J. A. A. v. A. D. A.

CourtMissouri Court of Appeals
Writing for the CourtSNYDER
CitationJ. A. A. v. A. D. A., 581 S.W.2d 889 (Mo. App. 1979)
Decision Date24 April 1979
Docket NumberNo. 39801,39801
PartiesJ. A. A., Petitioner-Respondent, v. A. D. A., Respondent-Appellant.

George D. Johnson, St. Louis, for respondent-appellant.

Richard R. Russell, Kirkwood, for petitioner-respondent.

SNYDER, Presiding Judge.

Husband appeals from a dissolution of marriage decree. The appeal was transferred to this court, without opinion, from the Missouri Supreme Court. The husband, respondent below, claims the trial court erred in: (1) finding the marriage was irretrievably broken and converting a decree of legal separation into a decree of dissolution; (2) receiving into evidence a child custody report and the investigator's testimony; (3) refusing to issue a writ of body attachment to secure the testimony of two subpoenaed witnesses and refusing to allow the child-custody worker to testify as to the wife's alleged statements about extramarital sexual relations; (4) making its awards of child support, maintenance and attorneys' fees and failing to divide the marital debts; and (5) refusing to grant his request for separate maintenance. It is this last issue which the husband claims raised a constitutional issue under the exclusive jurisdiction of the supreme court.

The judgment is modified, and as modified, affirmed.

The parties were married in 1959 and separated in March of 1975 when the wife left the family home. At the time the petition for dissolution was filed the wife was 33 and the husband was 37 years old. They have three sons, aged 17, 15 and 13 years at the time of trial in 1977.

In her petition for dissolution the wife stated the marriage was irretrievably broken in that she could no longer reasonably be expected to live with her husband because he: (1) forced their children to work long hours in his Volkswagen repair shop; (2) was domineering in the family's affairs; (3) held two jobs and was not able to offer her companionship; (4) used vulgar language in front of the children; and (5) had threatened her and physically assaulted her because she sought dissolution of their marriage and custody of the children. In his answer the husband denied the marriage was irretrievably broken. He later filed a cross-bill for legal separation, separate maintenance or, in the alternative, dissolution of marriage. At trial the husband denied the marriage was irretrievably broken.

Following the trial the court granted the husband's motion for legal separation but denied his motion for separate maintenance. Custody of the three sons was granted to the wife, and she was awarded $25 a week child support for each child. Maintenance of $25 a week for a period of two years was awarded to the wife, contingent upon her working thirty hours or less each week. She was also awarded $100 a month for 27 months as further maintenance. All personal property was awarded to the party then in possession. To adjust the property division the wife was awarded $750, payable at the rate of $50 a month. The trial court's decree did not mention the parties' debts of $13,271. The wife was also awarded $750 in attorneys' fees which was in addition to an earlier award of $350 pursuant to a motion for temporary allowances.

On March 11, 1977 the court, on its own motion, transferred custody of the eldest son to the husband and deleted the order of child support for him.

One hundred and twelve days after entry of the decree of legal separation, the trial court granted the wife's motion for dissolution, finding that the marriage was irretrievably broken and that there remained no reasonable likelihood that it could be saved. The division of property, maintenance, custody, support and attorneys' fees orders remained unchanged. The husband's appeal to the supreme court, and subsequent transfer of the cause to this court, followed.

In his first point of error the husband launches a two-pronged attack: (1) the trial court's finding of irretrievable breakdown was either against the weight of the evidence or not supported by substantial evidence, and (2) the trial court erred in converting the decree of legal separation into a decree of dissolution of marriage. Both arguments are rejected.

Section 452.305.1(2) 1 states that the trial court shall enter a decree of dissolution when it finds "that there remains no reasonable likelihood that the marriage can be preserved and therefore the marriage is irretrievably broken." Section 452.305.2 provides, "If a party requests a decree of legal separation rather than a decree of dissolution of marriage, the court shall grant the decree in that form." Although not expressly required by the language of the statute, it logically follows that a decree of legal separation may only be entered following a finding by the trial court that the marriage is irretrievably broken. See Smith v. Smith, 561 S.W.2d 714 (Mo.App.1978); McRoberts v. McRoberts, 555 S.W.2d 682 (Mo.App.1977). Where one party to the marriage has denied irretrievable breakdown, the same requirement imposed for a dissolution that the party seeking dissolution shall satisfy the court of one of the five facts listed in § 452.320.2(1)(a)-(e) should be imposed before the trial court enters a decree of legal separation.

By asking for a legal separation while denying irretrievable breakdown the husband, in effect, took the position that while the marriage, in his opinion, was not irretrievably broken, in the event the trial court should so find, the decree should be in the form of a legal separation rather than in the form of a decree of dissolution of the marriage. The question for resolution on appeal now is whether the wife produced sufficient evidence to satisfy the trial court that the husband had behaved in such a way that she could not reasonably be expected to live with him. § 452.320.2(1)(b). In applying this section, the court in Gummels v. Gummels, 561 S.W.2d 442, 443 (Mo.App.1978) stated, "(i)t will suffice if the behavior of one spouse, combined with the attitude and behavior of the other, indicates a reasonable likelihood the marriage cannot be (saved)." The evidence produced in this case warranted the trial court's findings that the marriage was irretrievably broken and could not be saved.

The wife testified that because the husband worked long hours in their Volkswagen repair business, as well as at his regular job, there was little companionship in the marriage. The husband required their three boys to work until 11:00 p. m. up to seven nights a week at the repair shop. She also testified the husband cursed her in front of the children and in front of customers at the shop and frequently used vulgar language around her and the children. The wife further testified the husband tried to convince her to become a prostitute and asked her to persuade her female friends to have sexual relations with him. Lending some credence to these last two allegations is the fact that the wife took a job at a massage parlor, at the husband's suggestion, after he visited one and discovered how much money the masseuses made. The wife also stated the husband repeatedly threatened to harm her, or kill her, if she kept any of his books, or obtained custody of their children. 2 Some of these allegations were not pled by the wife, but the husband failed to object that they were beyond the scope of the pleadings. "Under our procedure, issues not raised in the pleadings may be tried by consent of the parties and where so tried, they are treated as if they had been pleaded." In re Marriage of Uhls, 549 S.W.2d 107, 110 (Mo.App.1977).

The husband, of course, denied and contradicted much of the wife's testimony. Rule 73.01(3), however, requires an appellate court to defer to the trial court on the credibility of witnesses. LoPiccolo v. LoPiccolo, 547 S.W.2d 501 (Mo.App.1977). "We have before us only the printed record of the parties' words; in contrast, the trial court heard and saw the parties and could interpret the evidence in all its shades of meanings and assess the vital factor of their attitude toward each other." Gummels, supra, 443. There is substantial evidence in the record of a "deteriorating relationship" and "waning of their affections." Gummels, supra, 443. This evidence had a direct bearing on whether the wife could reasonably be expected to continue to live with her husband.

Mindful of the warning of Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30 (Mo. banc 1976), there is no firm conviction that the trial court's finding of irretrievable breakdown is against the weight of the evidence. On the record before it, the trial court properly found irretrievable breakdown based on § 452.320.2(1)(b). The Uhls case, Supra, and In re Marriage of Capstick, 547 S.W.2d 522 (Mo.App.1977) cited by the husband, are distinguishable.

Nor did the trial court err in converting the decree of legal separation into a decree of dissolution of marriage. Section 452.360.3 provides that: "No earlier than ninety days after entry of a decree of legal separation, on motion of either party, the court May convert the decree of legal separation to a decree of dissolution of marriage. (Emphasis added)." In McRoberts, supra, at page 684, the court categorized the ninety-day waiting period as a " 'cooling off' period" for the parties. If the trial court is convinced, after that period has elapsed, that the marriage cannot be saved, it has the authority, at a party's request, to enter the decree of dissolution. The legislature's choice of the word "may" clearly commits this decision to the sound discretion of the trial court. See Bloom v. Missouri Board for Architects, P.E. & L.S., 474 S.W.2d 861, 864 (Mo.App.1971). No abuse of that discretion has been shown, considering the evidence of the parties' actions and attitudes before and after the decree of legal separation.

The husband next argues the trial court erred in...

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19 cases
  • Hopkins v. Hopkins
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • October 27, 1981
    ...statute, has been rejected on appeal because the husband had not presented the issue before the trial court. J.A.A. v. A.D.A., 581 S.W.2d 889, 899 (Mo.App.1979). Indeed, the United States Supreme Court, while declaring unconstitutional statutes that require a husband and not a wife to pay a......
  • Simpson v. Strong
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • August 14, 2007
    ...either a decree of dissolution or legal separation. See, e.g., Costello v. Costello, 643 S.W.2d 81, 82 (Mo. App.1982); J.A.A. v. A.D.A., 581 S.W.2d 889, 893 (Mo.App.1979); McRoberts, 555 S.W.2d at 683. In the absence of such a finding, dismissal was required because the court could not gran......
  • Weiss v. Weiss
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    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • January 7, 1986
    ...e.g.: Schnitker v. Schnitker, 646 S.W.2d 123, 125-26 (Mo.App.1983); Rasmussen v. Rasmussen, supra, 627 S.W.2d at 119; J.A.A. v. A.D.A., 581 S.W.2d 889, 897 (Mo.App.1979); and In re Marriage of Carmach, 550 S.W.2d 815 (Mo.App.1977). Inclusion of the marital conduct factor in § 452.335, supra......
  • State v. Wilkins
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • March 15, 1994
    ...the word "may" indicates the legislature intended to make relief under the statute discretionary with the trial court. J.A.A. v. A.D.A., 581 S.W.2d 889, 895 (Mo.App.1979). Review is, therefore, to determine if that discretion was abused. Id. In the instant case, our review of the record doe......
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