J. Ray Arnold Lumber Corporation of Olustee v. Richardson

• Decision Date: 19 April 1932
• Citation: 141 So. 133,105 Fla. 204
• Parties: J. RAY ARNOLD LUMBER CORPORATION OF OLUSTEE v. RICHARDSON.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

141 So. 133

105 Fla. 204

J. RAY ARNOLD LUMBER CORPORATION OF OLUSTEE v. RICHARDSON.

Florida Supreme Court, Division B.

April 19, 1932

Action by Willard Richardson, a minor, by V. A. Richardson, his next friend, against the J. Ray Arnold Lumber Corporation of Olustee. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.

Affirmed on condition of remittitur.

BUFORD C.J., and ELLIS, J., dissenting.

COUNSEL

J. B Hodges, of Lake City, Walter A. Dopson, of Macclenny, and McKay, Withers & Ramsey, of Tampa, for plaintiff in error.

W. B Cone, of Macclenny, and Evan Evans, of Jacksonville, for defendant in error.

OPINION

DAVIS J.

In this case the plaintiff, a minor, recovered judgment in the court below in the sum of $10,000. Upon writ of error, the defendant contends that no basis for legal recovery was shown by the pleadings and proofs, of that, if so shown, the judgment is grossly excessive.

The declaration was in one count, and was predicated upon section 5943, C. G. L., section 4020, R. G. S., which reads as follows:

'No child under fourteen years of age shall be employed, permitted or suffered to work in, about or in connection with any (1) mill, (2) factory, (3) workshop, (4) mechanical establishment, (5) laundry, (6) or on the stage of any theatre.'

It alleges in substance that the defendant, J. Ray Arnold Lumber Corporation, was engaged in operating a lumber mill in Baker County; that the plaintiff, Willard Richardson, was a child of the age of twelve years; that the defendant, notwithstanding the age of plaintiff, wrongfully and unlawfully employed, permitted or suffered plaintiff to work in, about, or in connection with, said defendant's said lumber mill, by reason whereof, at said time and place, and while the plaintiff was so employed by the defendant, and acting in the course of said employment, he was struck and injured by a log being handled by the defendant's log-skidding apparatus, the details and manner of the occurrence of the injury being set forth.

The cause was tried upon the theory that, if the defendant 'employed,' 'permitted,' or 'suffered' the plaintiff to work in the manner described, and the plaintiff received the injury complained of while at work, the defendant was guilty of negligence per se by its act of employing, permitting, or suffering the child to work in violation of the positive inhibition of the statute, and was consequently liable for the damages occasioned by the child's injury, regardless of the manner in which the injury came about. In other words, the position of the plaintiff is that the illegal employment, or permitting, or suffering to work is, in such case, to be regarded as the proximate cause of whatever injury occurs in the course of the work that the child is permitted or suffered to do, and that it is only essential to prove the illegal employment, or suffering to work, and its casual connection with an injury in the course of it, to establish a ground for recovery.

The violation of such a statute as section 5943, C. G. L., supra, has been universally held to give rise to a cause of action, because statutes for the protection of the lives and limbs of children are held to create a liability for damages due to their infraction whether provided for in so many words in the statute or not. Morris v. Stanfield, 81 Ill.App. 264; Koester v. Rochester Candy Works, 194 N.Y. 92, 87 N.E. 77, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 783, 16 Ann. Cas. 589; Leathers v. Blackwell Durham Tobacco Co., 144 N.C. 330, 57 S.E. 11, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 349; Norman v. Virginia-Pocahontas Coal Co., 68 W.Va. 405, 69 S.E. 857, 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 504; Berdos v. Tremont & Suffolk Mills, 209 Mass. 489, 95 N.E. 876, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 797. See, also, Labotts's Master and Servant (2d. Ed.) vol. 5, p. 5885, par. 1899.

And such statutes, being to effectuate a humane purpose and intended for the progress of humanity, should be liberally construed. Cole v. Sloss-Sheffield Stee & Iron Co., 186 Ala. 192, 65 So. 177, Ann. Cas. 1916E, 99; DeSoto Coal Co. v. Hill, 179 Ala. 186, 60 So. 583; Nolan v. Moore, 81 Fla. 594, 88 So. 601. 'This is a statute which marks an epoch in the progress of humanity, and the courts should not get in its way or whittle it down, as courts have done in the past.' Lee v. Sterling Mfg. Co., 47 Misc. 182, 93 N.Y.S. 560, 563.

The statute was enacted in pursuance of a wise, humane, public policy to prohibit the parents of children under fourteen years of age from hiring them out to work not only in, about, but 'in connection with,' any mill, factory, workshop, mechanical establishment, laundry, or on the stage of any theater, and to make the observance of it effective by prohibiting the owners or operators of such places from employing children under age to work in, about, or in connection with, the named establishments.

In so enacting it, the Legislature not only took into account the likely hazardous nature of the work usually done in the prohibited places, but also exercised its power and duty to provide for the protection of the young children of the state from growing up in servility and ignorance, rendering them unfit to discharge the duties of citizenship. Not the least of the statutory objects was to prevent children from being deprived of educational advantages while hired out through the cupidity of parents or guardians in connection with those particular works where child labor was known to be most generally employed, or frequently sought, owing to its well-known cheapness and adaptability to be used as an auxiliary to adult labor. Leathers v. Blackwell Durham Tobacco Co. (N. C.) supra.

We hold, therefore, that a declaration alleging a violation of the quoted statute, coupled with an allegation of injury as a result thereof, is sufficient to state a cause of action under the rules of pleading prevailing in this state, and that the declaration in the instant case was sufficient under this rule to withstand the defendant's demurrer and motions for compulsory amendment, which the lower court overruled. Triay v. Seals, 92 Fla. 310, 109 So. 427; Pillet v. Ershick, 99 Fla. 483, 126 So. 784; Dowling v. Nicholson (Fla.) 135 So. 288.

The evidence shows that the defendant owned and operated a sawmill and lumber manufacturing plant at Olustee. The defendant also owned and operated a certain skidder equipment that was used in hauling up saw logs from the place where they were cut down in the woods to a location suitable for loading on railroad cars, so that they could be hauled to the mill at Olustee to be manufactured into lumber. Plaintiff first went to work for the defendant on April 26, 1929, and worked off and on for the defendant until he was injured on June 29, 1929.

That the work done by the skidding crews in cutting down and procuring logs through employment of these skidding operations was work required to be done, and actually done, in connection with the operation of defendant's lumber mill at Olustee, is manifest. It was likewise established by a great preponderance of the evidence that plaintiff, a mere lad, twelve years old at the time, was employed as a member of the skidder crew at the time he was hurt and his leg severely crushed while performing a part of such operations.

In the case now before the court, the work on which plaintiff is shown to have been employed, and permitted or suffered to engage in, was the procurement of a supply of raw material for the operation of defendant's sawmill. That work of that kind is to be construed as work 'in connection with' any mill is fully sustained by the authorities, although such work was not actually done in the mill itself or within the curtilage thereof. The best that can be said of the proposition is that it was a question for the jury to determine under all the facts and circumstances shown in evidence, and the record shows that the court in this case did submit the question to the jury under appropriate instructions.

In Gurney v. Atlantic, etc., Ry. Co., 58 N.Y. 358, the court, in construing the meaning of the phrase 'in connection with,' said:

'The words, 'in connection with that company's railways,' as used in the relation they bear to the whole clause, are the equivalent of 'in the interest and upon the employment of that company in and about its railways and the operation and management thereof, and all matters connected with, relating to, and growing out of the proper and legitimate business of the company as the possessor and operator of such railways.”

We are impressed with the fact that the definition of the phrase just given is applicable to that same phrase as used in section 5943, C. G. L., supra, and that it was at least a question for the jury to decide whether or...