J. McDonald v. Rockhill Iron & Coal Co

• Decision Date: 12 May 1890
• Docket Number: 12
• Citation: 135 Pa. 1,19 A. 797
• Parties: J. McDONALD v. ROCKHILL IRON & COAL CO
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

19 A. 797

135 Pa. 1

J. McDONALD v. ROCKHILL IRON & COAL CO

No. 12

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

May 12, 1890

Argued April 21, 1890

APPEAL BY DEFENDANT FROM THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF HUNTINGDON COUNTY.

No. 12 January Term 1890, Sup. Ct.; court below, No. 37 December Term 1884, C.P.

On December 18, 1884, John McDonald brought case against the Rockhill Iron & Coal Company, to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been received by the plaintiff in consequence of the defendant company's negligence. The defendant pleaded not guilty.

At the trial, on February 14, 1889, the following facts were shown:

On January 16, 1882, the plaintiff, who was then about fifty-two years of age, was in the employ of the defendant company as a miner of coal in its mine at Robertsdale, Huntingdon county. On the morning of that day, about seven o'clock, he entered the mine by what was known as No. 3 heading, to go to his work. At a point in the mine, about a quarter of a mile from the opening of No. 3 heading, was a perpendicular shaft extending from the floor of the main gangway to the surface of the earth, a distance of from 70 to 80 feet. In this shaft were two elevators or "cages," by means of which the loaded mine cars were hoisted to the surface. The machinery was so arranged that while one of the cages was ascending the other would be descending. When they were running, a man was stationed at the top of the shaft to attend to removing the loaded cars from the cages and to return them when emptied. The signals for hoisting the cages were given to the engineer, through this man, by the drivers at the bottom of the shaft, who would call up to him when their cars were placed in the cages. There was no metal speaking-tube between the top and bottom of the shaft. The cages were intended exclusively for hoisting coal, and the miners were not allowed to ride in them, though they sometimes did so. Except by descending the shaft in the cages, the only way by which the miners could enter the mine was through the opening to the surface, at the outer end of heading No. 3.

The cages, when at the bottom, rested in excavations about eighteen inches deep, made in the gangway, the purpose of which was to bring the floors of the cages, when at rest, on a level with the floor of the gangway. These excavations were called "sumps." At the side of one of these sumps a passage, called a man-way, was cut out, around the shaft sufficiently wide to enable a person to get through when carrying mining tools, by going sidewise. The plaintiff and other miners had to pass the shaft to get to their work, and the only way of doing so was by going through the narrow man-way, or else by crossing one of the sumps. The miners employed in the defendant's mines, including the plaintiff, were in the habit of passing over the floors of the cages when they would be resting in the sumps, and, at other times, of stepping into and passing through the sumps themselves. During the winter time the cages would be left at night suspended in the shaft, so as to avoid their freezing to the bottom of the sumps; and miners going to their work early in the morning would often cross the sumps while the cages were still in that position. The plaintiff was familiar with the shaft and its surroundings and the manner of operating it.

When the plaintiff, on the morning of his injury, reached a point about four or five yards from the shaft, he passed two drivers, engaged in conversation; one of them had sent up a loaded car, and the other had a car ready to send up and was waiting for the cage to come down. On reaching the shaft the plaintiff attempted to pass around it, but was deterred by reason of an accumulation of ice in the man-way, rendering it slippery. Standing in the man-way, he looked up the shaft as far as he could see from that position, which was to a height of about eight or ten feet. Neither cage was down at that time. He did not call up to the man at the top, to inquire whether the cages were running, nor make any inquiry of the drivers whom he had passed. Not seeing or hearing anything of them, and supposing that they were swung in the shaft stationary, he stepped into the sump, with the intention of crossing it. While in the act of so doing, he did not look up; but just as he made a step to go through, after getting his whole body into the sump, being in a stooping position and looking down at the ground to see where he was stepping he was struck by a descending cage and crushed to the earth underneath it. He testified that he had not time to look up from the sump before he was struck. Hearing him moan, one of the drivers who was standing near, called up to the man at the top of the shaft to have the cage hoisted again, and this was done almost immediately. The time usually occupied by the cages in descending the shaft was from thirteen to fifteen seconds, but on that morning they were running more slowly than usual. One of the drivers testified that, although hard of hearing, he heard the cage descending before it struck the plaintiff. The plaintiff, however, testified that it made so little noise in running, that it was impossible to hear it. On being asked, upon cross-examination, whether he took much time to examine either the man-way or the sump, the plaintiff replied: "A. I took time enough to go through; just as I got into the sump I was struck, I came there and I couldn't get through the man-way, and I wanted to get through as soon as I could to my work, and I had no time to take the time, as I thought it was all right." A large part of the testimony describing the circumstances surrounding the accident, is quoted in the opinion of the Supreme Court, infra.

At the close of the testimony, the court, FURST, P.J., after reviewing the evidence, charged the jury in part as follows:

In 1877 [act of April 18, 1877, P.L. 56], the legislature passed an act providing the method for securing the health and safety of persons employed in the bituminous coal mines in Pennsylvania. Several provisions of this act have been discussed in your hearing before the court. It is only for the purpose of calling your attention to that portion of the act that we deem material, that we say that many of its provisions have no relation to the case that you are sworn to try. . . . There is, however, one provision in this act of assembly, to which I desire to call your attention, because it has a very important bearing upon the question of fact, which will be submitted to you. It is the latter part of the sixth section, and it is in this language: "There shall be cut in the side of every hoisting shaft, at the bottom thereof, a traveling way, sufficiently high and wide to enable persons to pass the shaft in going from one side of the mine to the other, without passing over or under the cage or other hoisting apparatus.". . . .

First, Did the defendant establish a passage way around the shaft, or did the defendant knowingly consent to and permit the miners to use a passage way through this pit? If you find that the defendant permitted a passage way through this pit to be used, then another very important question is to be determined by you before you can find a verdict against the defendant, and that is, did this plaintiff know of the dangerous condition of that passage way; or, by the use of ordinary care and diligence could he have known it at the time? If he did, or if he could have had such knowledge, and then entered into the pit, he cannot recover, because his injury would be the result of his own negligence; and wherever his negligence causes the injury, or participates in the injury, he cannot recover. If you find he had such knowledge, or ought to have had, under the circumstances of the case, or if you find also he did not use proper precaution, that he did not stop to look and listen, and then was injured, he could not recover.

But if you find that the defendant adopted this passage way through the pit, and if you find further from the evidence that the plaintiff used every precaution and care that he should have used under the circumstances, that is, before he entered the pit; that he looked to see whether the cages were in motion and that he listened to hear whether the cages were in motion, and that having no knowledge of the danger he passed into the pit; if you find that he was careful in all of these particulars, then a recovery may be had by the plaintiff; and we say to you further, that if the plaintiff knew that the cages were in motion and attempted to cross under, that of itself would be negligence on his part, because no man, who should enter under a descending weight of that kind, could expect not to be injured; it would be the ordinary result of going into a dangerous place under such circumstances.

If, upon a careful consideration of all the evidence, you find that the defendant was not negligent, your verdict must be for the defendant; or, if you find that although the defendant may have been negligent in some particulars with regard to these mines, and that the negligence of the defendant did not contribute to the injury of the plaintiff, then your verdict must be still for the defendant; if you further find that the plaintiff was negligent, even though the defendant was negligent, there can be no recovery. If, on the other hand, you find negligence on the part of the defendant and it resulted in the injury to the plaintiff, and you find that the plaintiff used due care and precaution and was not negligent, then it will be your duty to assess damages for the plaintiff for the injuries received on the 16th of January, 1882. . . .

The defendant has presented certain points in writing, and has requested the court to answer; it is our duty to read...