J. Scott Rentals, Inc. v. Bryant
| Decision Date | 08 September 1977 |
| Docket Number | 32046,Nos. 32045,s. 32045 |
| Parties | J. SCOTT RENTALS, INC., et al. v. Goble W. BRYANT (two cases). |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Albert A. Roberts, Robert P. Midtlyng, East Point, for appellants.
Michael N. Mantegna, Atlanta, for appellee.
We granted certiorari in this case to review the question of whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct in ruling that all garnishment proceedings initiated and completed in the trial court during the period from July 1, 1975 to April 7, 1976, must be held invalid in light of legislative and appellate court activity subsequent to that period. See : J. Scott Rentals, Inc., et al. v. Bryant, 140 Ga.App. 770, 232 S.E.2d 123 (1976).
On September 2, 1975, J. Scott Rentals, Inc. obtained a judgment against Elam Rigging and Erection, Inc. in the Civil Court of Fulton County. In an attempt to satisfy that judgment J. Scott Rentals, in keeping with the legislative Act effective July 1, 1975, filed, on October 22, 1975, an Affidavit and Bond for Garnishment in the Civil Court of Fulton County, their complaint listing Elam Rigging and Erection, Inc. as defendant and Ragnar Benson, Inc. as garnishee. The garnishee was served on October 24, 1975, and because the defendant had gone out of business, the Secretary of State was served in lieu thereof. On December 8, 1975, Ragnar Benson, Inc. filed its answer and paid into court the amount it had owed Elam Rigging and Erection, Inc. No attack on the constitutionality of the July 1, 1975 Act was made by any party.
It is claimed, however, that Elam Rigging and Erection had sold all of its accounts receivable to a Mr. Bryant, prior to the garnishment proceedings. On January 12, 1976, Mr. Bryant filed a third party claim seeking the funds paid into court, asserting that, because of Elam Rigging and Erection's sale to him of its accounts receivable, J. Scott Rentals was not entitled to the funds owed Elam Rigging by Ragnar Benson. His argument, in effect, was that these funds could not be garnished because they were owed to him and not Elam Rigging.
The case was tried on February 2, 1976, and on February 11, 1976, the trial court entered an order granting these funds to J. Scott Rentals, Inc., the garnishor. On March 9, 1976, Mr. Bryant filed a notice of appeal, with J. Scott Rentals filing a cross-appeal. The Court of Appeals, in a brief opinion, reversed the trial court on the main appeal and dismissed the cross-appeal. They said that because of this court's opinion in City Finance Co. v. Winston, 238 Ga. 10, 231 S.E.2d 45, holding unconstitutional the 1976 post-garnishment statute, enacted on April 7, 1976, all cases pending on appeal after that date were void and of no effect. This, in effect, declared that all garnishment proceedings initiated and completed in the trial court during the period from July 1, 1975 to April 7, 1976, would be invalid. We do not agree with this conclusion.
This court, in Coursin v. Harper, 236 Ga. 729, 225 S.E.2d 428, ruled that Georgia's procedure for post-judgment garnishment, as it existed prior to July 1, 1975, was unconstitutional in that it failed to provide a judgment debtor due process of law. On July 1, 1975, the old law was amended by Ga.L. 1975, p. 1291 et seq., which amendment provided for judicial supervision over the issuance of process, a new procedure of service and provisions for post-seizure hearing for dissolution. Although the constitutionality of this amendment was never challenged, the dicta in Coursin, supra, implied that these new provisions cured the constitutional defects which existed in the prior law.
Effective April 7, 1976, the Georgia legislature passed a new post-judgment garnishment law setting forth an entirely new procedure to be followed in post-judgment garnishment actions. This new law expressly repealed all existing law relating to post-judgment garnishment, and was stated to apply to all cases then pending on the date of its adoption. Ga.L. 1976, pp. 1608, 1629, § 3. Nothing in the statute could be construed to show the intent of the legislature to give...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Ga. Dept. of Human Resources v. Deason
...a retroactive operation unless such construction is absolutely demanded." (Citations and punctuation omitted.) J. Scott Rentals v. Bryant, 239 Ga. 585, 587, 238 S.E.2d 385 (1977). Generally statutes prescribe for the future and that is the construction to be given unless there is a clear co......
-
Ferrero v. Associated Materials Inc.
...a "statute [from being] given a retroactive operation unless such construction is absolutely demanded." J. Scott Rentals, Inc. v. Bryant, 239 Ga. 585, 238 S.E.2d 385, 386 (1977). The second rule carves out an exception to the first rule for both procedural statutes and statutes that affect ......
-
Brown v. Wilson Chevrolet-Olds, Inc.
...v. Harper, 236 Ga. 729, 225 S.E.2d 428 (1976); City Finance Co. v. Winston, 238 Ga. 10, 231 S.E.2d 45 (1976); J. Scott Rentals, Inc. v. Bryant, 239 Ga. 585, 238 S.E.2d 385 (1977); Easterwood v. LeBlanc, 240 Ga. 61, 239 S.E.2d 383 (1977); Antico v. Antico, 241 Ga. 294, 244 S.E.2d 820 (1978).......
-
Pine Pointe Housing v. Lowndes County
...County, 711 A.2d 607, 611 (Pa.Commw. 1998). 26. 478 U.S. 647, 106 S.Ct. 3143, 92 L.Ed.2d 525 (1986). 27. J. Scott Rentals, Inc. v. Bryant, 239 Ga. 585, 587, 238 S.E.2d 385 (1977). 28. See Pearson v. City of Atlanta, 231 Ga.App. 96, 97(2), 499 S.E.2d 89 29. See Ross v. Lettice, 134 Ga. 866, ......