Jack v. Scanlon, 3467

• Court: Appellate Court of Connecticut
• Citation: 495 A.2d 1084,4 Conn.App. 451
• Decision Date: 09 July 1985
• Docket Number: No. 3467,3467
• Parties: Daniel JACK II v. William SCANLON et al.

Page 1084

495 A.2d 1084 4 Conn.App. 451 Daniel JACK II
v.
William SCANLON et al. No. 3467. Appellate Court of Connecticut. Argued May 9, 1985.
Decided July 9, 1985.

Page 1086

[4 Conn.App. 452] Howard B. Field, III, Glastonbury, for appellants (defendants).

Richard P. Weinstein, West Hartford, for appellee (plaintiff).

Before [4 Conn.App. 451] HULL, BORDEN and SPALLONE, JJ.

[4 Conn.App. 452] BORDEN, Judge.

This appeal raises as its principal issues the propriety and constitutionality of an award of double damages pursuant to General Statutes § 14-295. The case arose from the following facts: The plaintiff was southbound on a highway divided by a median strip. The defendant, ¹ driving a rented car, was northbound. At a break in the median, he prepared to make a left turn. In so doing, his car crossed into the southbound lane, in which the plaintiff was driving. The two cars collided. The plaintiff suffered injuries, and brought this [4 Conn.App. 453] action seeking compensatory damages. The plaintiff was permitted to amend his complaint, over the defendant's objection, to add claims for exemplary damages and double or treble damages pursuant to General Statutes § 14-295.

The defendant admitted negligence but not recklessness as alleged in the complaint. A hearing in damages was held and the jury awarded compensatory damages in the amount of $22,000. The award was accepted by the court. The court then considered the plaintiff's claim for damages pursuant to General Statutes § 14-295 upon the same evidence, and found that the defendant's conduct warranted an award of double the compensatory damages, increasing the damages to $44,000. The court also assessed exemplary damages, which the parties agreed would be one half of the jury's award of compensatory damages, or $11,000. The total recovery by the plaintiff was $55,000.

On appeal, the defendant challenges the propriety of the court's award of double damages pursuant to General Statutes § 14-295, and its consideration, when making

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that award, of evidence that the defendant was driving after drinking. The defendant further claims that General Statutes § 14-295 is unconstitutional because it lacks sufficient standards to guide the court in its decision whether to double or treble damages. ² We find no error.

The court's application of General Statutes § 14-295 was proper. The statute permits the assessment of double or treble damages against "[e]ach person who, by neglecting to conform to any provision of sections 14-230 to 14-242, inclusive, or section 14-245, or 14-247, causes any injury to the person or property of another ... if, in the discretion of the court in which any action is pending, double or treble damages are just ...."

[4 Conn.App. 454] The defendant admitted the allegations of the complaint which asserted liability. His liability, by those assertions, had numerous bases, including acts which amounted to a violation of General Statutes § 14-242 for which double or treble damages may be assessed pursuant to § 14-295, as well as other acts of negligence for which double or treble damages are not properly assessed. Since the defendant's admitted liability was based, in part, on a violation of one of the statutes mentioned in § 14-295, double or treble damages could properly be considered by the court.

The ultimate determination of damages pursuant to § 14-295, however, requires that liability be wholly based on a violation of one of the statutes enumerated. Leone v. Knighton, 196 Conn. 494, 496, 493 A.2d 887 (1985). This requirement is clearly enunciated in cases applying the general verdict rule, which prohibits this type of statutory damages if it is not clear from a jury's verdict that liability was found solely on a basis authorized by that statute. See DeMilo v. West Haven, 189 Conn. 671, 676, 458 A.2d 362 (1983); Tillinghast v. Leppert, 93 Conn. 247, 250, 105 A. 615 (1919); Broschart v. Tuttle, 59 Conn. 1, 8-9, 21 A. 925 (1890). This requirement is also founded on the principle that statutes imposing a penalty should be read strictly. Dunbar v. Jones, 87 Conn. 253, 256, 87 A. 787 (1913); Cantor v. State Board of Electrical Examiners, 3 Conn.App. 707, 710, 492 A.2d 194 (1985).

The requirement that the defendant's liability rest on a statutory foundation was met. The court found in its oral decision on the statutory damages that the evidence before it, ³ including the defendant's admission[4 Conn.App. 455] that he made a left turn without stopping for the plaintiff's approaching car, indicated that the specific basis of the defendant's liability was the violation of General Statutes § 14-242. This is one of the statutory violations listed in § 14-295 as a permissible basis for awarding double or treble damages. The court, therefore, properly went on to determine, pursuant to § 14-295, if this was a situation in which double or treble damages would be just.

Awards of double or treble damages under § 14-295 are not required simply because a defendant has been found to have violated one of the named statutes. Rather, such damages are assessed based on the degree of the defendant's culpability. Cristilly v. Warner, 87 Conn. 461, 469, 88 A. 711 (1913) (Beach, J., dissenting), overruled on other grounds, Daury v. Ferraro,

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108 Conn. 386, 143 A. 630 (1928); Goldfarb v. Bragg, 39 Conn.Sup. 228, 229, 475 A.2d 346 (1983); Eustace v. Adley Express Co., 1 Conn.Sup. 58, 59 (1935). As aptly stated in Eustace v. Adley Express Co., supra, and reiterated in Goldfarb v. Bragg, supra, "the imposition of the penalty of double or treble damages should be...