Jack v. P & A Farms, Ltd.

• Court: Iowa Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: ZAGER
• Citation: Jack v. P & A Farms, Ltd., 822 N.W.2d 511 (Iowa 2012)
• Decision Date: 02 November 2012
• Docket Number: No. 11–0877.,11–0877.
• Parties: Leonard JACK, Appellant, v. P AND A FARMS, LTD., d/b/a Crooked Creek Shooting Preserve, Appellee.

822 N.W.2d 511

Leonard JACK, Appellant,

v.P AND A FARMS, LTD., d/b/a Crooked Creek Shooting Preserve, Appellee.

No. 11–0877.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Nov. 2, 2012.

James K. Weston II of Tom Riley Law Firm, Iowa City, for appellant.

Heather L. Carlson of McDonald, Woodward & Carlson, P.C., Davenport, for appellee.

ZAGER, Justice.

In this case we are called on to decide whether a trial court's entry of a default judgment under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.971(3) is justified when a party fails to appear personally for trial but the party's attorney is present and able to proceed in the client's absence. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's entry of a default judgment due to the plaintiff's failure to appear personally at the time of his scheduled trial. We granted further review. We now vacate the opinion of the court of appeals, reverse the judgment of the district court, and remand for trial.

I. Factual and Procedural Background.

The relevant facts in this case are undisputed. In December 2005, Leonard Jack was an employee of P and A Farms, Ltd., doing business as Crooked Creek Shooting Preserve (Crooked Creek). Crooked Creek is a game preserve located in Washington County, Iowa, and its business activities include raising mallard ducks used for training hunting dogs and for human consumption. As an employee of Crooked Creek, Jack's responsibilities included caring for the ducks, feeding the ducks, maintaining the duck pens, and cleaning ducks for customers.

Crooked Creek housed approximately 3400 ducks in a 100 foot by 200 foot pen which was exposed to the elements but covered by a net. On December 20, 2005, the pen was covered in snow and ice. Jack slipped on the ice and fell while carrying two five-gallon buckets of grain. As a result, he sustained a shoulder injury. Jack received extensive treatment for the injury including surgery at the University of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics. On May 24, 2007, Jack filed a petition at law and jury demand in the Washington County District Court alleging medical expenses of approximately $47,000.¹ He also alleged that his injury occurred within the course and scope of his employment and that at the time of his injury Crooked Creek did not have workers' compensation liability insurance as required by law. Therefore, under Iowa Code section 87.21 (2005), it was presumed that his injuries were the direct result of, and grew out of, the negligence of Crooked Creek and that such negligence was the proximate cause of his injuries. Jack alleged damages for past and future medical expenses, past and future lost wages, past and future physical pain and suffering, and past and future loss of full body.

Trial was originally set for April 1, 2008. On January 25, 2008, Jack's counsel served requests for admissions on Crooked Creek, which did not timely respond.² However, on February 8, 2008, counsel for Crooked Creek filed a motion to withdraw from representation and a motion to continue. These resisted motions were granted by the court, which set a new trial date for December 16, 2008. New counsel for Crooked Creek did not file an appearance until October 24, 2008–over seven months later. Various motions were subsequently ruled on by the court. On November 7, 2008, the court entered an order denying Crooked Creek's motion to continue the trial and ordering Jack to make himself available for deposition. The court granted Crooked Creek's motion to file untimely responses to the January 25 request for admissions and ordered the responses be filed by November 18. On November 20, Jack filed a motion to reconsider the district court's order requiring him to make himself available for deposition in Washington County, Iowa, by December 1. Therein Jack asserted that he had recently started a new job in Idaho and traveling to Iowa for both the December 1 deposition and the December 16 trial would result in him losing his job.

On November 25, 2008, Jack filed a motion to remove the case from the operation of Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.944.³ The motion indicated that counsel for both parties agreed a continuance would be in the interest of justice. This motion was granted, and the trial in this matter was continued until June 9, 2009.

On June 1, 2009, Crooked Creek filed an application to serve responses to requests for admissions. Attached to that motion were responses denying six of the requests in whole or in part. The court granted Crooked Creek's application upon finding that Jack would not be unfairly prejudiced. Trial did not take place as scheduled on June 9, 2009, and the trial was continued and rescheduled no fewer than four times at the request of each of the parties. By order entered June 24, 2010, jury trial was scheduled to begin on May 3, 2011.

On May 3, 2011, Jack failed to appear personally for trial. After the jury was impaneled, a hearing was held outside the presence of the jury. Jack's counsel informed the court that it was his understanding Jack, who had since moved to Idaho, was absent because he was “stranded.” He also indicated he had notified Jack of the trial date by letter on June 24, 2010, the same day the trial date was scheduled.

Jack's counsel requested a continuance, and Crooked Creek moved to dismiss. After the court denied the motion to continue, Jack's counsel resisted the dismissal and argued in the alternative that based on the statutory presumptions contained in Iowa Code section 87.21, and the admissions made by Crooked Creek, Jack had already made a prima facie case of negligence. Therefore, as his attorney, he should be allowed to proceed to trial without Jack being personally present to testify. He also requested the opportunity to submit Jack's deposition testimony in lieu of his trial testimony.

The district court granted Crooked Creek's motion to dismiss and entered a ruling stating:

This case was scheduled for a jury trial commencing at 9:00 a.m. on May 3, 2011. Counsel for the Plaintiff and the Defendant appeared; however, the Plaintiff failed to personally appear. Plaintiff's counsel made an oral motion to continue the trial to a later date. Defendant's counsel resisted the motion to continue and moved that the case be dismissed. The Court notes that this case has been on file since 2007, that this trial date has been set for almost a year, and that the Plaintiff received notice of the trial date. After considering the arguments of counsel, the Court finds that the Plaintiff's motion to continue the trial should be and is here by denied and that the Defendant[']s motion for dismissal should be and is hereby granted.

On May 12, Jack filed a resisted motion to enlarge or amend, requesting that the district court enter a ruling addressing his counsel's proposition to proceed to trial in Jack's absence. He also requested that the district court reconsider its denial of his motion for continuance. The court granted the motion to enlarge or amend and added the following language to its previous ruling:

This lawsuit was commenced May 24th, 2007. Both parties were notified on June 24th, 2010 that the jury trial was scheduled to start at 9:30 a.m. on May 3rd, 2011.

Plaintiff Leonard Jack failed to appear for his jury trial on May 3rd. Attorney for Jack orally asked the Court to continue the trial minutes before it was to start. Defendants resisted any continuance and were ready to proceed. The court finds that the attorney for Plaintiff failed to state any good cause for continuing the trial.

Additionally, acting pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Pro[cedure] 1.971(3), the Court finds Leonard Jack to be in default when he failed to be present for trial.

On June 3, 2011, Jack filed a notice of appeal, and we transferred the case to the court of appeals. A majority of the three-judge panel of the court of appeals affirmed the holding that dismissal was appropriate under rule 1.971(3) and that Jack's absence prevented Crooked Creek from cross-examining him, which is essential to a fair trial. The majority also found that it was within the district court's discretion to decline to order a less drastic remedy. The dissenting judge wrote separately, concurring in part and dissenting in part. In her view, rule 1.971(3) did not require dismissal in a case such as this where a party was not personally present for trial, but his counsel appeared on his behalf and requested to proceed to trial.

II. Standard of Review.

“A decision to grant or deny a motion for default judgment rests in the sound discretion of the trial court.” See Wilson v. Liberty Mut. Grp., 666 N.W.2d 163, 165 (Iowa 2003). Reversal is only warranted upon a finding that the court's discretion has been abused. Id. Similarly, we review a district court's decision to grant or deny a motion for continuance for abuse of discretion. Hawkeye Bank & Trust, Nat'l Ass'n v. Baugh, 463 N.W.2d 22, 26 (Iowa 1990). However, this case turns on the interpretation of Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.971(3), and we review the interpretation of our rules of civil procedure for correction of errors at law. Reis v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 787 N.W.2d 61, 66 (Iowa 2010); see also Whitley v. C.R. Pharmacy Serv., Inc., 816 N.W.2d 378, 389 n. 6 (Iowa 2012) (“When a discretionary decision by a trial court involves an erroneous interpretation of law, our review is for legal error.”).

III. Discussion.

A. Default Judgment Under Rule 1.971(3). A default judgment is a judgment against the party who has failed to take the next step required in the progress of a lawsuit. Kirby v. Holman, 238 Iowa 355, 374, 25 N.W.2d 664, 674 (1947). Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.971 governs default judgments and subsection 3 states, “A party shall be in default whenever that party ... [f]ails to be present for trial.” We do not have any cases interpreting the word “party” as it appears in rule 1.971(3) or indicating whether the rule permits a party's counsel to appear on behalf of a party who is not personally present.⁴ Nor...