Jack v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., C 92-3787 BAC
Decision Date | 25 April 1994 |
Docket Number | No. C 92-3787 BAC,C 92-3787 BAC |
Citation | 854 F. Supp. 654 |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of California |
Parties | David and Barbara JACK, et al., Plaintiffs, v. TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC., et al., Defendants. And Related Actions. |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
Gerald C. Sterns, Sterns, Walker & Lods, San Francisco, CA, for plaintiffs.
Stephen C. Kenney, Kenney, Burd, Knutson & Markowitz, San Francisco, CA, William C. Brown, III, Bigham, Englar, Jones & Houston, New York City, for defendants.
AMENDED ORDER
The order of the court entered March 4, 1994 regarding summary judgment is amended to read as follows:
BACKGROUND
On July 30, 1992, Trans World Airlines flight 843, departing New York's John F. Kennedy Airport for San Francisco, experienced an aborted takeoff, crash and fire. Fire completely destroyed the plane but all passengers survived. During the aborted takeoff and evacuation, many passengers suffered minor physical injuries. Many passengers were traumatized by the incident.
Flight 843 passengers filed several lawsuits in San Francisco Superior Court, seeking damages for physical injury and emotional distress. Defendant Trans World Airlines, Inc. ("TWA") removed to federal court the three actions in which the plaintiffs held tickets for international flights. This court previously denied plaintiffs' motion to remand to state court and held that the sole basis of recovery available to passengers injured while traveling pursuant to contracts of international carriage was under the Multilateral Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, opened for signature October 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000 (1934), T.S. No. 876, reprinted at 49 U.S.C.App. § 1502 note (1988) (hereinafter, the "Warsaw Convention" or "Convention").
Defendant TWA now moves for partial summary judgment on several grounds. TWA moves for partial summary judgment against plaintiffs claiming physical injuries and emotional distress on the ground that emotional distress damages are not allowed as to those plaintiffs who did not have physical manifestations of emotional distress. TWA moves for partial summary judgment against plaintiffs claiming emotional distress only on the ground that such claims are barred by Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 111 S.Ct. 1489, 113 L.Ed.2d 569 (1991) (hereinafter "Floyd"). TWA moves for partial summary judgment on the state law causes of action on the ground that they are preempted by the Warsaw Convention. Finally, TWA moves for partial summary judgment on the punitive damages claims on the ground that such damages are not allowed under the Warsaw Convention.
Plaintiffs make several legal arguments in opposition to the motion and present evidence which they contend requires denial of the motion. Much of the evidence submitted by plaintiffs was challenged by TWA.
Summary judgment is appropriate where "there are no genuine issues as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A genuine issue exists if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party," Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986), and material facts are those "that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law," id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. All reasonable inferences from the evidence must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. Id. at 242, 106 S.Ct. at 2505.
At the hearing on TWA's motion, plaintiffs' counsel argued for the first time that the motion was premature because of the limited discovery allowed in this case under the Joint Pretrial Order of September 28, 1993. The court is unpersuaded by this argument. The Joint Pretrial Order provided for discovery in three phases; the cases have not moved beyond Phase 1. The assertion that plaintiffs were prevented from gathering evidence to present a meaningful opposition to TWA's motion simply is not supported by the Joint Pretrial Order. The discovery permitted in Phase 1 included, without limitation, obtaining plaintiffs' medical records from July 1, 1988 through the present, depositions of plaintiffs, depositions of treating doctors, and ten interrogatories regarding damages. Any information relevant to the issues raised by TWA's motions was discoverable in Phase 1. Moreover, the information plaintiffs needed is and was in their own hands and not in the hands of third parties.
Plaintiffs' counsel's suggestion that TWA sandbagged plaintiffs by using the original interrogatory responses is meritless. TWA had no duty to use different discovery tools such as depositions and requests for admissions to confirm information it had received in plaintiffs' responses to interrogatories. Nor may plaintiffs claim that TWA's reliance on the original interrogatory responses was unjustified. Plaintiffs' counsel told TWA's counsel at the June 1993 mediation that amended responses to the interrogatories immediately would be forthcoming. TWA filed its motions four months later, without having received the amended responses.
Upon receipt of TWA's motion, plaintiffs requested an extension of the deadline to file their oppositions because they anticipated it would "take an enormous amount of time and energy to oppose" the motions. The court granted a four-week extension. Plaintiffs continued to submit evidence in support of their opposition long after the extended deadline for the opposition had passed. This evidence was not rejected as untimely.
Among the evidence submitted by plaintiffs in opposition to TWA's motions were affidavits of plaintiffs, attorneys, a psychiatrist, a biomechanic, and an engineer; photographs and videotapes of the incident; and original as well as amended interrogatory responses. The court will address the problems presented by plaintiffs' evidence before turning to the other issues raised by the motions.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) permits the use of affidavits in support of or opposition to a motion for summary judgment. An affidavit must be confirmed by oath or affirmation. Brady v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Texas, Inc., 767 F.Supp. 131, 135 (N.D.Tex.1991). In lieu of an affidavit, a party may submit an unsworn declaration made under penalty of perjury. 28 U.S.C. § 1746. Declarations executed outside of the United States must be declared to be made "under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America." Id. All declarations must be declared to be "true and correct."
Plaintiffs submitted numerous affidavits1 containing the following language: "I name declare under penalty of perjury and of the laws of foreign country, the State of California and the United States of America as follows:" (emphasis and bracketed material added). Most of the affidavits were executed outside of the United States.2
On January 11, 1994, the court ordered twenty-four of plaintiffs' affidavits stricken because they were neither confirmed by oath or affirmation nor stated to be true and correct and made under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America.3 The affiants failed to strictly or even substantially comply with the requirements for execution of affidavits and declarations. The court permitted the plaintiffs to submit replacement affidavits free of the described defects.
Plaintiffs resubmitted the same affidavits after making changes only on the first page of each to correct the recitations that the document was made under penalty of perjury and that the statements made were true and correct. The changed documents were not re-executed by plaintiffs and there was no marking on the affidavits that the changes had been made with the affiants' permission. By changing the text of document after they had been signed, plaintiffs created a new problem. These documents altered after execution are unacceptable and are stricken from the record.4
Witness testimony translated from a foreign language must be properly authenticated and any interpretation must be shown to be an accurate translation done by a competent translator. See Fed.R.Evid. 604 and 901.
Signed foreign language versions of affidavits were attached to several of the plaintiffs' English-language affidavits. Originally, plaintiffs offered no explanation of any translation. In its January 11, 1994 order, the court directed plaintiffs to submit appropriate evidence regarding the accuracy of any translation and the qualifications of the translator. Plaintiffs then submitted a statement by an individual at a local translation center stating that the translations were true and correct. That statement is inadequate in that it is not a sworn statement, does not describe the maker's qualification or expertise regarding language translation, does not state whether the maker did the translations, and does not explain the circumstances under which the affiants signed affidavits in two languages (e.g., whether the affiants were advised of the content of the English-language affidavits before signing them). Plaintiffs have failed to lay a proper foundation for the admission of the translated affidavits.5
A party cannot create a genuine issue of fact merely by submitting testimony which contradicts, without explanation, his earlier sworn testimony. Radobenko v. Automated Equipment Corp., 520 F.2d 540, 543-44 (9th Cir.1975). Sham affidavits may be disregarded in summary judgment proceedings. This rule ...
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