J.P. v. Taft

Decision Date21 July 2006
Docket NumberNo. C2-04-692.,C2-04-692.
Citation439 F.Supp.2d 793
PartiesJ.P., and all others similarly situated, et al., Plaintiffs, v. TAFT, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio

Jennifer M. Kinsley, Sirkin Pinales & Schwartz, Cincinnati, OH, Kimberly Brooks Tandy, Children's Law Center, Covington, KY, Stephen L. Pevar, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, Hartford, CT, for Plaintiffs.

Joseph M. Mancini, Philip A. King, Ohio Attorney General, Geoffrey J. Moul, Murray Murphy Moul & Basil, Columbus, OH, Mary Anne Reese, Attorney General of Ohio, Cincinnati, OH, for Defendants.

ORDER AND OPINION

MARBLEY, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter is before the Court on the Defendants' Third Motion for Summary Judgment.1 For the reasons set forth herein, the Court DENIES Defendants' Third Motion for Summary Judgment.

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
A. Background

Defendant, Ohio Department of Youth Services ("ODYS") serves as that "legal custodian for [Ohio] juvenile offenders, age 10-21 who have been adjudicated delinquent as a result of committing felony violations." Pl.'s Ex. A. ODYS operates by fund or contract institutions including but not limited to: Circleville Juvenile Correctional facility, Mohican Juvenile Correctional facility, Cuyahoga Hills Juvenile Correctional Facility, Scioto Juvenile Correctional Facility, Ohio River Valley Juvenile Correctional Facility, Indian River Juvenile Correctional Facility, Freedom Center, and the Marion Juvenile Correctional Facility. See Pls.' Ex. A.2 ODYS also has six parole offices, and contracts with a private sector provider for services. See id. "At any given time, [Ohio] DYS has approximately 1,800 youth3 in its custody in the correctional facilities [listed above]." Id.

In 1992, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that because juvenile offenders cannot make effective use of legal materials by themselves, they require the assistance of lawyers to allow them meaningful access to the courts. See John L. v. Adams, 969 F.2d 228, 233 (6th Cir.1992).4 Nonetheless, this right to assistance of counsel has been narrowly interpreted to mean that juvenile offenders are not entitled to legal assistance on "general civil matters arising solely under state law." Id. Moreover, the right to assistance of counsel is limited to "the preparation and the filing of the complaint." See Knop v. Johnson, 977 F.2d 996, 1005-07 (6th Cir. 1992); see also, Bee v. Utah State Prison, 823 F.2d 397 (10th Cir.1987); Nordgren v. Milliken, 762 F.2d 851, 855 (10th Cir. 1985); Ward v. Kort, 762 F.2d 856 (10th Cir.1985).

B. Procedural History
1. The Initial Lawsuit

In July 2004, four youth (J.P., S.J., H.H. and D.B.) filed a proposed class action suit in federal court. See Complaint. Plaintiffs alleged that the Defendants violated the First, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and corresponding provisions of the Ohio Constitution by denying access to the courts to juveniles committed to ODYS as juvenile delinquents or serious juvenile offenders. See id.; J.P., et al., 2005 WL 2405993, at *1. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, asking the Court to declare Defendants' actions unconstitutional and to require Defendants to provide them with access to attorneys. See id.

On January 7, 2005, Defendants filed their First Motion for Summary Judgment in which they argued that the four Plaintiffs named in the Complaint had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies and, therefore, lacked standing to challenge Defendants' legal assistance program. See Defs.' First Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs responded to Defendants' motion. See Pls.' Opp. to Defs.' First Motion for Summary Judgment.

Taking Plaintiffs' pending claims into account, Defendants made extensive changes to the ODYS legal assistance program,5 and, on January 12, 2005, they filed their Second Motion for Summary Judgment, in which they argued that the four Plaintiffs named in the initial Complaint lacked standing to sue. See Defs.' Second Motion for Summary Judgment.6 Shortly thereafter, on March 7, 2005, Plaintiffs filed their first Amended Complaint, adding M.M. and T.M. as named plaintiffs.7 Plaintiffs also served Defendants with a written discovery request in an effort to "probe the content, scope, and operation of [the Defendants'] new program." See Pls.' Motion at 5; Pls.' Ex. A. Plaintiffs requested that Defendants produce the contract between ODYS and program attorneys, Larry Mathews ("Mathews") and Sharon Hicks ("Hicks"), so that Plaintiffs could "assess the scope of [the attorneys'] duties," as well as a description of any and all legal services the new ODYS legal services program was to provide in order to determine whether it, in fact, met the requirements of the law. Pls.' Motion at 5. In response, Defendants filed a motion to stay all discovery, which the Court subsequently granted. Id.

Defendants filed their Third Motion for Summary Judgment on August 1, 2005 in which they reiterated their previous assertions and insisted that M.M. and T.M., the two additional named plaintiffs, lacked standing. See Pls.' Motion at 5-6; Defs.' Third Motion for Summary Judgment. In response, Plaintiffs, once again, sought to "engage in discovery designed to uncover the content, scope, and operation of Defendants' new legal assistance program, and served Defendants with a second request for production of documents along with a first set of interrogatories." See Pls.' Motion at 6; Pls' Reply to Defs.' Response to Pls.' Motion for Extension of Time. In making their discovery request, Plaintiffs sought both an extension to the period of discovery set in the Court's preliminary pretrial order and an extension of time to respond to Defendants' Third Motion for Summary Judgment. See Pls.' Motion at 6; Pls.' Motion to Extend Discovery; Pls' Motion for Extension.

On February 7, 2005, the Court held a telephonic hearing and ruled, inter alia, that Plaintiffs could not engage in any discovery regarding Defendants' new legal assistance program, issuing a protective order to that effect. See Pls.' Motion at 1. The Court held that before any such discovery could occur, the parties and the Court needed to address the issues of jurisdiction, standing, and the exhaustion of administrative remedies present in Defendants' various motions for summary judgment. Id.

2. The Second Amended Complaint

With the Court's permission, Plaintiffs filed their seconded amended complaint on May 18, 2005. See Pls.' Second Amended Complaint; see supra note 7. Shortly thereafter, Defendants filed a motion requesting disqualification of Plaintiffs' Attorney, Kim Brooks Tandy for causing herself to become a material witness in the case. See Defs.' Motion to Disqualify Plaintiffs' Counsel.

On September 29, 2005, this Court granted Defendants' Second Motion for Summary Judgment based on the Court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction to entertain Plaintiffs' claims. See J.P., 2005 WL 2405993, at *19.8 In so holding, the Court also denied as moot Defendants' First Motion for Summary Judgment,9 and Defendants' Motion to Disqualify Kim Brooks Tandy as Plaintiffs' Counsel. Id. Finally, the Court also dismissed, without prejudice, Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification, noting that Plaintiffs may have an opportunity to re-file the motion following the Court's resolution of the Defendants' Third Motion for Summary Judgment. Id.

On March 15, 2006 the Court denied both Plaintiffs' Motion to Table the Court's Preliminary Pretrial Order, and Plaintiffs' Rule 59 Motion to Alter or Amend the Court's September 29, 2005 Opinion and Order. Also, on April 21, 2006, the Court granted Defendant Taft's Motion to Dismiss, dismissing all counts brought against Governor Taft, leaving Defendant Stickrath and Defendant ODYS as the sole defendants. See supra note 1.

3. Facts Regarding T.M.

On March 17, 2006, the parties engaged in a telephonic status conference before the Court. During the status conference, the Court re-opened discovery limited to the claims of T.M., the sole remaining plaintiff in this case.10

a. T.M.'s Assault Allegations

The following facts regarding T.M. are adopted, in relevant part, from the Court's previous opinion in this case. See J.P., 2005 WL 2405993, at *4-5. At the time the Plaintiffs' filed their Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff T.M. was an eighteen-year-old youth who had been in ODYS custody for approximately two years. See id. at *5. After a brief stay at the reception center in Scioto, Ohio, T.M. was permanently assigned to Marion Juvenile Correctional Facility ("MJCF") for the duration of his commitment. See Second Amended Complaint 11. While at MJCF, T.M. was placed in a number of different units, but he was housed in Building 5 for the majority of his confinement. Id.

On October 14, 2004, T.M. and other inmates in Unit 5B, engaged in a small uprising, banging on their doors in order to get permission to use the bathroom. See J.P., 2005 WL 2405993, at *5.11 During the incident, a Juvenile Corrections Officer ("JCO") entered T.M.'s room and restrained him, "choking him out" until T.M. was rendered unconscious. Id. T.M. also sustained an eye injury when the JCO hit him in the eye. Id. Additionally, T.M. claims that after being assaulted, he received inadequate medical care for his injuries. Id.12 When T.M. was released from the infirmary on October 15, 2004, he was transferred to Unit 2D in Building 2 and never returned to Building 5. See Defs.' Ex. A-1, Youth Injury & Assessment Form (10/15/2004); Defs.' Ex. A-3, Interdisciplinary Progress Notes (10/18/2004); Ex. A, Decl. of Jeffrey Rollins (5/4/2006); Ex. E, Aff. of Doneta Riegsecker (describing the movement for T.M. from the date of the incident to the date he was released from DYS).13 Unlike youth in Building 5, youth in Unit 2D of Building 2 have a toilet and sink in their rooms; thus, they do...

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