Jacinto v. Egan
Decision Date | 12 September 1978 |
Docket Number | No. 76-384-A,76-384-A |
Citation | 120 R.I. 907,391 A.2d 1173 |
Parties | , 100 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2138 Joseph L. JACINTO et al. v. Jerome P. EGAN et al. ppeal. |
Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
This is an appeal by the Cumberland Teachers' Association (the association) from a judgment of the Superior Court vacating an arbitration award made pursuant to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement effective during the years 1974-76 (the agreement) between the Cumberland School Committee (the school committee) and the association. The arbitrator had approved a request by a Cumberland teacher for a 1-year leave of absence without pay which had been previously denied by the school committee.
In March 1975, Paula McKeown, a chemistry teacher with 3 years' experience in the Cumberland school system, applied to the Superintendent of Schools (the superintendent) for a leave of absence without remuneration for the 1975-76 academic year. The leave was sought to pursue a graduate degree in Molecular Biology at the University of Connecticut, a program which requires full-time study and is not offered either part-time or at night. The advanced academic credits were necessary for further certification as a teacher by the State Department of Education when her provisional certification expired at the end of 5 years.
The agreement contains detailed provisions setting forth the conditions under which Cumberland schoolteachers could be granted leaves of absence. Article XX, entitled "Sabbatical Leave," provides for 1-year leaves with pay for advanced study in an approved college or university program. Leaves under this provision are reserved for teachers with at least 5 years' teaching experience in the Cumberland system. Article XXI, entitled "Long-Term Leaves of Absence," provides for leaves due to a teacher-exchange program, the Peace Corps, Vista, military duty, and pregnancy. Article XIX is entitled "Leaves of Absence" and lists seven different categories, 1 including section This section authorizes absence for a variety of events, including such occurrences as religious holidays, educational conferences, and participation in any legal proceeding which is related to the teacher's employment. Section E contains a catchall provision which reads:
Ms. McKeown sought her leave pursuant to this latter provision.
When the school committee denied the request, the association invoked the grievance procedure set forth in Article XXII of the agreement on behalf of Ms. McKeown. Article XXII was described as the "exclusive remedy" for the resolution of grievances. 2 Binding arbitration, before an arbitrator selected by the American Arbitration Association, was the final process for the disposition of grievances.
After a hearing on the merits in July 1975, the arbitrator made the following award:
Thereupon, the school committee brought a complaint in the Superior Court for a declaratory judgment to determine the rights of all the parties involved under the agreement and a motion to vacate the award pursuant to G.L.1956 (1968 Reenactment) § 28-9-18. In a decision dated September 23, 1976, the trial justice held that the arbitrator had, in effect, amended the agreement by granting Ms. McKeown a leave to which she was not entitled. Accordingly, he vacated the award on the ground that the arbitrator exceeded his authority.
The association is now before us on an appeal from the Superior Court judgment, contending that the trial justice exceeded his authority in vacating the arbitrator's award and in refusing to confirm it.
Before reaching the merits of the controversy, we must first address the issue of mootness. The school committee contends that Ms. McKeown did not return to the Cumberland school system after leaving for a year of study. The school committee, however, has not met its burden of establishing mootness on the record, in view of the conflicting statements in the briefs and at oral argument concerning Ms. McKeown's whereabouts and the reasons for her failure to return to her former position. There is, therefore, a real justiciable controversy before us on which we may make an effective determination. DiPrete v. Vallone, 70 R.I. 286, 289, 38 A.2d 769, 770 (1944).
Judicial authority to review or vacate arbitration awards is statutorily prescribed. Section 28-9-18 authorizes the judiciary to vacate an arbitration award only in three limited instances:
The trial justice, in vacating the award, ruled that the arbitrator "exceeded his powers." He relied in particular on a provision of the agreement (Article XXII) which prohibited the arbitrator from making any decision "amending, modifying, adding to or subtracting from the provisions of this agreement." In his view the arbitrator, in effect, created a "new classification of leave."
In Belanger v. Matteson, 115 R.I. 332, 355, 346 A.2d 124, 137-38 (1975), Cert. denied, 424 U.S. 968, 96 S.Ct. 1466, 47 L.Ed.2d 736 (1976), we noted that the judicial branch must not overlook the fact that an arbitration award is the decision of an extra-judicial tribunal which the parties themselves have created and by whose judgment they have mutually agreed to abide. The fact that the arbitrator misconstrued the contract or the law is no ground for striking down his award.
"A judicial reversal of an arbitration award based solely on the reviewing court's disagreement with the arbitrators' interpretation of the contract would not only nullify the bargain made by the parties but also threaten the strong public policy that favors private settlement of grievance disputes arising from collective bargaining agreements." Id. at 355-56, 346 A.2d at 138.
The statutory authority to vacate an arbitration award where the arbitrators "exceeded their powers" 3 does not authorize a judicial re-examination of the relevant contractual provisions. National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway, 551 F.2d 136 (7th Cir. 1977); Amicizia Societa Navegazione v. Chilean Nitrate & Iodine Sales Corp., 274 F.2d 805 (2d Cir.), Cert. denied, 363 U.S. 843, 80 S.Ct. 1612, 4 L.Ed.2d 1727 (1960). The courts are in agreement that an alleged misconstruction of the contract is not a sufficient basis for vacating an arbitration award. National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway, 551 F.2d at 142. Indeed, awards premised on "clearly erroneous" interpretations of the contract have been affirmed where the result was rationally based upon the contract. I/S Stavborg v. National Metal Converters, Inc., 500 F.2d 424, 432 (2d Cir. 1974). The proper role for the courts in this regard is to determine whether the arbitrator has resolved the grievance by considering the proper sources "the contract and those circumstances out of which comes the 'common law of the shop' " but not to determine whether the arbitrator has resolved the grievance correctly. Gorman, Labor Law 585 (1976), Quoting Safeway Stores v. American Bakery & Confectionery Workers International Union, Local 111, 390 F.2d 79, 82 (5th Cir. 1968). As long as the award "draws its essence" from the contract and is based upon a "passably plausible" interpretation of the contract, it is within the arbitrator's authority and our review must end. United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 1361, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424, 1428 (1960); Safeway Stores v. American Bakery & Confectionery Workers International Union, Local 111, 390 F.2d at 83.
The arbitrator basically relied upon three provisions of the contract in finding that certain provisions of the collective bargaining agreement had been violated when the grievant was denied a 1-year leave of absence without pay. First, Article XIX (Leaves of Absence), section E(2), of the agreement provides that "(t)eachers may be allowed additional time off for other personal reasons when such requests are considered valid by the Superintendent." Second, the opening paragraph of Article XIX recognizes the right of the school committee to make and enforce reasonable rules to ensure that there is no abuse of leave benefits. The committee agreed to discuss these rules with the teachers' association prior to their promulgation and agreed that they would be subject to a test in arbitration concerning their reasonableness and their fair and impartial administration in individual cases. 4 Finally, the arbitrator relied upon Article XXV of the agreement, which provides that the regulations and practices in effect relating to conditions of employment shall continue in force, unless the agreement provides for the contrary. The arbitrator found that the committee had not promulgated any rules relating to leaves but had established a pattern and practice of arbitrarily granting leaves (to coach a football team, to run a political campaign, etc.). The arbitrator apparently accepted the association's argument that the arbitrary granting of leaves without any rules or regulations violated the...
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