J.R. ex rel. R. v. Waterbury Bd. of Educ., 3:00CV887 (WWE).
| Decision Date | 20 July 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:00CV887 (WWE).,3:00CV887 (WWE). |
| Citation | 272 F.Supp.2d 174 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
| Parties | J.R. By and Through her parents and next friends, Mr. and Mrs. R, and Mr. & Mrs. R, Plaintiffs, v. WATERBURY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Valerie Stolfi-individually and in her official capacity, Barbara Wiggins-individually and in her official capacity, Elizabeth Gallagher-individually and in her official capacity, City of Waterbury, Goodwill Industries of Western Connecticut, Inc., Laurel Jordan, Maria Castro, Ilona Leffingwell, Laidlaw Transit, Inc., Jacqueline Recchia, Security Services of Connecticut, Inc., Joshua Vega, Jeffrey Small, the Connecticut Department of Education, Theodore Sergi, individually, and George Dowaliby, individually, Defendants. |
David C. Shaw, Law Offices of David C. Shaw, Bloomfield, CT, for Plaintiffs.
Charles Emil Oman, III, Elaine M. Skoronski, Corporation Counsel's Office, City of Waterbury, Waterbury, CT, Steven R. Dembo, Berman, Bournes, Aaron & Dembo, LLC, Wet Hartford, CT, Justin J. Donnelly, Sr., Windsor Locks, CT, John K. McDonald, Kernan & Henry, Waterbury, CT, Carla R. Walworth, Adam S. Bozek, Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker, Stamford, CT, Jame L. Brawley, Patricia A. Tisdall, Morrison, Mahoney & Miller, LLP, Hartford, CT, Ronald Joseph Loricco, Frederick Joseph Trotta, LoRicco, Trotta & LoRicco, New Haven, CT, Jon S. Berk, Patty G. Swan, Gordon, Muir & Foley, Holly Jean Bray, Attorney's General's Office, Jeffrey C. Pingpank, Cooney, Scully & Dowling, Hartford, CT, for Defendants.
RULING ON CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION'S, THEODORE SERGI'S AND GEORGE DOWALIBY'S MOTION TO DISMISS
This case arises from the rape of a mentally retarded sixteen-year-old girl who was placed in a community based training program as part of an alternative education plan administered by her high school. The plaintiffs allege that the defendants Connecticut Department of Education ("CSDE"), Theodore Sergi ("Sergi"), and George Dowaliby ("Dowaliby") breached their duties under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et seq. ("IDEA"), and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, causing the plaintiff J.R. to suffer severe physical and emotional trauma, sexually transmitted disease, depression, pain and suffering, and regression.
Defendants move to dismiss count ten (doc. # 108) of the plaintiffs' third amended complaint, on the grounds that (1) the Connecticut Department of Education is not a person within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) the alleged violation of § 1983 fails as a matter of law; (3) money damages are not recoverable for violation of the IDEA; (4) the plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for money damages under § 1983; (5) count ten of the plaintiffs' third amended complaint fails to state a claim for violation of the IDEA; and (6) the individual state defendants have qualified immunity from suit. For the reasons stated below, this motion will be denied.
Plaintiff J.R. was placed in an alternative education plan after evaluation by a school psychologist employed by the Waterbury Board of Education. The evaluation was prompted by plaintiffs' allegations of an inadequate program and support within J.R.'s high school, and concerns about J.R.'s personal safety due to her excessive compliance, lack of self-protection skills, and inability to associate consequences with her actions. The alternative education plan included homebound instruction, and a Community Based Training ("CBT") program to provide social and job skills in a community setting.
The complaint alleges that the defendants Waterbury School Board, Elizabeth Gallagher, and Barbara Wiggins placed J.R. in the CBT program at the Goodwill Store in Waterbury even though they had established no policies, procedures, or minimum guidelines to assure that the special education students at vocational sites were safe, adequately supervised, and had their special education needs addressed.
J.R. was assigned to spend some of her day at Goodwill Industries, and J.R.'s mother agreed to the arrangement after receiving personal assurances that J.R. would be accompanied by an adult at all times.
J.R. was transported from her home to Goodwill by defendant bus company Laidlaw. Defendants Maria Castro and Valerie Stolfi were supposed to meet J.R. and accompany her into the Goodwill store. On January 26, 1999, Laidlaw bus driver Jacqueline Recchia dropped J.R. off at the Goodwill store, and neither defendants Castro nor Stolfi were on hand to meet her. Recchia watched J.R. enter the Goodwill store alone.
Once inside the store, J.R. was approached by Goodwill employee Jeffrey Small. Small had a criminal arrest record for sexual assault and was listed on the Connecticut Department of Public Safety Sex Offender Registry. Small took J.R. to a trailer located in the parking lot of Goodwill's facility, where Small forced J.R. to engage in oral and vaginal sex.
Defendant Joshua Vega was employed by Security Services to look for security breaches within the Goodwill facility. During his rounds, Vega witnessed Small and J.R. in the midst of an oral sexual act in the trailer. Vega made no attempt to intervene or to stop the act. Vega reported the incident the next day to his employer, Security Services, which notified the principal of Wilby High School. Vega identified J.R. from a photograph provided by the school. J.R. was subsequently examined by a physician who confirmed that vaginal intercourse had taken place.
Stolfi told investigators after the assault that the sexual contact between Small and J.R. was consensual. Plaintiffs argue that due to J.R.'s age and cognitive defects, J.R. was unable to consent to sexual contact with defendant Small. Plaintiffs contend J.R. has suffered and will continue to suffer physical and psychological injuries, some of them permanent.
The defendant Connecticut Department of Education was named in the complaint as the agency charged by law with the implementation of federal and state laws governing the provision of special education related services for students with disabilities. Defendant Theodore Sergi was joined as the Commissioner of the Connecticut Department of Education and is sued in his individual capacity. Defendant George Dowaliby was joined as the Bureau Chief of the Bureau of Special Education and Pupil Personnel Services of the Connecticut Department of Education and is also sued in his individual capacity.
The function of a motion to dismiss is "merely to assess the legal feasibility of the complaint, not to assay the weight of the evidence which might be offered in support thereof." Ryder Energy Distribution v. Merrill Lynch Commodities, Inc., 748 F.2d 774, 779 (2d Cir.1984). When deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept all well-pleaded allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the pleader. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974). A complaint should not be dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957).
Immunity from § 1983 action; § 1983 action for an IDEA violation
For the sake of efficiency, this Court will address together the first two grounds of defendants' motion to dismiss. The defendants first state that the Court must dismiss the § 1983 action as to the CSDE because the Department is not a "person" within the meaning of § 1983. Second, the defendants claim that actions pursuant to § 1983 based on alleged violations of the IDEA are not viable, and fail as a matter of law.
It is well-settled in Connecticut courts and throughout the country that a state agency is not a "person" within the meaning of that section. Martin v. UConn Health Care, 2000 WL 303262 (D.Conn. Feb. 9, 2000). The Supreme Court held in Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58,66, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989), that in passing 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Congress had no intention of disturbing the states' sovereign immunity pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment. However, the plaintiff correctly asserts that § 1403 of the IDEA declares that a state "shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment to the Constitution of the United States from suit in Federal court for a violation of this chapter." Consequently, a § 1983 action is allowed against a state or an agency of the state under the plain language of the IDEA. If the plaintiffs were not permitted to seek relief under § 1983 for violation of the IDEA, no relief would be available to them.
The remedy for a violation of the IDEA is the withholding of federal funds, with no provision for a private cause of action. Sean R. by Dwight R. v. Bd. Of Educ., 794 F.Supp. 467 (D.Conn.1992). Sean R. is similar to the case before the Court in that the plaintiffs sought relief under § 1983 for an IDEA violation. In order to determine whether a private right of action exists when the statute does not specifically provide for one, the district court applied the following test from Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975):(1) whether the plaintiffs are of a class for whose benefit the statute was enacted; (2) if there is legislative intent to provide or deny the remedy; (3) whether the private remedy is consistent with the underlying purpose of the legislation; and (4) if the cause of action is traditionally relegated to state law. The Supreme Court effectively overruled Cort in Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 108 S.Ct. 513, 98 L.Ed.2d 512 (1988), by holding that unless the legislative intent can be inferred from the language of the statute or some other source, a private remedy will not be applied. However, the court in Sean R. relied on Quackenbush v. Johnson City School Dist., 716 F.2d 141, 145 (1983), which...
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