Jack Pry, Incorporated v. Drazin
Decision Date | 08 August 1961 |
Docket Number | No. 2792.,2792. |
Citation | 173 A.2d 222 |
Parties | JACK PRY, INCORPORATED, also known as Jack Pry, Ltd., Appellant, v. Harry DRAZIN, Appellee. |
Court | D.C. Court of Appeals |
Nelson Deckelbaum, Washington, D. C., with whom Milford F. Schwartz, Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellant.
Before HOOD and QUINN, Associate Judges, and SMITH, Chief Judge of The Municipal Court for the District of Columbia, sitting by designation.
This case was before us previously, D.C. Mun.App., 154 A.2d 553. Involved is substantially the same question of whether appellant's manager had apparent authority to sign a two-year lease for certain premises.
In March 1956 a two-year lease was entered into between appellee, Harry Drazin, and appellant, an automobile dealer. Warren M. York, appellant's manager, signed the lease for appellant. Drazin testified that prior to the signing of the lease by York he had negotiations with both York and Jack Pry, appellant's president. Pursuant to these negotiations, he drew up a lease for two years and left it with York. Subsequently York signed the lease for "Jack Pry Ltd.," and the corporation entered into possession of the premises. Appellee further stated that he had discussed the lease more with York than with Pry; that York appeared to be "the boss" whenever Pry was unavailable; that during appellant's occupancy he had received rent payments by checks drawn on corporations of which Jack Pry was president; and that appellant vacated the premises in March 1957 without notice.
York testified that he was employed by appellant during the period in question as general manager; that he ran the business while Pry was out of town; that he had authority to sign checks and transfer titles to automobiles; that he had signed the lease in question on behalf of appellant; that he had no specific authority to do so; that Pry had expressed the desire of entering into a lease from month to month; and that although Pry had probably seen the lease earlier, he had no knowledge of Pry seeing it after it was signed.
Pry testified that although the corporation occupied the premises, it was his impression that the lease was from month to month; that during the negotiations with appellee he indicated his desire to take the premises from month to month; that York had no authority to enter into the lease; and that he first learned of the...
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