counties; Darius Baker, Judge.
Action by the J. L. Mott Iron Works against John A. Arnold. There was a verdict for defendant, and plaintiff brings exceptions. Overruled in part, and sustained in part, with directions to enter judgment for plaintiff.
Henry E. Tiepke, Henry M. Boss, Jr., and Louis W. Dunn, all of Providence, for plaintiff.
William A. Spicer, Jr., Frank H. Swan, and Edwards & Angell, all of Providence, for defendant.
This is an action on the case, brought by the plaintiff, a creditor of the Pawtucket Steam & Gas Pipe Company, a Rhode Island corporation created by special act of the General Assembly, to enforce certain statutory liabilities alleged to have been incurred by the defendant as a director of said company, under the provisions of Pub. St. R. I. 1882, c. 155, later re-enacted as Gen. Laws R. I. 1896, c. 180.
The declaration contains three counts, but the second, since abandoned by the plaintiff, need not be considered. In the first count the plaintiff attempts to set forth a case within that portion of the statute imposing a penalty upon directors for failure to make and file a certificate stating the amount of capital stock added and paid in within ten days after the payment of the last installment of the increase thereof. To this count the defendant demurred, contending that the plaintiff had not stated a case within the terms of the statute. The third count seeks to impose upon the defendant a director's liability under the statute, on the ground that the total indebtedness of the company was allowed to exceed the amount of its capital stock actually paid in, while the defendant was one of its directors. To this count the defendant pleaded the general issue, and also filed a special plea stating that prior to the commencement of this suit the debts of the company had been reduced below the amount of the capital stock paid in, by the payment of certain dividends in bankruptcy. To this special plea the plaintiff demurred.
Both demurrers, that of the defendant to the first count and that of the plaintiff to the special plea to the third count, were decided on February 15, 1910, in favor of the defendant, and these rulings were duly excepted to. Subsequently, on October 20, 1910, the case was heard on its merits before a judge of the superior court and a jury, the defendant admitting for the purpose of the suit substantially all the allegations of the third count, including that of excess of Indebtedness over paid-in capital stock, and that as to the amount of the debt which it was sought to recover. This debt was admitted by the defendant and proved by the plaintiff to be $1,154.28, with interest thereon from June 13, 1907. The only defense claimed was that set up under the special plea to the third count. Upon motion of the defendant, the jury was directed to return a verdict of not guilty in favor of the defendant, and thereupon the plaintiff preferred its bill of exceptions, on which the case is now before this court.
The bill contains six exceptions, which will he more fully set forth hereinafter. The first two are to the rulings sustaining the defendant's demurrer to the first count of the declaration, and overruling the plaintiff's demurrer to the special plea to the third count. The other rulings excepted to relate to testimony excluded or admitted in accord with the rulings on the demurrers, and to the direction of a verdict for defendant.
The first exception was to the decision sustaining the demurrer to the first count. The provisions of the statute under which it is sought to charge the defendant with liability in the first count are as follows (Pub. Stat. 1882, c. 155, §§ 1, 2, 3; Gen. Laws 1896, c. 180, §§ 1, 2, 3):
That part of the first count based on this statute, with which the demurrer is concerned, reads:
The grounds assigned for demurrer to this count are:
At the hearing of the demurrer two questions were in issue: First, whether the first count is defective in not alleging payment of the entire increased capital. Second, whether, irrespective of the above question, the first count is defective in not alleging payment of any part of the increased capital, and generally in not stating a case within the statute.
This court is of opinion that the demurrer to the first count was properly sustained. This court states that the capital stock was originally fixed by vote of the corporation, September 1, 1891, at $50,000; but it does not state whether or not said stock to that amount was ever actually issued, or ever actually paid for, or whether or not any certificate of such payment was ever made. It further states authority from the General Assembly in 1904 for an increase of $50,000 in preferred stock; but it does not show that any definite increase under this last authority was ever fixed and limited by vote of the company. It simply states that the company actually increased its capital stock, and issued $10,727 first preferred stock. It does not state that this last issue of stock was ever paid for. The count is fatally defective in these particulars, and clearly fails to state a case of liability against a director under sections 2, 3, above quoted. There is nothing to show that the duty ever devolved upon the officers of the company to file any certificate as provided in the said sections. The statute plainly and clearly provides the same proceedings in case of an increase of stock as in case of original capital "fixed and limited." It must appear in both cases that the capital or the increase has been ...
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...it cannot lawfully be impaired. Cleveland v. Jencks Mfg. Co., 54 R.I. 218, 221, 171 A. 917, 918. * * *" See also J. L. Mott Iron Works v. Arnold, 35 R.I. 456, 87 A. 17, L.R.A.1915D, 1028; Baker v. Smith, 41 R.I. 17, 102 A. Said Sec. 41, supra, prohibits the making of dividends except "from ......
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...to acquaint themselves with its financial standing and to preserve its capital for their benefit. In Mott Iron Works v. Arnold, 35 R. I. 456, 409, 87 Atl. 17, 21 [L. R. A. 1915D, 1028], this court said "The capital stock paid in is under the policy of our law, as under similar laws of other......
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