J.S.A. v. M.H.

• Decision Date: 01 February 2007
• Docket Number: No. 101697.,101697.
• Parties: J.S.A. et al., Appellants, v. M.H. et al., Appellees.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

863 N.E.2d 236

224 Ill.2d 182

309 Ill.Dec. 6

J.S.A. et al., Appellants, v. M.H. et al., Appellees.

No. 101697.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

February 1, 2007.

J. Scott Arthur, Orland Park, for appellant.

Edward R. Jaquays, Joliet, for appellees.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Springfield (Gary Feinerman, Solicitor

General, Diane M. Potts, Assistant Attorney General, Chicago, of counsel), for intervenors-appellants.

Justice FREEMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion:

Plaintiff, J.S.A., filed an action in the circuit court of Will County to establish a parent and child relationship with W.T.H. pursuant to the Illinois Parentage Act of 1984 (Parentage Act) (750 ILCS 45/1 et seq. (West 1998)). Thereafter, the mother of W.T.H., M.H., and her husband, W.C.H., filed a petition to adopt W.T.H. pursuant to the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1 et seq. (West 1998)). Both actions proceeded in the circuit court, with M.H. and W.C.H. ultimately filing an interlocutory appeal of certain orders entered by the trial court. The appellate court dismissed the appeal on the basis that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the action. 361 Ill.App.3d 745, 299 Ill.Dec. 251, 841 N.E.2d 983. The appellate court held that because J.S.A. failed to register with the Putative Father Registry (750 ILCS 50/12.1 (West 1998)), he was therefore barred from maintaining his parentage action. As a result, the appellate court declared all orders entered in the parentage action void ab initio. For the reasons that follow, we vacate the judgment of the appellate court and remand this cause to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

BACKGROUND

As an initial matter, we note that this case has had a tortuous seven-year litigation history. Because the instant appeal is limited to reviewing the appellate court's ruling that it lacked jurisdiction to hear an interlocutory appeal of certain orders entered by the circuit court, we recount only those facts here which are pertinent to the issues raised in the matter before us.

J.S.A. and M.H. are attorneys who shared office space together. From 1993 to 1998, J.S.A. and M.H. engaged in an extramarital sexual affair while each was married to other individuals. A male child, W.T.H., was born to M.H. during this affair on January 26, 1996. M.H.'s husband, W.C.H., was listed as W.T.H.'s father on the child's birth certificate. However, in February 1999, after the affair between J.S.A. and M.H. ended, the parties—at the urging of J.S.A.—agreed to perform a deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) "self-test" to determine W.T.H.'s paternity. The results of this test allegedly established that J.S.A. was the child's biological father. Thereafter, in July 1999, M.H. told her husband, W.C.H., about her affair with J.S.A. and the possibility that J.S.A. was W.T.H.'s father. W.C.H. continued to raise W.T.H. as his own son, and M.H. and W.C.H. remain married.

On September 9, 1999, J.S.A. filed a petition in the circuit court of Will County to determine the existence of a father-child relationship with W.T.H. This petition was filed pursuant to the Parentage Act (750 ILCS 45/1 et seq. (West 1998)) and named M.H. as the respondent. In his petition, J.S.A. alleged that he was the biological father of W.T.H.

Approximately six weeks later, on October 20, 1999, M.H. and her husband, W.C.H., filed in the circuit court of Will County a "Petition to Adopt Related Child" pursuant to the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1 et seq. (West 1998)) and named J.S.A. and the minor child, W.T.H., as respondents. The adoption petition alleged that M.H.'s husband, W.C.H., is not only the biological father of W.T.H., but that W.C.H. is also the presumed father of W.T.H. because W.C.H. and M.H. were married at the time of the child's birth. In addition, the adoption petition alleged that J.S.A. was an "unfit person within the meaning of the Illinois Adoption Act" because, inter alia, he "evidence[d] his intent to forgo his parental rights, as manifested by his failure * * * [t]o commence legal proceedings to establish his paternity under the Illinois Parentage Act of 1984."

In addition to filing the adoption petition, the marital couple also filed on that same date a petition to terminate the parental rights of J.S.A. The petition alleged that J.S.A. is an "unfit parent and his parental rights should be terminated" because, inter alia, he did not commence legal proceedings to establish his paternity of W.T.H.

On November 1, 1999, J.S.A. filed in the circuit court a pleading styled "Motion to Stay Adoption Proceedings Pending Determination of Paternity." In his motion, J.S.A. referenced the February 1999 DNA test and attached a lab report which allegedly disclosed that J.S.A. had a 99.93% probability of being the biological father of W.T.H. J.S.A. asked in his motion that a "determination of the paternity of the child * * * take place prior to any proceedings in the adoption case in light of the fact that the paternity of the child is the threshold question in the adoption." Accordingly, J.S.A. requested that the adoption proceedings be stayed pending the court's ruling on whether the parties would be ordered to take DNA tests to determine the paternity of the child.

Also on November 1, 1999, M.H. and W.C.H. filed a motion to strike J.S.A.'s motion to stay the adoption proceedings. This motion attacked J.S.A.'s statements with respect to the prior DNA testing in February 1999, contending that the allegations made in J.S.A.'s motion and the attached lab report were "a blatant attempt * * * to introduce inadmissible evidence, and thereby prejudice the court, * * * [as J.S.A.] is well aware that there exists no documentation of the chain of custody of the blood or tissue samples, nor the requisite affidavit or certification necessary to establish the chain of custody concerning the alleged blood tests."

On November 15, 1999, J.S.A. filed with the circuit court a motion to strike and dismiss the petition to terminate his parental rights. This motion, brought pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 1998)), alleged that the petition to terminate his parental rights filed by the marital couple was inconsistent with their previously filed "Petition to Adopt Related Child" and, therefore, should be dismissed. Specifically, J.S.A. noted in his motion that the petition to terminate his parental rights was "premature and inconsistent," as it stated that he was an "unfit parent and his parental rights should be terminated" despite the fact that there had not yet been any judicial determination that J.S.A. was, in fact, the biological father of the child. J.S.A. requested that the court either dismiss the petition to terminate his parental rights or at least stay proceedings on that petition pending a determination by the court with respect to whether J.S.A. is the natural father of W.T.H.

Also on November 15, 1999, J.S.A. additionally filed a motion to strike and dismiss the adoption action filed by the marital couple. This motion, which was brought pursuant to sections 2-603 and 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-603, 2-615 (West 1998)), alleged that the adoption petition was flawed not only in that it pled two separate causes of action in one count, but also that the statements pled were "completely and entirely inconsistent" to the extent that the document stated that it was a "petition to adopt a related child," but also stated that W.C.H. is the child's biological father. J.S.A. argued that if W.C.H. were indeed W.T.H.'s biological father, then there would be no need for W.C.H. to file a petition to adopt his own child.

In turn, on February 9, 2000, M.H. and W.C.H. filed a motion in the circuit court pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 1998)) not only to dismiss J.S.A.'s parentage action, but also to dismiss J.S.A. as a party to the adoption proceedings. The marital couple argued that J.S.A.'s failure to comply with the Putative Father Registry provisions contained in section 12.1 of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/12.1 (West 1998)) barred him from maintaining any action to assert any interest in W.T.H., either through the adoption or the parentage action. The marital couple concluded their dismissal motion by contending that because J.S.A. was statutorily barred from bringing any action to assert any interest in the child, he therefore lacked standing to file any motion concerning the paternity of W.T.H. or the validity of the adoption petition.

On June 7, 2000, the circuit court entered an order in which it ruled on the various motions filed by the parties. All motions filed by J.S.A. were denied. The circuit court, however, granted M.H. and W.C.H.'s motion to dismiss J.S.A. as a party to the adoption proceeding based on his failure to register with the Putative Father Registry. Finally, the circuit court denied M.H. and W.C.H.'s motion to dismiss J.S.A.'s parentage action, thereby allowing that action to proceed forward.

Thereafter, on June 20, 2000, the circuit court entered an order staying the adoption proceedings pending the outcome of the parentage action. In addition, the court stated in this order that it was taking J.S.A.'s motion to reconsider and vacate its June 7, 2000, order under advisement. According to the record before us, however, it appears that the circuit court never made a subsequent ruling on J.S.A.'s motion to reconsider and vacate the June 7 order.

As J.S.A.'s parentage action proceeded forward, the marital couple filed a motion to hold a hearing to determine whether it was in the best interests of the child, W.T.H., to proceed with the parentage litigation and to order DNA testing. The circuit court granted this motion and held a best-interests hearing. It appears from the record that the best-interests proceedings were conducted on a periodic basis over the span of a year, with both parties...