J.M., In re

• Decision Date: 14 November 1996
• Parties: In re J.M. Appeal of J.M.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

Page 185

685 A.2d 185

454 Pa.Super. 276

In re J.M.

Appeal of J.M.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted July 8, 1996.

Filed Nov. 14, 1996.

Etta M. Warman, Uniontown, for appellant.

Joseph E. Ferens, Jr., Uniontown, for Fayette County, participating party.

Before HUDOCK, SCHILLER, and MONTEMURO ^*, JJ.

SCHILLER, Judge.

Appellant appeals from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County denying her challenge to an order for involuntary treatment. We reverse.

FACTS:

On January 11, 1996, Patrick Morrison, acting on behalf of the Fayette County Mental Health Administration, ¹ visited appellant's house, along with a Uniontown police officer, in response to reports he had received, in part from appellant's sister who lived in Connecticut, concerning the appellant's mental well-being. Appellant would not allow Morrison or the officer into her home. Morrison then left the premises and obtained a warrant to take appellant into custody for emergency medical treatment, as provided by 50 P.S. § 7302 of the Mental Health Procedures Act. ² Accompanied by two Uniontown police officers, Mr. Morrison returned to appellant's home. Again, appellant would not let them into her home. A 45 minute discussion ensued through the appellant's closed door, during which time appellant was talking on the telephone with her sister from Connecticut. One of the officers present at the house testified that he received information from his dispatch that they had received a telephone call from appellant's sister to the effect that appellant was threatening to harm herself and her adult son, who resided with her. The officers then forcibly entered the house and found appellant pointing a loaded gun at them. With the help of appellant's son, the officers disarmed the appellant and took her into custody. ³ Appellant was taken into custody pursuant to 50 P.S. § 7302, which allows treatment up to 120 hours.

Upon being taken into custody, the appellant was examined by Dr. Cesar Noche at Uniontown Hospital, who determined that she needed mental health treatment. Appellant was then transferred to Highlands Hospital, where Dr. Joel Last diagnosed her as suffering from a delusional disorder and ordered emergency treatment. A few days later, a petition for extended treatment was made, pursuant to 50 P.S. § 7303. A hearing was held before Herbert G. Mitchell, the Fayette County Mental Health Review Officer. Mr. Mitchell found that appellant was severely mentally disabled, and ordered further treatment, not to exceed the twenty days allowed by the statute.

Approximately two weeks later, the hospital sought a further extension for emergency treatment, and filed a petition for extended treatment under 50 P.S. § 7304, which allows for treatment up to 90 days. On February 2, 1996, a hearing was again held before Mr. Mitchell, at which time he recommended that appellant be confined at Torrance State Hospital. On February 6, 1996, the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County, per the Honorable Gerald R. Solomon, entered an order for involuntary treatment at Torrance State Hospital. This order was entered without a hearing, and was based on the recommendation of the review officer. Appellant then filed a petition for review of this order. On February 8, 1996, the trial court held a hearing, at the close of which the court denied appellant's petition for review. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION:

Appellant raises two issues for review: (1) whether the preparation and service of the warrant for emergency examination violated appellant's right to procedural due process; and (2) whether the evidence at the petition for review hearing was sufficient to justify the 90 day treatment order.

At issue in this case are several sections of the Mental Health Procedures Act [MHPA]. Sections 7301-7306 of the MHPA provide for the involuntary commitment of those persons who are "severely mentally disabled."

Section 7302(a) provides for the emergency examination of an individual upon a warrant issued by the county administrator:

Warrant for Emergency Examination.--Upon written application by a physician or other responsible party setting forth facts constituting reasonable grounds to believe that a person is severely mentally disabled and in need of immediate treatment, the county administrator may issue a warrant requiring a person authorized by him, or any peace officer, to take such person to the facility specified in the warrant.

50 P.S. § 7302(a)(1).

Section 7301(a) states that a person is "severely mentally disabled"

when, as a result of mental illness, his capacity to exercise self-control, judgment and discretion in the conduct of his affairs and social relations or to care for his own personal needs is so lessened that he poses a clear and present danger of harm to others or to himself.

50 P.S. § 7301(a). The statute then defines in some detail what is meant by "clear and present danger." ⁴

Appellant first argues that the warrant secured by Mr. Morrison was defective in that it did not allege sufficient grounds to take appellant into custody.

The warrant was obtained by Patrick Morrison of the county health offices. He completed the warrant and had it approved by the county administrator at approximately 5:30 P.M. on January 11, 1996. The warrant was based on two sources of information: unsworn reports Mr. Morrison had received concerning the appellant's mental well-being, coming from appellant's sister in Connecticut, and his observations of the appellant when he first visited her house at approximately 3:00 P.M. on January 11, 1996. The warrant stated:

[Appellant] has made many calls to law enforcement agencies, i.e. FBI, City Police, Attorney General's office, Pgh [Pittsburgh] rape hotline and many others. She is very delusional in that she feels that she is a federally protected witness. She is very paranoid and guarded. She would not allow us in the home. She was disheveled with a contusion to her right eye. She said that she would speak only to the FBI. At this time she is clearly unable to care for herself. She would benefit from inpatient care.

Warrant, MHPA § 302 [50 P.S. § 7302] (emphasis added).

There is little in the statute or in the case law that offer assistance in our consideration of whether reasonable grounds were alleged in this warrant. The one case we have found involving such a warrant, Uram v. County of Allegheny, 130 Pa.Cmwlth. 148, 567 A.2d 753 (1989), provides little guidance on the standards governing warrants, and is clearly a different case on the facts. ⁵ As a result, we must turn to criminal procedure to examine how arrest warrants, the closest analogy to the warrant under the MHPA, are reviewed.

In order to be valid, an arrest warrant must show probable cause for the arrest. Pa.R.Crim.P. 119(a). In considering whether an arrest warrant satisfies the requirement of probable cause, Pennsylvania Courts use the totality of the circumstances approached formulated by the United States Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). See Commonwealth v. Rogers, 419 Pa.Super. 122, 137, 615 A.2d 55, 62 (1992). Only the information within the four corners of the warrant may be examined in determining whether the warrant was sufficient. Id.; Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 526 Pa. 374, 382, 586 A.2d 887, 891 (1991); see also Commonwealth v. Weidenmoyer, 518 Pa. 2, 8, 539 A.2d 1291, 1294 (1988) (same rule for search warrants).

In this case, Mr. Morrison testified that he never checked with the FBI to see if the appellant was a protected witness or if she had ever had dealings with the FBI. Nor did he claim to have any personal knowledge that appellant made the calls to the law enforcement agencies. His statement that she was very "paranoid and guarded" is actually a medical conclusion that he was not qualified to make. ⁶

In addition, at no time in making his investigation did Mr. Morrison attempt to talk to appellant's son, daughter or brother, all of whom lived in the same area as appellant. ⁷ Instead, he relied on the statements of appellant's sister, who lived in Connecticut and who, according to appellant's daughter, had a serious conflict with the appellant. ⁸

In the criminal context, our courts have held that the police must show some specific facts that would give them a substantial basis for believing the information supplied by an informant. ⁹ Commonwealth v. Stokes, 480 Pa. 38, 44, 389 A.2d 74, 76 (1978). This requirement exists to insure that the information that the police rely on was actually witnessed by the informant and is not merely an unsubstantiated rumor or a well-constructed fabrication. Id., at 45, 389 A.2d at 77. Certainly, those same concerns are present in the mental health context. Mr. Morrison had no prior contacts with appellant's sister, was not aware of appellant's relationship with her sister, and did not have any knowledge of her veracity. As such, Mr. Morrison had no basis to believe that the sister was reliable and her statements trustworthy.

Finally, our statute clearly provides that for involuntary mental commitment, one must be severely mentally disabled such that one is a clear and present danger to himself or others. ¹⁰ While Mr. Morrison's personal observations led him to conclude that appellant was delusional, he did not state that she represented a clear and present danger to others or to herself, and there was no evidence of any overt act showing such a danger, as required by the statute.

The county argues that when the facts concerning the second visit to appellant's home are included, the warrant was sufficient. This argument is grounded in the fact that after he had taken appellant into the hospital, Mr. Morrison amended the warrant to include the following: "When serving 302, [appellant] threatened to shoot herself and her 23 year old son and, in fact, pointed a loaded automatic pistol at police and MH delegate. She is clearly...