J.N.C.B. v. Officer
Decision Date | 28 June 2013 |
Docket Number | No. WD 75299.,WD 75299. |
Parties | In the Interest of J.N.C.B., Appellant, v. JUVENILE OFFICER, Respondent. |
Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Patricia Ann Harrison, St. Louis, MO and Stephanie Allen, Rule 13 Student, for appellant.
Michael R. Fogal and Terence M. O'Malley, Kansas City, MO, for respondent.
Before Division Three: CYNTHIA L. MARTIN, Presiding Judge, JOSEPH M. ELLIS, Judge and GARY D. WITT, Judge.
J.N.C.B. appeals the judgment of the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri, Juvenile Division sustaining the allegations against him for burglary in the second degree. J.N.C.B. argues on appeal that the trial court erred in finding sufficient evidence that pursuant to Section 569.170, 1 J.N.C.B. committed the delinquent act of burglary in the second degree because no fact finder could reasonably conclude that each and every element was proven beyond a reasonable doubt, particularly the intent to steal. For reasons stated below, the judgment of the juvenile court is reversed.
The following facts were adduced at trial from the sole witness, Edward Johnson (“Johnson”), a patrol officer for the Kansas City Public Schools. At approximately 7 p.m. on March 13, 2012, Johnson was called to Northeast Middle School due to an alarm trip that indicated an intrusion or motion within the building. Northeast Middle School is a closed school building and does not permit entry by anyone without authorization of the school board. The building contained property, including computers and furniture remaining from its prior use, but was no longer in use as a school.
Johnson did not notice any immediate signs of intrusion, so he waited for other officers to arrive. Another officer arrived and noticed that the south door of the building was propped open by a rock. Johnson and Officer Long 2 entered the building, and heard laughter, noise, and ruckus from the southeast side of the building.
Johnson testified that
Johnson and Long positioned themselves at the opposite end of the hallway as the juveniles approached the east exit. The officers shined their flashlights on the juveniles and ordered them to stop and freeze. One of the juveniles had possession of a broom, but Johnson testified that he did not believe the juveniles were trying to steal the broom. Johnson searched the juveniles and secured all items from their pockets. None of the juveniles had any weapons, tools, or items of property from the school in their possession.
The officers took the three juveniles into custody, including J.N.C.B., who was fourteen years old at the time, and held them at the east entrance until Kansas City police officers arrived. After being taken into custody by the Kansas City police officers, J.N.C.B. was alleged, by the juvenile officer, to have committed one count of burglary in the first degree, a class B felony, pursuant to section 569.160.3
At the close of the juvenile officer's evidence,4 J.N.C.B. filed a motion for judgment of acquittal, arguing, among other things, that the juvenile officer failed to establish that J.N.C.B. possessed the requisitemental state for any degree of burglary and that the juvenile officer failed to prove that there was anyone present in the building, an element necessary for burglary in the first degree. The trial court overruled J.N.C.B.'s motion but concluded that the evidence established the lesser-included offense of burglary in the second degree beyond a reasonable doubt pursuant to section 569.170.
Review of juvenile proceedings is analogous to other court-tried cases. M.A.A. v. Juvenile Officer, 271 S.W.3d 625, 628 (Mo.App. W.D.2008) (citing In the Interest of G.F.M., 169 S.W.3d 109, 111 (Mo.App. W.D.2005)). The judgment must be affirmed unless it is not supported by substantial evidence, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law. In re D.M., 370 S.W.3d 917, 922 (Mo.App. E.D.2012) (citing In re J.A.H., 293 S.W.3d 116, 119 (Mo.App. E.D.2009)).
The determination on appellate review is whether there is sufficient evidence from which the fact finder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Langdon, 110 S.W.3d 807, 811 (Mo. banc 2003). In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, we “view the evidence and reasonable inferences which may be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the verdict and we ignore all evidence and inferences to the contrary.” C.L.B. v. Juvenile Officer, 22 S.W.3d 233, 236 (Mo.App. W.D.2000) (citation omitted). “An inference is a conclusion drawn by reason from facts established by proof; a deduction or conclusion from facts or propositions known to be true.” State v. Gonzalez, 235 S.W.3d 20, 24 (Mo.App. S.D.2007) (internal quotations and citation omitted). “While we are to accept as true all inferences favorable to the State, they must be logical inferences that may be reasonably drawn from the evidence.” Id. (emphasis added). We disregard contrary inferences, unless they are such a natural and logical extension of the evidence that a reasonable fact finder would be unable to disregard them. Langdon, 110 S.W.3d at 811 (quoting State v. Grim, 854 S.W.2d 403, 411 (Mo. banc 1993)). In viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, “courts will not supply missing evidence or give the state the benefit of unreasonable, speculative or forced inferences.” Langdon, 110 S.W.3d at 811–12 (quoting State v. Whalen, 49 S.W.3d 181, 184 (Mo. banc 2001)).
In his sole point on appeal, J.N.C.B. contends that the trial court erred in finding sufficient evidence that he committed the delinquent act of burglary in the second degree pursuant to section 569.170.1. That provision provides that “[a] person commits the crime of burglary in the second degree when he knowingly enters unlawfully or knowingly remains unlawfully in a building or inhabitable structure for the purpose of committing a crime therein.”
The juvenile officer alleged in the petition that J.N.C.B. “knowingly entered unlawfully, and knowingly remained unlawfully, in ... Northeast Middle School ... for the purpose of ... stealing.” J.N.C.B. does not dispute that the evidence supported the first element, that J.N.C.B. “knowingly enters unlawfully or knowingly remains unlawfully” in the building. Rather, J.N.C.B. contests the sufficiency of the evidence only as to whether the juvenile officer proved he was in the building “for the purpose of committing a crime,” in this case, stealing.
Where, as here, there is no direct evidence of a defendant's intent to commit a crime, “[t]he elements of burglary second degree may be proved by circumstantial evidence.” State v. Jenkins, 741 S.W.2d 767, 768 (Mo.App. E.D.1987) (citation omitted). “Proof of conduct before, during or after the offense are circumstances from which one's participation in the offense may be inferred.” Id. “Evidence of forcible entry coupled with defendant's presence inside the building is sufficient to support a charge of burglary.” Jenkins, 741 S.W.2d at 768–69. “Consummation of the intended crime of stealing is not essential to establishing that the intruder entered the building with the necessary intent to sustain the burglary charge.” State v. Haslar, 887 S.W.2d 610, 614 (Mo.App. W.D.1994) (citation omitted). “A conviction may rest upon a collection of related facts, no one of which alone is sufficient to support a conviction.” Jenkins, 741 S.W.2d at 768.
The tension between the parties centers on the often-cited proviso that “[i]ntent to steal may be established by unlawful entry into a building containing items of value.” State v. Moore, 729 S.W.2d 239, 240 (Mo.App. E.D.1987) ( ).5 In affirming convictions against challenges to sufficiency of the evidence, although courts often note this particular inference, it has always been in tandem with additional supportive facts and inferences, often including forced entry, flight, weapons, burglary tools, admissions, established or readily presumed knowledge of the presence of valuables, or the movement of valuable items within the building by the defendant or an accomplice. See, e.g., State v. Ford, 367 S.W.3d 163 (Mo.App. W.D.2012) ( ); State v. Gibbs, 306 S.W.3d 178, 179 (Mo.App. E.D.2010) ( ); Haslar, 887 S.W.2d at 614–15 ( ); State v. Hall, 785 S.W.2d 652, 653 (Mo.App. E.D.1990) ( ); State v. Blaney, 801 S.W.2d 447, 449 (Mo.App. E.D.1990) ( )(jury rejected defendant's testimony as to his reason for breaking into home while occupants were gone and was free to infer intent to steal); Jenkins, 741 S.W.2d at 769 ( ); State v. Patterson, 741 S.W.2d 298, 299 (Mo.App. S.D.1987) ( ); State v. McNair, 719 S.W.2d 113, 114 (...
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