J.R.C. v. Mobile Cnty. Dep't of Human Res.

• Decision Date: 18 June 2021
• Docket Number: 2190975
• Parties: J.R.C. v. MOBILE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
• Court: Alabama Court of Civil Appeals

342 So.3d 580

J.R.C.

v.MOBILE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES

2190975

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

June 18, 2021

Jessica Y. Pilgrim, Mobile, for appellant.

Steve Marshall, att'y gen., and Felicia M. Brooks, chief legal counsel, and Karen P. Phillips, asst. att'y gen., Department of Human Resources, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

J.R.C. appeals from a judgment of the Mobile Juvenile Court ("the juvenile court") purporting to terminate his parental rights to J.C.J.C. ("the child"). The Mobile County Department of Human Resources ("DHR"), which filed the petition seeking to terminate his parental rights, as well as the parental rights of C.H. ("the mother") and A.H. ("the mother's husband"), contends on appeal, both in its appellate brief and in a motion to dismiss the appeal, that the juvenile court did not have jurisdiction over J.R.C. and asks this court to dismiss the appeal. We agree with DHR that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to consider the parental rights of J.R.C., and we therefore grant its motion and dismiss the appeal, with instructions to the juvenile court to vacate the portion of its final judgment purporting to terminate J.R.C.'s parental rights.

Background

On July 3, 2019, DHR filed a verified petition to terminate the parental rights of the mother, the mother's husband, and J.R.C. In its petition, DHR stated that the mother's husband is the father of the child "pursuant to marriage," see § 26-17-204(a)(1), Ala. Code 1975 (defining a "presumed father" as the husband of the mother at the time of the child's birth), and that J.R.C. is the child's father by virtue of having been listed on the child's birth certificate.

At the trial on DHR's petition, DHR social worker Vera Evans testified that the mother's husband was the "legal father" of the child, and she identified J.R.C. as an "alleged father," as did several documents admitted into evidence. According to DHR's regulations, an "alleged father" is defined as "a man who alleges himself to be, or is alleged to be, the genetic father or a possible genetic father of a child, but whose paternity has not been determined. ..." Ala. Admin. Code (Dep't of Hum. Res.), r. 660-3-11-.01(c). The term "alleged father" does not include a presumed father. Id. No other evidence was presented at trial as to the relationship between J.R.C. and the child. J.R.C. did not attend the trial, and evidence presented at the trial indicated that J.R.C. had been convicted of rape in Louisiana and that he was incarcerated in a maximum-security prison, with a scheduled release date in 2042.

On September 11, 2020, the juvenile court entered an amended judgment terminating the parental rights of the mother, the mother's husband, and J.R.C. Although the juvenile court did not, in its amended judgment, formally adjudicate the issue of paternity, the amended judgment identifies the mother's husband and J.R.C. as "father and alleged father respectively."

J.R.C. filed a timely notice of appeal to this court. The mother and the mother's husband did not appeal. On January 20, 2021, DHR filed a motion in this court seeking to have the appeal dismissed because, it said, the juvenile court had lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate J.R.C.’s parental rights. It argued that J.R.C. was not the child's legal father and, as a result, had not established that he had any parental rights to the child in the face of the mother's husband's status as the child's legal father. J.R.C. did not respond to DHR's motion.

Analysis

The termination of parental rights is governed by the Alabama Juvenile Justice Act ("the AJJA"), § 12-15-101 et seq., Ala. Code 1975. The statute authorizing a juvenile court to terminate parental rights provides that, if the juvenile court determines that "the parents of a child are unable or unwilling to discharge their responsibilities to and for the child, or that the conduct or condition of the parents renders them unable to properly care for the child ..., it may terminate the parental rights of the parents." § 12-15-319(a), Ala. Code 1975 (emphasis added). The AJJA defines "parent" as "[t]he legal mother or the legal father of a child under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court" pursuant to the AJJA. § 12-15-102(19), Ala. Code 1975 (emphasis added). The AJJA does not further define the term "legal father," but that term has a commonly understood legal meaning:

"The man recognized by the law as the male parent of a child. • A man is the legal father of a child if he was married to the child's natural mother when the child was born, if he has recognized or acknowledged the child, or if he has been declared the child's natural father in a paternity action. ..."

Black's Law Dictionary 640 (8th ed. 2004).¹ Consistent with that definition, Alabama law recognizes a man as a legal father of a child when he is the "presumed father" of the child, see § 26-17-204, Ala. Code 1975, or has been adjudicated as the father of the child, see § 26-17-201(b), Ala. Code 1975. Under DHR's regulations, an "alleged father" does not meet the criteria to be considered a "legal father" and, therefore, is not a "parent" whose parental rights are subject to termination by a juvenile court under the AJJA.

In his dissent, Presiding Judge Thompson opines that certain considerations render untenable the use of these definitions to determine who constitutes a "legal father." However, principles of statutory construction instruct this court to interpret the plain language of a statute to mean exactly what it says and to engage in judicial construction only if the language in the statute is ambiguous. Ex parte Pratt, 815 So. 2d 532, 535 (Ala. 2001). Thus, we are confined to what Presiding Judge Thompson calls the "limited definition of ‘parent’ " set forth in the definitional section of the AJJA, § 12-15-102, 342 So. 3d at 589. Any concern that the use of that definition of "parent" in a case plainly governed by the AJJA might, for public-policy reasons, result in what this court may view as an "untenable" outcome does not allow this court to ignore the plain language the legislature employed in crafting the governing statutes. As our supreme court has explained:

"It is true that when looking at a statute we might sometimes think that the ramifications of the words are inefficient or unusual. However, it is our job to say what the law is, not to say what it should be. Therefore, only if there is no rational way to interpret the words as stated will we look beyond those words to determine legislative intent. To apply a different policy would turn this Court into a legislative body, and doing that, of course, would be utterly inconsistent with the doctrine of separation of powers. See Ex parte T.B., 698 So. 2d 127, 130 (Ala. 1997)."

DeKalb Cnty. LP Gas Co. v. Suburban Gas, Inc., 729 So. 2d 270, 276 (Ala. 1998).

In exercising jurisdiction over juvenile cases, a juvenile court may validly render a judgment only as authorized by the AJJA. See Ex parte R.H., 311 So. 3d 761, 766 (Ala. Civ. App. 2020). Because the AJJA does not provide for termination of the parental rights of alleged or putative fathers, a juvenile court's purported termination of such rights as to an alleged or putative father falls outside its statutory authority.² A judgment entered beyond a court's statutory authority is outside the jurisdiction of the court. See Dubose v. Dubose, 132 So. 3d 17, 21 (Ala. Civ. App. 2013).

Here, because J.R.C. was never shown to be anything more than the "alleged father" of the child, the juvenile court did not have the authority to adjudicate his parental rights, if any. Although the juvenile court could have first determined in a paternity adjudication whether J.R.C. was the legal father of the child, DHR did not ask the juvenile court to do so, nor did that court act on its own motion to do so. Having thus acted outside its jurisdiction in purporting to terminate J.R.C.'s parental rights, that portion of the juvenile court's judgment is void. See Johnson v. Metro Land Co., 18 So. 3d 962, 967 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009) (holding portion of judgment void for lack of jurisdiction); A.S. v. T.R.B., 246 So. 3d 963, 969 n.1 (Ala. Civ. App. 2017). A void judgment will not support an appeal. See Holt v. Holt, 319 So. 3d 1281 (Ala. 2020). Accordingly, DHR's motion to dismiss the appeal is granted, and the appeal is dismissed with instructions to the juvenile court to vacate the portion of its final judgment purporting to terminate J.R.C.'s parental rights.

APPEAL DISMISSED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

Moore, Hanson, and Fridy, JJ., concur.

Edwards, J., concurs in the result and dissents from the instructions, with writing.

Thompson, P.J., dissents, with writing.

EDWARDS, Judge, concurring in the result and dissenting from the instructions.

To be certain, the circumstances giving rise to this appeal are not ideal. The Mobile County Department of Human Resources ("DHR") commenced an action in the Mobile Juvenile Court ("the juvenile court") seeking the termination of the parental rights of two men, J.R.C. and A.H., alleging in its complaint that J.R.C. was listed as the father of J.C.J.C. ("the child") on the child's birth certificate and that A.H. was the child's presumed father by virtue of his being married to the child's mother, C.H. ("the mother"). See Ala. Code 1975, § 26-17-204(a)(1)-(4) (setting out the presumptions of paternity based on marriage or attempted marriage). Thus, it appears that DHR was not certain which of the two men was, in fact, the child's legal father and, therefore, listed both on the complaint so that the rights of whichever man was declared the father could be terminated.

However, DHR did not request that the juvenile court determine the child's paternity and failed to present sufficient evidence to prove which of the men was, in fact, the child's legal father. Although DHR's complaint indicated that A.H. was "the father of the ... child pursuant to marriage," the sole witness at the trial, Vera Evans,...