J.A. v. . Bd. of Educ.
| Docket Number | 1:20-cv-09498-NLH-MJS,1:21-cv-06283-NLH-MJS |
| Decision Date | 24 August 2023 |
| Parties | J.A., individually and on behalf of her minor child J.A., Plaintiffs, v. MONROE TOWNSHIP BOARD OF EDUCATION; NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION; KEVIN DEHMER, Interim Commissioner of Education; and NEW JERSEY OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
ROBERT CRAIG THURSTON
THURSTON LAW OFFICES LLC
Counsel for Plaintiffs
KERRY SORANNO
SADIA AHSAUDDIN
STATE OF NEW JERSEY
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Counsel for the State Defendants
WILLIAM S. DONIO
YOLANDA NICOLE MELVILLE
COOPER LEVENSON, P.A.
Counsel for Monroe Township Board of Education
Pending before the Court are the partial motions for summary judgment of Plaintiffs Joanna A.[1] (“Joanna”) and J.A. (together “Plaintiffs”) against Defendant Monroe Township Board of Education (“MTBOE”), (ECF 145),[2] and against Defendants New Jersey Department of Education(“NJDOE”), Interim Commissioner of Education Kevin Dehmer, and the New Jersey Office of Administrative Law (“OAL”) (together “State Defendants”), (ECF 196); MTBOE's cross-motion for partial summary judgment, (ECF 153); and MTBOE's motions to seal, (ECF 130; ECF 177). For the reasons expressed below, each of the pending motions will be denied.
The facts of these cases and underlying administrative proceedings are extensive. The Court presumes the parties' familiarity with them and has considered them in full in drafting this opinion. They will be recited briefly here and referenced as applicable further below.
J.A. is a child with autism, making her eligible for special education and related services under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). (ECF 145-1 at ¶ 4; ECF 152-1 at ¶ 4). Joanna A. is J.A.'s parent. (ECF 145-1).
MTBOE operates public schools in the Township of Monroe, New Jersey, where Plaintiffs have been domiciled during all times relevant to the pending actions. (ECF 145-1 at ¶¶ 1-2; ECF 152-1 at ¶¶ 1-2). NJDOE is a State Educational Agency as defined by the IDEA, (ECF 196-1 at ¶ 1; ECF 209-1 ¶ 1), for which Dehmer served as Acting Commissioner. OAL is an executive-branch agency that hears special-education matters. (ECF 196-1 at ¶¶ 3-4; ECF 209-1 ¶¶ 3-4).
Plaintiffs allege in their statement of facts that J.A. was diagnosed with autism, feeding disorder, and developmental delay by Dr. Mariko Nakanishi of Children's Hospital of Philadelphia in May 2011 and that MTBOE's Office of Special Services/Child Study accepted the diagnoses and evaluative data on which they were premised, but not Dr. Nakanishi's recommendations. (ECF 145-1 at ¶¶ 64-65; ECF 145-4 at 1-2). Plaintiffs thereafter obtained additional independent evaluations in areas including occupational therapy and auditory processing, but while MTBOE accepted diagnoses, including J.A.'s “severe auditory processing disorder,” (“ADP”) it did not accept related recommendations or all findings and evaluative data relied upon. (ECF 145-4 at 728; ECF 145-6 at 60-63). Plaintiffs assert that MTBOE did not perform an audiology test or central auditory processing evaluation for J.A. and the professionals who comprised J.A.'s Individualized Education Program (“IEP”) Team did not specialize in audiology, ADP, autism, and other relevant disciplines. (ECF 145-1 at ¶¶ 87-88, 91, 103, 120, 131, 147-48). Plaintiffs eventually made a demand, on February 17, 2020, for MTBOE to conduct an Independent Educational Evaluation (“IEE”) of J.A. designed to test ADP. (ECF 145-7 at 1-2).
Three years earlier, on May 24, 2017, Plaintiffs filed a pro se request with NJDOE's Office of Special Education Programs (“OSEP”) for a mediation, purportedly due to MTBOE's alleged failures to provide data and compensatory services. (ECF 196-1 at ¶ 5; ECF 196-4 at 26-28). Following unsuccessful mediation, the matter was transmitted to OAL, where a settlement conference - as opposed to peremptory hearing - was unsuccessfully held on July 6, 2017, the matter was transferred to Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Jeffrey R. Wilson, and motion practice, briefing schedules, and allegedly unwarranted adjournments pushed the matter into June 2018. (ECF 145-1 at ¶¶ 9-17; ECF 196-1 at ¶¶ 8-9, 17-18, 21, 27-35, 38; ECF 196-4 36-43; ECF 196-5 at 1-39, 41-43). After Plaintiffs filed a federal suit naming ALJ Wilson as a defendant, ALJ Wilson recused himself and the matter was assigned to ALJ John Kennedy who scheduled hearings for October 2018. (ECF 196-6 at 14-17).
Meanwhile, Plaintiffs filed a second due process complaint, for which mediation was unsuccessful, and ALJ Kennedy ultimately consolidated the two pending matters, following the October hearing schedule for the original matter. (ECF 145-1 at ¶¶ 26, 28-30; ECF 196-1 at ¶¶ 50, 53-54, 59-60; ECF 196-6 at 26-30, 4143). Plaintiffs allege that they provided MTBOE with evidence five business days in advance of a scheduled October 1, 2018 hearing date in compliance with federal and state law while MTBOE's submission was untimely, resulting in Plaintiffs' motion to exclude, which ALJ Kennedy denied, and an interlocutory appeal, which the undersigned dismissed. (ECF 145-1 at ¶¶ 4046; ECF 145-3 at 5-37; ECF 196-1 at ¶¶ 63-72). Following remand, ALJ Catherine Tuohy conducted hearings from September to December 2020 with ALJ Kennedy's evidentiary ruling in place, culminating in a February 22, 2021 decision dismissing Plaintiffs' petitions, which Plaintiffs appealed - resulting in the filing of an action before this Court under Docket No. 1:21-cv-06283. (ECF 145-1 at ¶¶ 32-36; ECF 196-1 at ¶¶ 85-90, 95; ECF 196-8 at 1-7, 16-107).
Separately, and following Plaintiffs' February 2020 demand for an IEE, MTBOE filed a due process complaint, a hearing for which was scheduled for June 18, 2020 before ALJ MaryAnn Bogan prior to which Plaintiffs allegedly requested school records and were denied, served a subpoena on MTBOE's counsel, and themselves complied with the five-day evidentiary requirements while MTBE did not - resulting in Plaintiffs filing a motion to exclude. (ECF 145-1 at ¶¶ 50-54; ECF 145-3 at 40-58; ECF 196-1 at ¶¶ 99-100, 106, 110-16; ECF 196-9 at 1-5, 10-14). The matter was reassigned to ALJ Joseph Ascione who set schedules for the motion to exclude and a motion to quash the subpoena. (ECF 1961 at ¶¶ 120, 122, 124). ALJ Ascione did not formally rule on Plaintiffs' motion to exclude but ultimately permitted MTBOE to present evidence and reportedly made additional evidentiary rulings, such as limits on documentary evidence and cross-examination, objected to by Plaintiffs. (ECF 145-1 at ¶ 58; ECF 145-2 at 1-16; ECF 196-1 at ¶¶ 126-31). ALJ Ascione issued an opinion granting MTBOE's denial of the IEE on July 16, 2020, (ECF 145-2 at 1-16), which Plaintiffs appealed to this District under Docket No. 1:20-cv-09498, (ECF 145-1 at ¶ 35).
On March 21, 2022, this Court consolidated these two cases. (118-cv-09580, ECF 94 at 8, 10; ECF 95). Magistrate Judge Matthew J. Skahill then amended the case caption and directed that future filings be made with the consolidated caption under Docket No. 1:20-cv-09498. (1:20-cv-09498, ECF 110; 1:21-cv-06283, ECF 69).
In a pair of March 30, 2022 decisions, the Court held that individual ALJs were entitled to judicial immunity and dismissed claims against them with prejudice. (1:20-cv-09498, ECF 87 at 26-27; ECF 88; 1:21-cv-06283, ECF 50 at 25-26; ECF 51).
The pending motions followed.
The Court exercises original jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' claims brought under federal law pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. It exercises supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' statelaw claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). The Court has jurisdiction to review the administrative decisions below pursuant to the provisions of the IDEA. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2); K. E. v. N. Highlands Reg'l Bd. of Educ., 840 Fed.Appx. 705, 709 n.2 (3d Cir. 2020).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure dictate that a “court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A dispute is genuine when “the ‘evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party'” and a fact is “‘material' if it ‘might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.'” Razak v. Uber Techs., Inc., 951 F.3d 137, 144 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). Facts and evidence are to be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Id.
Though these familiar principles apply here, see Moorestown Twp. Bd. of Educ. v. S.D., 811 F.Supp.2d 1057, 1064-65 (D.N.J. Sept. 15, 2011), district courts apply what is referred to as “‘modified de novo' review” when presented with appeals of administrative decision under the IDEA, see D.S. v. Bayonne Bd. of Educ., 602 F.3d 553, 564 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting P.P. v. W. Chester Area Sch. Dist., 585 F.3d 727, 734 (3d Cir. 2009)). Under this standard, “[f]actual findings from the administrative proceedings are to be considered prima facie correct” and courts are obligated to explain any departure from those findings. Id. (quoting P.P., 585 F.3d at 734). An ALJ's legal determinations, however, are reviewed de novo. S.D., 811 F.Supp.2d at 1064. A court's decision is to be based on the evidence as developed at the administrative proceedings unless additional evidence is presented. See M.G. v. N. Hunterdon-Voorhees Reg'l High Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 778 Fed.Appx. 107, 110 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)).
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