J.S. v. State
| Decision Date | 06 May 2022 |
| Docket Number | CR-20-0674 |
| Parties | J.S. v. State of Alabama |
| Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
J.S appeals his convictions for first-degree rape, see § 13A-6-61, Ala. Code 1975, and first-degree sodomy see § 13A-6-63, Ala. Code 1975. The trial court sentenced J.S. to life imprisonment for each conviction, the sentences to run consecutively.
In February 2019, a Pike County grand jury indicted J.S. on charges of first-degree rape and first-degree sodomy, and each charge contained two counts.[1] The first count of the rape charge alleged that J.S. had engaged in sexual intercourse with K.S. when she was incapable of consent by reason of being physically helpless or mentally incapacitated see § 13A-6-61(a)(2), and the second count which was separated from the first count by the disjunctive conjunction "or," alleged that J.S. had engaged in sexual intercourse with K.S by forcible compulsion, see § 13A-6-61(a)(1). (C. 27.) Similarly, the first count of the sodomy charge alleged that J.S. had engaged in deviate sexual intercourse with K.S. when she was incapable of consent by reason of being physically helpless or mentally incapacitated, see § 13A-6-63(a)(2), and the second count, which was again separated from the first count by the disjunctive conjunction "or," alleged that J.S. had engaged in deviate sexual intercourse with K.S. by forcible compulsion, see § 13A-6-63(a)(1). (C. 27.)
In June 2019, J.S. filed a motion to dismiss the indictment. In support of that motion, J.S. initially noted that, because the rape and sodomy charges each contained two separate counts, it was unclear whether he was charged with two or four offenses. However, J.S. ultimately acknowledged that the separate counts for each charge were separated by the disjunctive conjunction "or"; thus, he argued that the State was required to elect whether it was charging him with committing those offenses by forcible compulsion or committing them when K.S. was incapable of consent by reason of being physically helpless or mentally incapacitated. (R. 21.) J.S. also argued that the State was required to include in the indictment "some kind of time period" in which the alleged offenses had occurred. (R. 19.) In conjunction with that motion, J.S. filed a motion for a more definite statement in which he argued that the State should be compelled to clarify those alleged deficiencies.
In response, the State argued that the indictment "clearly charged" J.S. with one rape offense and one sodomy offense (C. 83) and that it was proper for the indictment to allege alternative methods of committing those offenses. As to the fact that the indictment did not indicate when the alleged offenses had occurred, the State noted that it had provided J.S. with discovery indicating that the alleged offenses had occurred "between … [1990] to [1992] when [K.S.] was 20 to 21 years old." (R. 24.)
Following a hearing, the trial court denied J.S.'s motion to dismiss and found that the motion for a more definite statement was moot. In support of its rulings, the trial court found that, although "the charged offenses of [first-degree rape] and [first-degree sodomy] include alternative counts, said counts concern only the possible proof of or manner in which the offense was committed and do not allege multiple offenses." (C. 120.) The trial court also found that the indictment" fully and properly apprises [J.S.] of the essential facts of the … crimes charged" and, moreover, that "the supplemental information provided by the prosecution in discovery and in response to the motion for more definite statement provides [J.S.] with the particulars of said offenses." (C. 121.)
The evidence presented at trial tended to establish the following facts. In 2019, K.S. contacted Detective Lindsey Kirkland of the Troy Police Department to report that "she had been molested by" J.S., her biological father, in the early 1990s.[2] (R. 164.) In support of her allegation, K.S. provided Det. Kirkland with a VHS-format video recording that depicted six "scenes" of J.S. engaging in sexual activity with K.S., who was at least 19 years old at that time. After watching the VHS recording, Det. Kirkland interrogated J.S., who "admitted that he [was] the one who recorded all of those" "scenes" (R. 175) and admitted that he "would … perform oral sex" on K.S. (R. 174.) J.S. claimed, however, that he had "never [engaged in] any sexual intercourse" with K.S. (R. 174) and that he "did not force" K.S. to submit to oral sex. (R. 175.)
Consistent with J.S.'s statement, there was no evidence indicating that J.S. had forced K.S. to submit to the sexual acts depicted on the VHS recording. In fact, the prosecutor acknowledged during K.S.'s testimony that, "looking at [the VHS recording], [a person] would think that [K.S.] wanted" most of the acts to occur (R. 229), and K.S. admitted that J.S. had "said all [she] had to say was, stop this, and it would have stopped." (R. 233.) However, although the evidence tended to indicate that K.S. had consented to most of the acts on the VHS recording, there was one "scene" on the recording in which she did not consent. Regarding that "scene," K.S. testified as follows:
(R. 232-36.) There was no evidence establishing the reason for K.S.'s unconsciousness during that "scene." On cross-examination, K.S. testified as follows:
(R. 243-49.)
The jury convicted J.S. of the first count of both the rape and sodomy charges. That is to say, the jury found that J.S. had raped and sodomized K.S. when she was incapable of consent by reason of being physically helpless or mentally incapacitated. See § 13A-6-61(a)(2) and § 13A-6-63(a)(2).[3] As noted, the trial court sentenced J.S. to consecutive sentences of life imprisonment. The trial court also ordered J.S. to pay $25, 370 in restitution.
On appeal, J.S. raises multiple claims that, he says, entitle him to relief from his convictions and one claim that, he says, entitles him to relief from his sentences.
J.S argues that the prosecution of his rape and sodomy offenses was barred by the statute of limitations. As noted, those offenses occurred in the early 1990s, and, at that time, § 15-3-1, Ala. Code 1975, provided, in pertinent part, that "[t]he prosecution of all felonies, except those specified in Section[ ] … 15-3-5, must be commenced within three years after the commission of the offense."[4] Section 15-3-5, Ala. Code 1975, provided, in pertinent part:
Here it is undisputed that the State prosecuted J.S. for his rape and sodomy offenses well beyond three years from the commission of those offenses. The question is whether § 15-3-5 excluded those offenses from the three-year statute of...
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