A.J.V. v. M.M.V.
| Decision Date | 14 May 2021 |
| Docket Number | DOCKET NO. A-3990-18 |
| Parties | A.J.V., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. M.M.V., Defendant-Respondent. |
| Court | New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division |
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
Before Judges Fisher, Gilson and Gummer.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Morris County, Docket No. FM-14-1402-14.
Karin Duchin Haber argued the cause for appellant (Haber Silver & Simpson, attorneys; Karin Duchin Haber and Jane B. Simpson, of counsel; Jani Wase Vinick, on the brief).
Mark H. Sobel argued the cause for respondent (Greenbaum, Rowe, Smith and Davis LLP, attorneys; Mark H. Sobel, of counsel and on the brief; Lisa B. DiPasqua, on the brief).
The parties to this matrimonial action were married in October 1996 and have one child. Both plaintiff A.J.V. (Alan1) and defendant M.M.V. (Martha) have college degrees and have worked in the pharmaceutical industry. After a twenty-two-day trial, Judge Noah Franzblau rendered a 117-page written decision, which included twenty pages of thorough and thoughtful credibility findings, and entered a judgment of divorce.
In this appeal, Alan seeks review of certain portions of the judgment of divorce, arguing the trial judge erred or abused his discretion: (1) in including a $5,000 monthly savings component in his eleven-year obligation to pay Martha $11,500 per month in limited durational alimony; (2) by imposing a Mallamo2 adjustment - based on the alimony savings component - because that component was absent from the pendente lite support order; (3) in the manner in which he distributed restricted stock units Alan received as part of his compensation from his employer; and (4) in allowing Alan less parenting time than he enjoyed during the pendente lite stage. Because the trial judge's extensive factualfindings are supported by substantial credible evidence and because his legal conclusions comport with applicable law, we affirm the judgment of divorce in all respects.
The following general circumstances inform the trial judge's alimony rulings.
Alan worked at the same pharmaceutical company throughout most of the marriage; he has been the company's head of global pricing for its oncology unit since 2006. Martha worked at three different pharmaceutical companies during part of the marriage but left her job in 2006 to care full time for their newly-born and only child, Stephen.
After they married, the parties initially lived in a condominium unit owned by Alan, but they later purchased a home in Flanders for $312,000. In 2004, after Alan received a promotion, the parties sold their Flanders home and purchased a home in Montreal. Another promotion two years later necessitated their move back to New Jersey; they then purchased a $1.3 million-dollar, 5,000-square-foot home in Chester.
Alan was the primary wage earner during the marriage. His W-2 wages for the years 2012 through 2018 were: $1,022,923 in 2012; $962,465.81 in2013; $784,786.84 in 2014; $832,694.32 in 2015; $971,793.45 in 2016; $841,562.01 in 2017; and $633,606.20 in 2018. Alan also received short-term cash incentives in the form of annual bonuses and long-term incentives awarded yearly in the form of restricted stock units (RSUs). According to Alan, his employer calculated employee compensation differently depending on whether the employee's position was part of the Corporate Executive Group (CEG). He testified that in or around 2010, his position was considered part of the CEG, resulting in the employer's calculation of his short-term and long-term incentives so that he received greater compensation.
In 2011 or 2012, Alan was working as the head of a particular operation that was not part of the CEG, but his compensation in that role was "grandfathered" under the CEG framework through 2012. From 2013 forward, the employer calculated Alan's short-term and long-term incentives outside of the CEG framework so that his compensation generally decreased. But in 2017, Alan received a supplemental, one-time cash payment of $158,800, which he claimed represented "three years of transition payments" for 2014, 2015, and 2016 that were supposed to have been paid to him during those years.
Martha earned substantially less than Alan during the marriage and, as noted, left the workforce after Stephen was born. She began working as apharmaceutical sales representative just before the parties married, earning between $40,000-$50,000 per year plus bonuses. In 1999, Martha obtained employment as a market researcher earning around $60,000 per year, and she later worked for another pharmaceutical company until 2004, when the parties moved to Canada due to Alan's promotion. She had some difficulty obtaining employment in Canada.
When the parties moved back to New Jersey in 2006, Martha returned to work at a pharmaceutical company that had previously employed her; she was then earning approximately $140,000 per year and received multiple one-time bonuses in 2007 that increased her earnings to approximately $187,000. She left that position in November 2007.
In February 2014, on learning Alan had engaged in adulterous affairs, Martha moved out of the marital home with Stephen to an extended-stay hotel and later to an apartment in Somerset. She put most of the marital home's furniture into storage and removed $22,000 in cash from Alan's gun safe, leaving behind a letter from her attorney advising she wanted a divorce.
In November 2014, about five months after Alan filed for divorce, Martha and Stephen returned to the marital home pursuant to a pendente lite order and Alan moved to a rental home, also in Chester.
Based on these and many other facts unnecessary to recount in full here, the trial judge ordered Alan to pay Martha limited durational alimony - for a period of eleven years - in the amount of $11,500 per month. Alan argues the trial judge abused his discretion by including in that amount a $5,000 monthly component for savings. Alan, in fact, asks this court "to exercise its original jurisdiction and determine that no savings component is needed."
"[A]limony is neither a punishment for the payor nor a reward for the payee," Mani v. Mani, 183 N.J. 70, 80 (2005), but instead constitutes an economic right arising from the marital partnership, providing the dependent spouse with "a level of support and standard of living generally commensurate with the quality of economic life that existed during the marriage," Koelble v. Koelble, 261 N.J. Super. 190, 192-93 (App. Div. 1992).
The fixing of a spousal support award is "broadly discretionary." Steneken v. Steneken, 367 N.J. Super. 427, 434 (App. Div. 2004), aff'd, 183 N.J. 290 (2005). A court may order alimony "as the circumstances of the parties and the nature of the case shall render fit, reasonable and just." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. "Whether alimony should be awarded is governed by [the fourteen] distinct, objective standards" - not one of which is "elevated in importance over anyother" - listed by the Legislature in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b). Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 429 (2015).
A matrimonial judge must "make specific findings on the evidence about all of the statutory factors." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(c); see also Crews v. Crews, 164 N.J. 11, 26 (2000). Overall, "[t]he goal of alimony is to assist the supported spouse in achieving a lifestyle 'reasonably comparable' to the one enjoyed during the marriage." Lombardi v. Lombardi, 447 N.J. Super. 26, 37 (App. Div. 2016) (quoting Steneken, 183 N.J. at 299). Establishing the standard of living experienced during the marriage "serves as the touchstone" in the analysis. Crews, 164 N.J. at 16. Marital lifestyle is ascertained by considering "the marital residence, vacation home, cars owned or leased, typical travel and vacations for each year, schools, special lessons, and camps for [the] children, entertainment . . ., household help, and other personal services." Weishaus v. Weishaus, 360 N.J. Super. 281, 290-91 (App. Div. 2003), rev'd in part on other grounds, 180 N.J. 131 (2004). A marital lifestyle finding must be based not just on the amounts expended but ultimately what is equitable. Glass v. Glass, 366 N.J. Super. 357, 372 (App. Div. 2004).
At trial, the judge learned that the parties had their own credit cards and maintained separate checking, savings, and money market accounts during themarriage. Martha testified that Alan "didn't want . . . anything joint," although the testimony revealed there were exceptions to this general approach. For example, even before they married, the parties deposited their incomes into Alan's checking and money market accounts, which Martha could not access. Alan used his money market account to, among other things, assist with purchasing their homes and other large marital expenses, and he used his checking account to pay household bills. They also garnered significant annual income from several investment accounts, and plaintiff paid the credit card bills in full each month.
Because Martha did not have access to Alan's bank accounts, she mostly used her American Express card for day-to-day expenses, acknowledging as well that Alan would give her cash "[a]t times" if she needed it. Although Alan paid Martha's credit card bill each month, he required her to itemize the statement.
They owned a million-dollar home in Chester and a $285,000 vacation home on a farm in Pennsylvania where they spent their weekends between April and September, and they had already paid off both mortgages by the time of the separation because they were "debt adverse." The parties also vacationed elsewhere - between 2010 and 2014, they traveled with Stephen to DisneyWorld during the off-season, the Bahamas, the U.S. Virgin...
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